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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the Nigeria – Benin international boundary, around the 
Yoruba geo-cultural space. The primary research question, which the study is 
centred on, is the assessment of the impact of partition on the Yoruba identity and 
group relations 
The study relies on the multidisciplinary approach in the analysis of the 
boundary and the people it partitions. Multidisciplinarity is particularly required 
for such a study as this in order to accommodate the various nuances, which a 
specific disciplinary approach would not be able to adequately cater for.  
The methodology utilised in answering the research question was the 
historicised case-study, which relied on field work in the specific borderland 
communities astride the Nigeria – Benin boundary as well as archival research. It 
also relies on a content analysis of the news media as well as government 
publication. The secondary sources of data are collected from extant literature on 
the theme of African boundaries. 
The study finds that contrary to the expectation in the research literature that 
the partition would have a disruptive effect on the Yoruba, the peculiar 
characteristics of the group created a buffer, which resisted change. Thus, the 
Yoruba identity has remained relatively unscathed by the forces of colonisation 
and contrasting socialisation processes. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
International boundaries in Africa are colonial creations; they were 
deliberately determined by rival colonial authorities following intensive struggles 
and competitions for territories all over the continent. Although boundaries 
everywhere are artificial and largely arbitrary and forcefully imposed, the 
magnitude, duration as well as the process of boundary making in Africa make its 
case more dramatic and problematic (Anene, 1970; Asiwaju, cited in Anderson, 
1996). Unlike in Europe
1
 where the evolution of boundaries was gradual and 
evolved essentially, over three centuries,
2
 the delimitation of African boundaries 
was completed in less than three decades.
3
 Though the boundaries were 
determined in a hurry, this did not pose as many problems as the fact that they 
were imposed with little or no consultation with the Africans. Thus, the 
supposedly self-determined boundaries that predated the colonial intervention 
were undermined. The emergent boundary regime, among others, dismembered 
several pre-existing ethnic groups into two or more nation-states (Coleman, 1958; 
Hargreaves, 1963 and 1984; Anene, 1970; Asiwaju, 1985 and 2001; Phiri, 1985). 
Once ethnic groups are divided by state boundaries, the fractions tend to grow 
along different paths, developing contrasting loyalties, languages, values and 
economies (Asiwaju, 1985; Sahlins, 1989). Furthermore, in the process of the 
                                               
1 The contemporary state system is European in origin; it was from here that the model was diffused 
everywhere else, essentially through colonialism. 
2 Even though the Westphalian state emerged from Europe, the boundaries of the European state are 
not a settled reality. Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, new state boundaries 
emerged; and in places like the Cerdanya and Basque regions between France and Spain, state 
boundaries are still being contested. In other words, the boundary making process is current even at 
the source of the Westphalian state system. 
3 Interstate boundaries in Africa were determined essentially between 1885 and 1914 by which time 
the present map of the continent had almost evolved. 
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colonial determination of boundaries in Africa, some ethnic (tribal) groups were 
divided into spheres of influence of different colonial lords, some of which were 
engaged in bitter and fierce competition for territories in one another‟s spheres of 
influence.   
As boundaries function to separate and exclude, the incidence of identical 
cultures on both sides of an international boundary holds significant implications 
for post-partition (post-independent) interstate relations in Africa. Ethnic loyalties 
compel inter-group relations whether or not the group is wholly located within a 
single country or split between countries. Thus, there exists a wide range of 
relationships between parts of partitioned groups across interstate boundaries in 
Africa (Phiri, 1985). The corpus of the negative and positive implications of these 
relationships, including problems of nationality and citizenship, irredentism, trade 
and commerce, territorial dispute, cooperation and integrative linkages, and so on, 
is the subject of this study with the Yoruba divided between Nigeria and Benin as 
the focus. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
 This study investigates the impact of the colonial partition of the Yoruba 
divided between Nigeria and Benin. Central to the study is the „dismemberment‟ 
of the Yoruba group and culture area by the colonial boundary that was 
determined with little or no consultation with the group and whose interests were 
not part of the consideration in the process (Griffiths, 1986). The fractions fell 
under different colonial administrations and expectedly followed different 
developmental trajectories. The fraction in present-day Nigeria fell under the 
control of Britain while the part in Benin fell under French colonial 
administration. As the different fractions are exposed to centripetal forces of 
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integration within the states in which they are located, they are further pulled apart 
from the part included in the other country (Asiwaju, 1984). 
 The pertinent research question is what is the impact of the colonial partition 
on the Yoruba identity? To answer this question, it is necessary to explore related 
questions and issues, which would further enhance the analysis of the research 
question.  These questions and issues are: did the Yoruba as we have come to 
know it today exist before the partition? If it did, did the culture area of the group 
occupy a continuous stretch of territory? Is it possible to talk of disruption of ties 
by the imposition of boundary? What are the discourses of disruption? Such 
interrogation is necessary because at the formal level, that is, state/government, 
the boundary is regarded as the jurisdictional extent of territoriality and 
sovereignty, separating citizens from aliens; while at the informal level, that is, 
the people/groups, it could very well be regarded as an administrative line, and no 
more! People still cross the boundary as though it is not there (Phiri, 1985).  
What is responsible for the absence of conflicts and tensions along the 
boundary in spite of great potentials for irredentism occasioned by the presence of 
the Yoruba partitioned between the states, contrary to the conventional wisdom in 
the literature around the time of independence in Africa? Furthermore, there exists 
a wide range of trans-border below-the-state interactions between members of the 
partitioned group that may be potentially conflict-prone and inimical to the 
forging of nationhood in these states, yet this region has been largely conflict 
free.
4
 
Moreover, many early independent African leaders were pan-Africanist in 
outlook and they sought vigorously for pan-African political integration based on 
                                               
4 Indeed, this boundary line is the most stable among Nigeria‟s territorial borders. 
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the revision or eradication of the colonial boundaries as they were regarded as 
anomalous contraptions that have only succeeded in fostering competition and 
rivalry rather than cooperation among African states. Yet almost fifty years after 
independence, these boundaries, as inherited from the colonialists have remained 
the basis for ordering interstate relations rather than the massive redrawing 
anticipated by many African and Africanist writers. This study investigates the 
reasons behind the resilience and stability of African boundaries; the nature of the 
relationship between parts of a partitioned group and the ensuing inter-state 
relations between neighbouring states with an ethnic group astride their shared 
boundary. 
In specific terms, the substantive research question which this study 
attempts to answer is: what has been the impact of partition on the Yoruba 
identity? The related sub-research questions are: 
1. What was the manner of the boundary making process? Were Africans 
involved in the process? What roles did they play? This question addresses the 
issues surrounding the debate regarding the roles of Africans in the boundary 
making process. Were the Yoruba involved in the process of partitioning their 
territory, would the present map be located where it is presently? In other 
words, would the Yoruba be partitioned into two had they been actively 
involved in the negotiations and agreements leading to the determination of 
the Nigeria – Benin boundary?  
2. What are the reactions of the bifurcated people to the boundary and how do 
they negotiate it? Boundaries are meant to divide and separate, especially 
those which partitioned homogenous groups into competing spheres of 
influence. Has the boundary under investigation really functioned as a 
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rampart, keeping the partitioned fractions of the group apart? How do the 
Yoruba negotiate it?  
3. Unadjusted inherited boundaries were thought, in the years leading to 
independence and just beyond, to create continental upheavals. Have these 
expectations come to pass? What are the dynamics of boundary discourse 
(state versus group perceptions) and how has that affected the function of this 
boundary in the post-colonial period? What are the consequences of 
contemporary globalisation on the role of the African boundary? 
1.3 Justification of Study 
 The creations of state boundaries have seldom been the result of democratic 
consensus or plebiscite (Anderson, 1996). This, and the peculiarity of the 
determination of boundaries in Africa make its boundaries generally problematic; 
this is no less so with Nigeria. Even though, there have been no violent disputes 
with its neighbours,
5
 which makes the case with Cameroon over Bakassi the 
exception, there is abundant evidence that border lines create a wide variety of 
political tensions, and hold significant potential for conflict. The Somali and Ewe 
irredentism are ready examples of boundary problems emanating from bifurcated 
groups. It was expected that West Africa, especially, would face a lot of 
irredentist agitations given the sheer number of partitioned groups along its 
boundaries. Yet, the Ewe Irredentism has proved to be the exception rather than 
the rule. One of the main justifications for this study will be to explore the 
absence of irredentism and other related problems in West Africa, especially at 
the Nigeria-Benin axis on the one hand; on the other hand, the study will examine 
                                               
5 With the exception of the Chadian incursion into some northern states in the early 1980s, which 
almost led to confrontation between Nigeria and Chad, Nigeria has enjoyed peaceful relationship 
with all its neighbours. 
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the potentialities for cooperation and integration in the region given its pre-
colonial interdependence as well as the bridge-building potentials of boundaries, 
especially those straddled by identical culture groups.  
Although, African boundaries have been subjects of intense analysis since 
independence, these studies are focused on historical, spatial, economic and legal 
aspects. However, there has not been much emphasis on the political implications 
for states that host the partitioned groups as well as the nature of the ensuing inter-
state relations. This study seeks to bridge this gap by providing the political 
implications for the states as well as for the region. 
 Another major justification for this study is the need to confront received 
wisdom regarding the pattern of the pre-colonial arrangement of this society. The 
general trend in the literature appears to follow the conventional wisdom that the 
pre-colonial spatial arrangement of society in (West) Africa was characterised by 
identifiably distinct groups. What this position overlooks is that all over Africa, 
societies were separated from one another by large tracts of unclaimed and 
unoccupied territories. This presupposes that it was almost impossible to have a 
continuous spread of a culture area of the extent being claimed for the Yoruba in 
the literature. This study examines alternative concepts such as dispersal and 
Diaspora community in understanding the geographical spread of the Yoruba 
culture area as evidenced by the observable pattern of the location of the group in 
a disjointed spread from western Nigeria through midland Benin to certain 
enclaves in Togo. 
Furthermore, in recent times, there has been a dearth of academic activities 
focused on boundaries in Africa contrary to what obtains elsewhere, particularly 
in Europe. This study therefore is set to provide:  
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i, the political and international relations dimensions of boundary-partitioned 
groups and;  
ii, an up-to-date analysis of international boundary study in (West) Africa. 
1.4 Scope of Study 
 The study area is the border region (frontier zone) between Nigeria and Benin 
as well as the region lying just behind it. It corresponds roughly to the South-
western part of Nigeria and the east-central part of Benin, that is, the region 
occupied by the Yoruba in these countries. Yoruba locations in Togo will also be 
included in the field of study as stated in the methodology. The study adopts a 
historicised approach, thus, it will cover pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
eras. However, particular emphasis will be on the post-colonial period for the 
analysis of inter-group, inter-state relations and sub-regional integration.   
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 Chapter 1 presents the general introduction to the thesis. It introduces the 
theme of the study, the research problem, scope and justification. It also presents 
an overview of the structure of the study. 
 Chapter 2 is concerned with the review of extant literature on international 
boundaries generally, and African boundaries in particular. The function of this 
chapter is to develop an hypothesis for the thesis to test in answer to the research 
question. The first section deals with the historical evolution of boundaries in 
Europe. The next section then considers the approaches to boundary study, which 
is a reflection of the treatment of boundaries by policy-makers that has curiously 
shaped the academic research on the subject. Section 3 reviews literature on the 
evolution of boundaries in (West) Africa following the European Scramble and 
the Berlin West African Conference. The chapter closes with an examination of 
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the territorial extent of the Yoruba group, in order to justify the geographic scope 
of the study. 
 Methodology, which is a critical aspect of research, is the subject of chapter 
3. It begins by justifying the research methodology, as distinct from earlier studies 
of the subject. It then describes the methods of data collection, using a 
multidisciplinary approach. The rationale for the research methodology adopted is 
also provided. Similarly, the limitations of the data collection techniques are also 
identified. 
 Chapter 4 sets out the historical background of the study. As the study adopts 
the historicised case study approach, this chapter provides the historical basis of 
the study by examining and analysing the consequences of boundary making on 
the specific Yoruba societies. The chapter is divided into the pre-colonial and the 
colonial periods, in order to be able to assess the impact of the imposition of 
boundary and colonial rule on the case study. 
 The theme of chapter 5 is the consolidation of colonial rule as well as the 
reactions of the partitioned Yoruba subgroups to foreign rule and territorial 
differentiation. It examines the different colonial administrations and the impacts 
of contrasting socialisation processes on the Yoruba group identity and ethnic 
affinity. It also focuses on the responses of the group to their separation, and 
subsequent inclusion in competing spheres of influence. Furthermore, the chapter 
highlights the development of contrasting and competing discourses of the 
boundary. 
 Post-colonial interstate relationship is the subject of chapter 6. The purpose of 
this chapter, relating to the research question, is to examine the impact of the 
reification of the African border in the post-colonial period on partitioned groups 
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and interstate relations. It begins with an analysis of the OAU Resolution and its 
implications for post-colonial interstate relations in Africa. The chapter then 
examines the relationship between Nigeria and Benin, which it arranges into three 
stages, highlighting the significance of each stage and the factors that translated 
one stage into the other. It also considers the „unofficial-official‟ discourse of the 
boundary, which it claims is partly responsible for the inability of the states to 
effectively control their borders, especially in relations to the sustenance of 
clandestine cross-border activities. 
Chapter 7 investigates the inability of the two states to respond to 
challenges to their sovereign control over (the Yoruba) border. The chapter 
demonstrates the disparity between the responses of the state to the border and 
those of the Yoruba people. It also highlights the impact or otherwise of 
globalising forces on state sovereignty in this part of West Africa. 
Chapter 8 presents the summary and the conclusion, which includes the 
contributions of the study to the theme of boundary and partitioned groups in 
Africa. The chapter concludes with an agenda for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2:1 Introduction and Origin of Boundaries 
The purpose of this chapter is to review extant literature on international 
boundaries generally, with a specific focus on African boundaries, especially the 
Nigeria – Benin boundary. The objective being the development of an hypothesis 
for the thesis to test in answer to the principal research question. The chapter 
begins by historicising the contending perspectives on geographical boundaries. 
Second, it examines the disputations around the concept of boundary. Third, it 
focuses on colonially-constructed boundaries in Africa, emphasising the making 
of the boundary between Nigeria and Benin.  
Geographically, the notion of boundary is universal (Foucher, 1988); 
boundary is also an important part of human social organisation (Alexander, 1963; 
Anene, 1970; Anderson, 1996).  Through the ages, boundaries have remained the 
„container‟ by which national space is delineated and „contained‟ (Anderson and 
O‟Dowd, 1999). 
For as long as there has been human society based on territoriality and 
space, there have been boundaries (Cukwurah, 1967; DeBlij, 1973). Little wonder 
that boundary studies have been the concern of scholars since classical times, 
through the middle ages to the present times. Although, the concept has evolved 
through the ages, from zones of separation to frontiers (no man‟s land); or border 
regions and finally to its present form as a finite line of division, it has remained 
(either as frontier or boundary) a zone/line indicating the extent of the area of 
jurisdiction of one independent political community in relation to another 
(Weigert, et al, 1957; DeBlij, 1973). For instance, in the ancient Greek city-state, 
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boundary was the extent of the city representing the enclave of subjects and slaves 
who were subject to the rules as well as the protection of the rulers of the city and 
beyond which were barbarians who were unwelcome and prevented from the city 
which marked civilisation or citizenship (van Creveld, 1999).  
The emergence of modern boundaries as finite delimiters of geopolitical 
space evolved gradually over the ages, beginning from zones of separation or „no-
man‟s land‟, to the frontier, and finally, to the definite „line on map‟. The Treaty 
of Westphalia and the Enlightenment were crucial to the development of the finite 
boundary. The Treaty of Westphalia heralded the advent of the modern state 
system with its requirement for definite territorial sovereignty, while the 
Enlightenment was a period marked by rationalism, increasing empiricism, 
reductionism and scientific rigour. In other words, the Enlightenment engendered 
new ways of thinking, which influenced the contemporary thoughts on 
territoriality as fixed lines and definite boundaries which were preferred over 
zonal boundaries (Taylor, 1985). In the medieval period, authority over territory 
was shifting and overlapping. The transformation of the conception of 
territoriality involved the merging of delimited territory with exclusive authority 
(Zacher, 2001: 216). Since then, giant strides have been made in boundary making 
with the invention of sophisticated survey equipment and mapping methods, 
which aided the quest for definite boundaries as the juridical limits of territorial 
sovereignty.  
Crucial to the establishment of boundaries as finite delimiters of 
geopolitical space is the concept of territoriality. Territoriality is the „attempt by 
an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena or 
relationships, by delimiting or asserting control over a geographic area‟ (Sack, 
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1986: 19). This behaviour is territoriality and the area of control is the territory 
(Sack, 1983). In other words, territoriality is a „spatial strategy‟ which actively 
uses territory and boundary to „provide classification, communication and 
enforcement; it regulates information, symbols, resources and people‟ (Sack, 
1986: 32) by delimiting and asserting control over territorial boundaries. 
Territoriality is thus characterised by enforcement of control over access to a 
geographic space as well as to things within it, or to things outside by restraining 
those within and outside its confines. In other words, territories would be 
meaningless without the attendant ability to exercise control and ownership, 
which sovereignty provides. 
  Foucault‟s (1977) study of governmentality explains the manner in which 
states organise practices of control, discipline and exclusion in order to engender 
unity and homogeneity of the state. This implies that the state is to be regarded as 
an effect of both disciplinary practices which seek to guarantee the security of its 
territory by differentiating it from, and securing it against all forms of external 
threats (Devetak, 1995). Territorial sovereignty forcefully marks the boundary 
between inside and outside as the limits of the territory denoted by boundaries 
signifying simultaneously what is external to the states and what is internal to 
them (Devetak, 1995: 26).  
Closely related to the concept of territoriality is the concept of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty implies a superior and absolute authority within a given domain of 
power. The relationship between territoriality and sovereignty did not evolve until 
the Treaty of Westphalia when the two concepts were welded together as the 
nucleus of the modern state system (Taylor, 1985: 96). The Treaty provided for 
the sovereignty of each state and made provisions against external interference in 
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the domestic affairs of the state, which was regarded as the first offence of 
international law. Article 64 of the Treaty of Westphalia states without 
equivocation that „and to prevent for the future and Differences arising from in the 
Politick State, all and everyone of the Electors, Princes and States of the Roman 
Empire, are so establish‟d and confirm‟d in their antient6 Rights, Prerogatives, 
Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of territorial rights…that they never can or 
ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence‟. 
In other words, in relation to the state, the Treaty codified the basic principles of 
territorial integrity, border inviolability, and supremacy of the state (rather than 
the Church); effectively establishing the basis of territorial sovereignty.  
The legal concept of sovereignty was backed by a „hard shell‟ of defences, 
in this instance, the territorial boundaries, which made the violation of territorial 
sovereignty an international offence demanding collective action, thus becoming 
the ultimate unit of protection (Taylor, 1985). Ruggie (1989) argues that not until 
the essence of the newly emergent territorial states was defined by the possession 
of territory and the exclusion of others did the international system evolve an 
ordering principle.  
To Anderson (1996: 4), the boundary „acquired a mythical significance in 
building nations and political identities‟. In terms of building nations and political 
identities, boundaries could be classified into two principal categories, one based 
on origin and the other on cultural relationship which will further enhance our 
understanding of the nature and implications of boundaries on divided societies. 
Alexander (1963) distinguishes between generic and functional classifications of 
boundaries. The generic classification is based on origin and consists of four types 
                                               
6 Obsolete use for ancient 
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– physical, ethnic, historical and geometric. The functional classification is based 
on cultural relationships, which is related to the ethnic type under the generic 
classification. This classification is anthropological in that it considers boundaries 
in relation to the human aspect of the landscape such as patterns of settlement, 
land utilisation and population distribution. This category is sub-classified into: 
antecedent, superimposed and consequent. For the purpose of this study, this 
classification, that is, functional (based on cultural relationships) will be explored 
in detail. 
 Antecedent boundaries were created before the present cultural landscape 
developed. The territory had been pre-partitioned before the development of 
human societies or cultural features of the area, such as the pattern of economic 
activities, arrangement of roads, settlement patterns and so on. Kapil (1966: 657) 
contends that antecedent boundaries refer to the situation „where political 
boundaries have been formally allocated before human settlement has taken place, 
or at least before socio-cultural features, such as industrial growth, markets or 
regions of articulation and movement have had time to develop‟. The boundary 
between the United States and Canada, west of Lake Superior is antecedent 
(Alexander, 1963).
7
 However, contrary to his (Alexander‟s) claim that many 
African boundaries are antecedent,
8
 boundaries in the continent are superimposed. 
This is because contrary to antecedent boundary, a superimposed boundary is only 
delimited after the development of the human pattern of the area had taken place. 
Such boundaries (often termed subsequent) cut through the cultural pattern of the 
                                               
7 The Treaty of Washington settled territorial disputes between the United States and British North 
America by determining the boundary on the western part of Lake Superior to the Pacific before the 
development of the human features of the area. 
8 This perception may not be unconnected with the European treatment of Africa, which was 
regarded as „unpeopled‟ and without territoriality in their Scramble for territory and subsequent 
partitioning of the continent. 
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area and are thus superimposed on the pre-existing social formations. Boundaries 
in Africa are superimposed in that these boundaries were established long after the 
area had evolved established territorial patterns, which the imposed boundaries 
subsequently disordered. Reader (1997: 127) rightly contends that colonially-
superimposed boundaries in Africa „cut through 177 ethnic culture areas, dividing 
pre-existing economic and social units and distorting the development of the 
entire region‟.  
Could the dismemberment of indigenous African societies have been 
avoided? Did the colonialists deliberately partition these societies or were 
attempts made to prevent the division? Some have argued that territorial 
boundaries should be coterminous with ethnic boundaries, claiming that that 
would ameliorate the divisive impact of territorial boundaries, as well as the 
„suffocating‟ tendencies arising from the lumping together of disparate groups 
within the newly contrived states (Soyinka, Mazrui, and wa Mutua, in Asiwaju, 
2003). However, would ethnically determined territorial boundaries be problem 
free? Indeed, in the colonial metropolis, the state is an assortment of diverse 
ethnic groups that suggests that ethnic based boundaries are simply not the norm. 
Yet another level of distinction can be made in the study of boundaries; 
this is the externally (superimposed) and internally (negotiated) determined 
boundary. This distinction is of great importance to this study as African 
boundaries were externally determined. Externally determined boundaries are 
imposed by outsiders whose own interests are the sole consideration in the 
partitioning. This is true of interstate boundaries in Africa. As Griffiths submits, 
„African boundaries were drawn by Europeans, for Europeans and, apart from 
localised details, paid scant regard to Africa, let alone Africans‟ (Griffiths, 1986: 
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204). Thus, Africans do not consider these boundaries as dividing them, but the 
colonialists who needed definite lines to distinguish one territory from another 
(Asiwaju, 1984). On the other hand, internally determined boundaries are those 
that are consciously determined by the people themselves or their representatives 
with their interests as the central determinants through treaties, negotiations, 
cessions, etc, such boundaries are relatively crisis free. On the other hand, 
externally determined boundaries are those superimposed by foreign powers and 
interests; they are usually contested and conflict prone. 
It is important to note, however, that the manner of the determination of 
boundaries in Africa was not an exception, but in tandem with the practice of 
boundary determination everywhere else; either before the African experience or 
after it. Indeed in Europe (for instance in the Cerdanya and the Basque regions 
straddling France and Spain) boundaries were superimposed on a previously 
homogenous culture area, just as was the case in Africa (Sahlins, 1989 and 
Lancaster, 1987).
9
 In the words of Sahlins (1989: 286), „Cerdans came to identify 
themselves as either French or Spanish…‟ For Colley (1992), Britain is an 
invented nation superimposed onto much older alignments and loyalties; the 
amalgamation of four politically and culturally distinct peoples – the English, the 
Scots and the Welsh as well as the Northern Irish into one identity. 
Empire building and overseas colonisation was not a novel idea, but an 
extension of internal colonisation in the metropolis, which pioneered the shifting 
of boundaries and the establishment of new ones. The question then is: what is so 
peculiar about African boundaries (seeing that their process of becoming was not 
                                               
9 Though the boundary here was a superimposition, it differed from the African experience by the 
fact that the determination process involved intricate negotiations and renegotiations between the 
two governments. 
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different from the process elsewhere)?  
 Another category of boundary differentiation in the literature is the 
conception of boundary as either artificial or natural. Are boundaries natural or 
artificial? The debate was between two schools: the artificiality school (Weigert, 
et al, 1957; Asiwaju, 1984; Williams, 2006), and the natural boundary school 
(Ratzel, 1897; Cukwurah, 1967; Malaka, 1989). The debate has since been settled 
with the acceptance of the position of the artificiality school. 
One may seek to reiterate the artificial boundary position by interrogating 
the rationale for boundaries and boundary making. Cukwurah (1967) posits that 
human society began from the most rudimentary form of social organisation made 
up of several independent bands of people who had no prior contact with one 
another. As population grew with a concomitant pressure on land, adjoining 
territories became assimilated until such a point that contact was made with 
another band or group of people. In this case, there had been no mutually agreed 
mode of spatial interaction as well as inter-group relations; what followed would 
be a struggle for space with the weaker group either expelled from the land or 
assimilated into the stronger group.  
On the other hand, as Prescott (1965) claims, boundary negotiation ensued 
between political communities once a conflict of interest developed or appeared 
imminent. These conflicting interests may involve territorial contacts and 
disputations. Boundaries are therefore drawn to eliminate potentially dangerous 
situations and to secure peace by neighbouring groups. War was prevented 
between Britain and France in the Niger Basin in the closing years of the 19
th
 
century, especially in the hinterland of Lagos where there were protracted 
territorial contact and struggles until the boundary determination of 1898 
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(Prescott, 1965: 58). Indeed, the Berlin West African Conference was convened in 
order to regulate the inter-imperial territorial „scramble‟ in Africa to prevent war 
in metropolitan Europe.  
Another reason why boundaries are drawn is the need to gain economic 
advantage, especially in areas of strategic or economic potential. The international 
boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, around the Bakassi Peninsula was only 
settled following international adjudication by the International Court of Justice in 
2002. The Peninsula became a subject of conflict following the discovery of huge 
deposits of petroleum in an area of ambiguous international boundary. In earlier 
times, this same boundary had been a subject of intense disputation and 
negotiation between Britain and Germany with the tropical areas capable of 
supporting valuable tropical crops as objects of interest (Prescott, 1965).  
The danger of a possible loss of autonomy may compel states to negotiate 
boundary agreements. Prescott (1965) supports this assertion by submitting that 
states facing imminent defeat in war agree to boundary negotiation in order to 
retain some degree of independence. „The Guadalupe-Hildago Treaty of 1848, 
which ended the Mexican-American war resulted in Mexican territorial 
concession to America, but did secure Mexican independence in the remaining 
territory‟ (Prescott, 1965: 57). 
Finally, boundaries become necessary between states in order to regulate 
administrative matters at the frontier. The frontier is a no man‟s land and may 
provide escape routes or a safe haven to offenders or those escaping from 
financial responsibilities. In order to sort the administrative problems between 
their colonies in the Gold Coast and Togoland, Germany and Britain negotiated a 
boundary to demarcate the neutral zone between those colonies (Hertslet, 1896).  
37 
 
Given that the various needs for the determination of boundaries arise out 
of expediency and are deliberate constructs, consciously and purposely contrived 
to meet specific social demands, they are artificial. In the words of Williams 
(2006: 18), boundaries are...„social practices and as such the product of human 
agency and choice…‟ which „requires a rejection of the idea that territorial 
borders are exclusively …natural‟. Boundaries are only categorised as artificial or 
natural depending on their use of natural features. Thus, „natural‟ boundaries are 
supposed to follow natural features such as rivers, mountains ranges, ravines, etc, 
while artificial boundaries are man-made without regard for physical features. 
Indeed, all boundaries are man-made, whether or not they follow natural features. 
Artificiality is often used as the „equivalent for “bad boundaries‟” (Weigert, et al, 
1957: 93-94). In the same vein, natural boundaries („as nature intends‟) are 
regarded as good. 
Having established that (all) territorial boundaries are deliberate social 
constructs (rather than natural), African boundaries could therefore not be 
described as „artificial‟. As stated above, these boundaries are only artificial in the 
sense that they are described as „bad‟. What is a „good‟ boundary? What would be 
required to transform African boundaries into good boundaries? From Lord 
Curzon‟s (1907) description, good boundaries would be those that promote peace, 
while bad ones would be those that provoke (or potentially can provoke) war 
between neighbours. Again from Curzon, every boundary possesses that dual 
capacity to either provoke war or to promote peace, depending upon which of 
these characteristics the state chooses to adopt (Curzon, 1907). In other word, 
states can choose how to interpret their boundaries either as points of cooperation 
or conflict highlighting the potential dynamism and malleability of boundary 
38 
 
discourse. 
 A recent theme in the literature on boundaries is the role of globalisation in 
the changing nature of boundaries. Some authors have argued that no debate on 
boundary is complete without examining the concept of globalisation (Brown, 
1995, Anderson and O‟Dowd, 1999).10 Globalisation is the compression of space 
and the resultant de-delimitation of territories. Sovereignty as a concept and 
character of the state has been significantly affected by contemporary 
globalisation; and if territorial sovereignty is crucial to the bounded space of the 
state, it follows that the fortunes of boundaries are inevitably linked with those of 
sovereignty. As Williams (2006: 16-17) asserts, „if sovereignty declines in 
importance or changes in its nature, then territorial borders will change too in 
order to accommodate the need for a “new” sovereignty regime…‟. International 
boundaries have been undergoing considerable changes both in form and in 
function as a result of the impact of globalisation on the nature and function of 
sovereignty. Hence, the effect of the disciplinary practice of states to control and 
differentiate, elucidated by Foucault is hampered by globalisation.
11
   
Globalisation is an intensification of an age-old phenomenon in the 
context of boundaries in Africa. Before, as well as through the colonial period and 
beyond, Africans never regarded boundaries as finite lines of exclusion, barrier or 
wall, but as corridors of opportunities, either for trade or expansion (DeBlij, 1973; 
Reader, 1997; Asiwaju, 2003). Indeed, boundaries (frontiers) were zones of 
expansion opportunities as they were „no man‟s land‟ (interstices) between 
political organisations in pre-colonial Africa. However, it is curious to note that 
                                               
10 Globalisation is the theme of Chapter 7 later on. 
11 The emergence and growth of the European Union is one classical example of the redefinition of 
the nature and role of sovereignty especially as it relates to territorial boundary and citizenship.  
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the impact of contemporary globalisation on African boundaries has been limited 
compared to its impact on interstate boundaries in Europe. In other words, 
sovereignty has remained static in post-colonial Africa while it has constantly 
been redefined elsewhere. One of the tasks before this study is to examine and 
analyse the fixation of the state in Africa with the statist, realist approach to 
sovereignty and territoriality, which reifies the „artificiality‟ of territorial 
boundaries and hampers cross-border cooperation and integration. 
As noted above, boundaries everywhere are a social construct; the 
boundaries of every state are deliberately created. Given that all boundaries are 
artificial as they are man-made, what makes the African situation extraordinary? 
The issue with the boundaries in Africa is that they are external impositions; 
superimposed by outsiders on pre-existing social formations and created with little 
or no knowledge of the region and completed in a hurry. The externality 
(superimposition) of the boundaries would not have been a major issue had the 
process been completed with due regard to the pre-existing social context, 
involving the leadership of the local population ensuring local details and interests 
were integral parts of the process. However, in the arrogance of power of the 
invading, omniscient imperial powers, the deciding factors could not have 
included local interests or knowledge of the socio-political circumstances of 
African societies. Again, time was of the essence, especially as territorial 
boundaries were desperately needed to order inter-colonial (metropolitan) 
relations. Thus, according to Church (1956: 774-75):  
The key to understanding African boundaries is the speed with which 
they were defined. Most of them were decided between 1884 and 
1919…boundaries drawn on maps by European politicians bore little 
relation to the physical and even less to the social, economic or 
political fabric of indigenous societies. Yet, of course, the rapid and 
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intensive partition of Africa took place when little or no knowledge 
had been available of the terrain, peoples or economies of the interior. 
Nevertheless, even if that knowledge had been available, the mood of 
the statesmen who partitioned Africa was not as to suggest that they 
would have been willing to use it in their boundary deliberations. 
2.2 Approaches to Boundary 
International boundaries have been conceptualised across two broad 
approaches (the Structuralist and the Functionalist), which have influenced their 
perceptions, both in theory and practice. Structuralism and functionalism refer to 
the analytical approaches to understanding interactions with the border. For the 
sake of analytical clarity, actions by the agents of the state, resulting from the 
embedding of boundary in the political structures of the states are described in this 
study as being „structurally induced‟ behaviour, as distinct from structuralism. On 
the other hand, functionalism is regarded as behaviour patterns that are typical of 
those expected to arise from a functionalist understanding of boundary and are 
classified here as „practical‟ behaviour. Most behaviour patterns are a mixture of 
the two to some extent, however there is more practical activity than there is 
structurally-induced activity among the Yoruba, suggesting that functional 
analyses are more persuasive in this case. However, given the primacy of the state 
in foreign policy, functional analysis alone will be unable to effectively explain 
boundary dynamics. Hence structuralism is also important as an analytical tool for 
this study. 
It is important to note that a thesis that aims to deploy both approaches 
faces certain challenges, that is the difficulty of producing results likely to lead to 
theory-building that stresses parsimony and predictive power. However, these 
challenges are overshadowed by the ability of the thesis to offer a far richer 
explanatory account of events that will serve as a more accurate basis for 
identifying currently rising and falling trends in behaviour related to the core issue 
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of Yoruba identity that will enable some predictions about the future trajectory of 
that identity's development to be made. These are not of the dependent-
independent variable, type, but are more hermeneutic in character. 
This section examines these approaches, highlighting the difference 
between them as well as their appropriateness to the understanding of boundaries 
and partitioned groups. Given the tendency of behaviour patterns at the border to 
be both practical and structurally-induced, as well as the centrality of the state in 
the border decision-making process, this section concludes that some form of 
synthesis between these approaches is required for a proper understanding of the 
dynamics of the border, the borderland and the borderland peoples. 
2.21 The Structuralist Approach   
The Structuralist approach manages a state‟s boundaries with „one rule for 
all‟ policies, while the Functionalist approach employs integrative trans-border 
mechanisms to manage everyday trans-boundary realities of the borderland 
peoples (Stoddard, 2002: 45). In other words, the Structuralist treatment of 
boundaries is a state-centric approach whose exclusive preoccupation is with the 
maintenance of the sanctity of the integrity of the state while other considerations 
are relegated to the background. On the other hand, the Functionalist approach 
views boundaries from the perspective of the people whose interests are 
secondary or ignored in the statist approach. The Structuralist approach focuses on 
the high politik of the realist school of international relations while the 
Functionalist perspective is centred around issues of low politik  
The government/state regards boundaries as an immutable feature of the 
state from which the character and essence of the state derives; it marks the extent 
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of its territorial jurisdiction, beyond which are foreigners whose access into the 
state must be controlled and within which are citizens who must be protected and 
provided for (van Creveld, 1999). For the state and state elite, boundaries are a 
powerful „ideological symbol‟ of national unity and represent a crucial component 
of the national interest (Anderson, 2001: 220). To the Structuralist, international 
boundaries are barriers and filters, separating foreigners from nationals. 
Conversely, to the group and people separated by international boundaries, ethnic 
loyalties compel inter-group relations whether or not the group is wholly located 
within a single country or split among countries (Phiri, 1985). To them, lines of 
political jurisdiction halt at fixed national boundaries, while those of economic, 
social and cultural activities must continue beyond such strictures. This is 
underscored by the everyday realities of the borderland people: price differential 
and opportunity for cross-border arbitrage, the need to visit kith and kin, religious 
shrines, farmlands, and so on across the boundaries make boundary crossings 
(largely unauthorised and therefore, illegal from the perspective of the state) 
inevitable.  Thus, the dynamics of interactions among borderland people requires 
cross-border movement of people and goods as though the boundaries are non-
existent.  
The Structuralist approach regards the international boundaries of the state as 
the juridical extent of state territory and sovereignty. Contemporary territorial 
sovereignty focuses on international boundaries as the points at which a state‟s 
territorial competence finds its ultimate expression (Sahlins, 1989: 2). Thus, 
central to the Structuralist approach in the study of international boundaries are 
the twin concepts of territoriality and sovereignty.  The Structural approach reifies 
the doctrine of territorial integrity, which refers to a preoccupation of the state 
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with the issues of self-preservation and accumulation of power aimed at 
maintaining territorial and political continuity (Losch, 1954: 200). The approach 
is hinged on three core hypotheses (Stoddard, 2002: 42): 
1. Nation states are homogeneous coercive entities where all 
subgroups accept their respective national goals and objectives; 
2. Formulating policies affecting the survival of the state is the 
exclusive preserve of national leaders with the basic assumption 
that interests of the various sections are aggregated as the interests 
of the state; 
3. The singular function of every international boundary is the 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state it encloses. The 
responsibilities of national leaders include the preservation of 
territorial integrity by protecting the people and its land from 
external encroachment. 
 
Many studies on boundaries have employed this approach. Solutions to 
boundary related issues are examined within the Structuralist framework of 
national sovereignty (Boggs, 1940; Kristof, 1959; Prescott, 1965 and 1970). 
However, this approach has proved inadequate in the study of boundaries, 
particularly those that partition previously existing homogeneous culture groups. 
The preoccupation of the approach with the maintenance of territorial integrity 
over every other consideration ignores the every day realities of the people around 
the boundary region as well as the age-old history of relationships and affinities 
that had existed prior to the colonial demarcation, which colonisation and 
subsequent (independent) state system have not been able to completely eliminate.  
Another important criticism of this approach is its assumption that state and 
society, or state and nation are necessarily synonymous or coterminous and 
therefore, the application of „one-rule-for-all‟ approach of the state. This 
assumption informs the aggregation of the interests of the people by the political 
elite as the interests of the states. In other words, the interest of the state in 
44 
 
policing (and maintaining) the boundary is equated with the interests of the 
people. However, this attitude is constantly queried as the same people cross the 
same boundary for sundry reasons and circumvent state policies in spite of the 
strictures imposed by the state. This dichotomy in perception between the 
state/government on one hand, and the people/groups on the other and subsequent 
policy by the state have contributed in no small measures to the failure of the 
Structuralist approach in transforming the barrier challenge of boundaries (which 
are often conflict prone) to cooperative and integrative advantages.  
Another challenge for this study is the analysis of the contrasting perspectives 
between the state (and government) and the society (people); highlighting the 
implications of such situations for both the state and the people as well as for 
interstate relations.  
2.22 The Functionalist Approach 
The Functionalist approach to the study of boundaries developed as a 
reaction to the failure of the Structuralist school in the study of boundaries. It 
takes off on the premise that certain research endeavours could not be effective if 
restricted to formal institutions, but they must spread to include informal groups 
and organisations (Jones, 1967: 10). Functionalism involves the employment of 
sociological and anthropological techniques and conceptual frameworks in the 
understanding of certain political phenomena which traditional political science 
techniques alone would not be able to adequately address. It provides tools for the 
analysis of informal, non-institutional politically relevant activities; it reduces 
value orientation to an insignificant degree; it is concerned principally with what 
happens, and not such ethical judgment as what ought to happen (Jones, 1967).  
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The Functionalist approach, contrary to the Structuralist views boundaries 
as points of „differential converters‟ to ameliorate socio-economic and political 
differences between people and institutions across international boundaries. It is 
„based on the doctrine of mutual necessity or symbiotic reciprocity, which 
promotes cooperation and integration‟ (Stoddard, 2002: 45). It acknowledges and 
employs informal functions and affinities between people straddling a bi-national 
boundary. This becomes important when the people across the boundary are of the 
same stock that the delimitation of the boundary had partitioned in the first 
instance. Asiwaju (1984) refers to such groups as vivisected, that is, de-linked 
parts of the same body which would always seek reunification, or at least, some 
form of re-linking. The perspective promotes permeable boundaries, which allow 
unfettered mutual cross- boundary interchanges. 
The Functionalist approach is a dynamic view of contemporary boundaries 
based on land-use and ownership customs. At the primitive stage of the 
development of human social organisations, primeval societies were essentially 
nomadic. They frequently moved about in tribal bands in search of fruits and 
game as well as land to be used in the simplest form of tillage. Life was 
essentially insecure, „nasty, brutish and short‟. Travels and communications were 
hazardous and hampered by natural obstacles and wild beasts (Cukwurah, 1967: 
10-11). In their continuous search for fertile land, they came into contact with 
other groups from whom they must have been separated by natural barriers. 
Competition and conflicts necessarily ensued over access to land and other 
resources. Subsequently, some forms of crude limits of territories were worked 
out, usually in the form of frontier zones insulating neighbouring groups from 
each other. In these buffer zones, a whole range of interactions including 
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annexation (of the frontier) went on without necessarily violating each other‟s 
designated ancestral lands or territoriality (Stoddard, 2002). When modern state 
boundaries (with precise locations and as the absolute limits of state territoriality) 
were imposed in the New World, Africa and much of the Third World, frontier 
zones disappeared but indigenous borderland peoples continue to use them in 
surmounting the disruptive impact of boundaries as well as exploiting them for 
economic gains through trans-border arbitrage among others.
12
        
The Functionalists view frontier networks as continuous trans-boundary 
linkages, the so called „cultural borderland‟; a permanent non-state system for 
coordinating activities of contiguous cultural areas separated by colonial 
boundaries. Since boundaries in Africa are colonial impositions with little or no 
regard for pre-existing boundary situations, local trans-boundary cooperation 
usually subsists in spite of the structurally-induced strictures imposed by states. 
Momoh (1989) identifies the maximum interaction frontier zone as one of three 
frontier interaction zones, which is one where two cultures overlap or where one 
culture area had been partitioned by international boundary but continues as 
though the boundary was non-existent. Thus, long after the determination of the 
boundary, trans-boundary interactions continue even though they may not be 
sanctioned by the states (Stoddard, 2002: 60). Apparently, state policies would be 
geared towards the production of a zero-frontier where absolute control of the 
territory can be maintained.  
There are three fundamental postulations of the Functionalists on boundaries 
                                               
12 At the time of colonial rule in Africa, many African societies had developed highly organised 
indigenous political structures based on territoriality. In other words, political societies in Africa 
were not at the primeval stage of hunting and gathering as pre-colonial Africa was home to a 
number of empires and kingdoms. However, the traditional African conception of territoriality was 
different from the European conception, characterised by definitive lines on the ground (see 
Kehinde, 2008b) 
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(Stoddard, 2002: 62), namely: 
1. A contemporary nation-state is made up of a sundry array of interest 
groups and social classes as well as a complex mosaic of ethnic, 
racial and religious categories  
2.  Trans-boundary interfaces involving cultural, economic, political and 
ideological influences preserve important channels of communication 
between local populations straddling international boundary. These 
local informal networks allow local authorities to coordinate common 
regional goals while reducing bi-national tensions between the states. 
3.  Whenever centrist structural policies for the borderland are ineffective, 
local functional practices are employed in attempts to find solutions 
to current border problems. Regional and local jurisdictions, more 
familiar with chronic boundary irritations are more appropriate to 
support functional policies which reflect realistic solutions to 
boundary problems. 
 
These functional assumptions about the nature of boundary are important in 
the understanding of the primacy attained by functionalism over structuralism in 
boundary studies in recent years. While the Structuralists believe that the nation-
state is coterminous with the society and as such, collective policies are made on 
such bases which have had grave repercussions for the borderland people and 
regional integration, Functionalists on the contrary see the modern state as being 
comprised of a mosaic of interests and social groups. State decision makers must 
necessarily factor in these multifarious interests and aspirations in the decision 
making process about boundaries and borderland people.  
To the Structuralists, the singular function of the boundary is territorial 
maintenance with its attendant separation and exclusion tendencies. Indeed, to this 
school of thought, any amount of „boundary leakage‟ is a measure of the state‟s 
ineffectiveness in asserting its territoriality. This perception of boundary by the 
state fosters rival territoriality and competition between neighbouring states that 
should rather be involved in cooperative and symbiotic relationships. 
Unauthorised trans-boundary movements intrinsic to the nature of borderland 
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people, especially those separated by the boundary are considered as grave crimes 
against the state. However, the Functionalists advocate permeable boundary to 
cater for the realities of everyday interactions with the boundary by people who 
live along and are directly affected by the boundaries. The livelihood of these 
people are tied to the boundaries as they are largely left to their own devices by 
the state whose policies toward the border are largely characterised by neglect, as 
these regions are considered peripheral zones. 
The Functionalist approach to boundaries constitutes the crucial component of 
the perspective adopted by this study as it seeks a community oriented, bottom up 
approach to understanding boundaries and borderland people. The Structuralist 
approach with its one rule-for-all approach has proved to be inadequate in 
understanding and handling the dynamics of every day reality of the borderland 
people as well as their interactions with the boundary. The Functionalist approach, 
with its focus on historical, social and cultural linkages and affinities of the people 
as well as its view of frontier networks as continuous trans-boundary linkages 
have proved to be very useful for our purpose. As many interstate boundaries in 
Africa are colonial creations with little or no regard for pre-existing boundary 
situations, local trans-boundary cooperation usually subsists in spite of the 
structurally-induced strictures imposed by states. The „bridge-building‟ 
characteristics of functionalism is also instructive for this study in terms of 
cooperative interstate relations between geographically contiguous states hosting 
fractions of the same ethnic group partitioned by an international boundary, 
ultimately fostering sub-regional integration.  However, as boundaries remain 
central to the essence of the state and interstate relations remain a preserve of the 
central authorities of the state, the Structuralist perspective cannot be completely 
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discarded in its entirety. Thus, this study adopts a perspective which uses a 
combination of both approaches- the Structuralist and the Functionalist. 
2.3 Determination of African Boundaries 
Much of the knowledge available on pre-colonial African history is 
derived from oral tradition.
13
 However, beginning with the Portuguese adventure 
and subsequent European exploration and colonisation of the continent, African 
society, history and culture became more actively recorded as the subject of study 
by explorers, adventurers, colonial officials and missionaries. The implication of 
this is that this history is recorded with the eye of the stranger, such that what 
would be correct and normal in the local African context may not make sense to 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century European. However, there have been 
attempts by African scholars (especially the Ibadan School
14
) to produce 
knowledge about the African past in order to present an African account of the 
history of the continent. The following section details a review of relevant 
literature on the determination, delimitation and demarcation of African 
boundaries. The first section of the review considers literature that affirms the 
disruptive character of the colonially-determined and imposed boundaries, arrived 
at without the interests and consent of the indigenous peoples. This is followed by 
a review of the literature that takes an opposing view to the first, that is, that 
colonial boundary makers did factor-in the interests of the indigenous population 
in the boundary making process. 
 Brownlie (1979) presents a comprehensive checklist of African 
                                               
13 Though, oral tradition constitutes the bulk of pre-colonial African history, there are other minor 
written sources, especially those influenced by Islam. Law (1977: 12) claims that Islam brought 
Arabic literacy to Yorubaland which facilitated some written records.  
14 Prominent members of the Ibadan School include K. Dike, J. Ade-Ajayi, O. Ikime, E. Alagoa and 
I. Akinjogbin). 
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boundaries; the legal documents leading to their determination as well as the 
diplomatic manoeuvrings between rival imperial states prior to, during and after 
the determination and delimitation of these boundaries. Brownlie records a 
significant agreement between France and Britain over communities that were 
partitioned by the establishment of the boundary between their possessions in the 
Gulf of Guinea. The agreement virtually acknowledged the fact that the boundary 
indeed cuts across a homogenous ethnic (culture) area, and care was taken to 
accommodate any problem ensuing therefrom. Section 3 of the delimitation 
agreement states: 
The villages situated in proximity to the frontier shall retain the right 
to use the arable and pasture lands, springs and watering-places where 
they have heretofore used, even in cases in which such arable and 
pasture lands, spring and watering places are situated within the 
territory of the one Power, and the village within the territory of the 
other (Brownlie, 1979: 171-172). 
 
This provision unambiguously indicates that the boundary so determined by 
the colonialists disrupted social relationships and patterns of interaction; and 
provisions were made to ameliorate its divisive impact on the borderland people. 
The provision was made at the point of the delimitation of the boundary and could 
not have been influenced by any other consideration but the genuine concerns of 
the colonial officers to create a boundary with a „human face‟. The question at this 
point is, in spite of this agreement, was there ever a time that such cross-border 
exchange was allowed, even during the colonial era? Furthermore, had this 
section of the agreement been implemented, would it have engendered greater 
cross-border cooperation between neighbouring states? Why have the post-
colonial states not exploited this provision to further the integration of the sub-
continent, especially the kind being promoted by the Economic Community of 
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West African States (ECOWAS)? 
Perham (1956) presents a criticism of the manner of the colonial partition 
of Africa. She claims that boundary making process in Africa was merely a game 
whose rules were constantly changing depending on the whims of the players. It 
was a game without referee, whose outcome could be nothing better than the 
confused and bizarre political maps of contemporary Africa. This arbitrariness 
was echoed by Sir Claude Macdonald, a member of the pioneering Nigeria-
Kamerun boundary survey team when he stated that: 
In those days, we just took a blue pencil and ruler and we put it down 
at Old Calabar
15
 and drew that blue line to Yola…I recollect thinking 
when I was sitting having an audience with the Emir of Yola 
surrounded by his tribe, that it was a good thing that he didn‟t know 
that I with a blue pencil had drawn a line through his territory. 
(Macdonald, 1914: 650). 
The much trumpeted use of treaties between imperial officers and agents and 
local rulers as the basis of colonial acquisition of African territories was absent 
here. What was present was the arbitrary imperial determination of the boundaries 
of indigenous societies without their knowledge and acquiescence. It represents 
the arrogance of power of the incomers and synonymous with the proverbial 
„shaving of a man‟s head in his absence‟. Given such a scenario as the one 
described above by Sir Claude Macdonald, it would not be far from the truth to 
describe such boundaries as bad, especially since this kind of boundary would 
more likely engender conflict rather than cooperation between the successor 
states. Indeed, the most protracted and bloody of Nigeria‟s boundary disputes 
occurred along this stretch over the Bakassi Peninsula. 
Freund (1984) draws on a materialist perspective in examining indigenous 
                                               
15 Indeed, the Anglo German boundary around Old Calabar provides some comic relief! In the 
delimitation of the boundary, the river, Rio Del Rey had been prescribed as the boundary between 
the two colonial possessions of Britain (Nigeria) and Germany (Kamerun). However, at the point of 
demarcation, it was found by the surveyors that no such river existed! The officials of the two 
Powers then had to devise ad hoc limits to their territories. 
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social development as well as the implications of contacts with Europe. He traces 
the evolution of European imperial rule in Africa, highlighting the „Scramble‟ and 
the ultimate partition of the continent.  Freund argues that the quest of Europe in 
Africa in the 19
th
 century was driven by capitalist accumulation, which impelled 
inter-imperial competition for „choice‟ areas in the continent leading to the 
„Scramble‟ and the ultimate „haphazard‟ division of its territories. Attempts are 
made to show that the indigenous population did not fold their arms while their 
territories were being over-run by the conquering imperialists, but presented a 
resistance, albeit futile, to the European imposition owing to the superior military 
and tactical approach. Freund‟s work is essentially a general reader, drawing 
inspiration from Marxian political economy.  
The challenge posed by Freund for this study revolves around the resultant 
geopolitical structure (and implications) of the continent following the capital-
inspired demarcation of its territories. As capital was the motivation, these 
boundaries made sense to those who drew them, but do they make any sense to 
those whose culture area was partitioned and subsequently subjected to 
immigration and customs control? 
Griffiths (1986) presents an analysis of the legacies of colonially ordered 
boundaries in Africa. Like many others, Griffiths submits that „boundaries 
collectively divide the continent into many states and individually divide 
people…they are sources of international conflicts and affect spatial patterns of 
economic development‟ (Griffiths, 1986: 204). For him, African boundaries are 
traceable to Berlin where the conference to determine the modalities of sharing 
the territories of the continent among competing European powers was held.  
Griffiths contends that the process of arriving at inter-European 
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boundaries in Africa was „dehumanising‟ as it partitioned groups and nationalities 
into the spheres of influence of different colonial powers and the Africans whose 
territories were being shared were not stakeholders in the process (Griffiths, 
1986). Thus, the emerging boundaries could not have been better than what 
obtains. Indeed, Griffiths describes African boundaries as haphazard as they are 
products of foreign impositions benefiting from scant knowledge of the subject 
territories (Griffiths, 1986). Furthermore, a greater percentage of the boundary 
lines were determined through a combination of astronomical lines (longitudes 
and latitudes), straight lines, physical features, arcs and curves. And as human 
social organisations are hardly configured on these bases, colonial boundaries thus 
distorted several pre-colonial African societies.  
Griffiths argues that the bulk of the territorially-based problems in 
contemporary Africa are traceable to the manner of the partition of the continent. 
His contention hinges on the „dehumanising‟ effect of these boundaries and their 
haphazard nature, which have foisted on the continent its economic problems and 
endemic conflicts (Griffiths, 1986: 204). Illuminating as his work is, Griffiths 
could be accused of over-simplifying the African predicament. Every predicament 
cannot be blamed on colonialism, even though it has remained pivotal and 
epochal, the roots of the African crisis go further back to the era of the slave trade 
which depleted the continent of the bulk of its active labour force on the one hand. 
On the other hand, it has been about fifty years since Africans have assumed the 
reins of power and yet have not been able to undo the perceived evils of foreign 
domination. Rather, Africa is worse off than it was at the point of independence 
owing largely to maladministration, corruption and unfair international political 
economic relations. Indeed, Galtung (1971) in his structural theory of imperialism 
54 
 
blames the problems in Africa on the peripheralisation of the continent as well as 
the active collaboration between African leaders and those of the West. 
Furthermore, the claim that conflicts in Africa emanate from haphazard boundary 
is an exaggeration. Granted, there have been a number of interstate conflicts in 
Africa since the 1960s, the number is so few considering that over 177 groups 
(Reader, 1997) are partitioned by its international boundaries. Had boundary been 
conflict generating in the mould suggested by Griffiths, the whole of the continent 
ought to be one massive cauldron. 
Zartman (1965) explores the dynamics of imperial boundary-making, as 
well as post colonial territorial politics in Africa. Like other Africanist scholars, 
Zartman (1965) agrees with the assertion that interstate boundaries in Africa are 
colonial impositions, foisted on the continent and its peoples by Europeans whose 
interests were the only determining factors. These boundaries have remained as 
the basis for ordering interstate relations in Africa, in spite of their inadequacies. 
Zartman falls into the same trap which many colonial historians and analysts were 
victims of regarding pre-colonial boundaries in Africa. He argues that pre-colonial 
African societies were not territorial as finite limits to spatial spread were non-
existent (Zartman, 1965: 160). This was probably the same argument projected by 
would-be colonial officers that Africa was unterritorial and as such the principle 
of effective occupation should be adopted in farming out its territories among 
discovering European powers. It also explains why a segment of the literature 
about Africa at the time of the colonial penetration and afterwards regards African 
boundaries as consequent, that is drawn on unoccupied territories which later 
formed the basis of spatial configuration of these societies. 
McEwen‟s International Boundaries of East Africa is a legal analysis of 
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the boundary-making process in East Africa as well as consequent implications 
for the successor states. McEwen provides a detailed study of individual boundary 
lines in East Africa, drawing on the processes involved in their determination in 
treaties and inter-imperial relations as well as the problems associated with the 
externally-imposed boundaries. According to McEwen (1971), the reliance on 
treaties between European powers and African societies as the basis for territorial 
claims in Africa was a spurious and dubious manipulation of international law. 
For treaties to be regarded as legal, they must be between subjects of international 
law, which pre-colonial African societies were not. Resting on McEwen therefore, 
the European domination of Africa was illegal as it had no legal backing of 
international law.  
McEwen further departs from the general norm in African studies where 
pre-colonial Africa was thought to be unterritorial and devoid of territorial limits 
with his contention that though „factual knowledge concerning the territorial 
limits of African communities in pre-colonial times is often scanty‟ (McEwen, 
1971: 3), there are certain instances which show that the notion of boundaries as 
foreign cannot be completely accepted.  This work focuses on East Africa; 
however, it mirrors events elsewhere in the continent as the same dynamics were 
at work all over Africa during colonisation. 
Kapil (1966) presents one of the earliest challenges to the received 
wisdom regarding the conflict potentials of African boundaries. This was a bold 
initiative in the hey-days of pan-Africanism, and calls for the revision of these 
inherited „unnatural‟ boundaries partly on the grounds of their potentials for 
conflicts emanating from irredentism and the haphazardness. He agrees with the 
assertion that African boundaries are exogenous or ahistorical in relation to the 
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indigenous political history of the societies they demarcate (Kapil, 1966: 659). 
This consequently creates a disjuncture between the boundaries and locally 
generated political processes. He claims further that the argument for the conflict 
potentials of African boundaries hinges on this very fact (Kapil, 1966). However, 
he argues that certain factors, including un-demarcated or delayed demarcation of 
boundary lines and an absence of homogenous traditional societies divided by the 
boundaries mitigates against this perception (Kapil, 1966: 660).  
Furthermore, he contends that as the boundaries are relatively recent in 
origin and were determined rather speedily, the speed involved in the process 
required that the boundaries be easily defined and quickly agreed upon (Kapil, 
1966). As prophetic as Kapil‟s work has turned out to be, his justification of the 
European imposition of boundaries which disrupted age-old traditions on the 
grounds of exigency is an attempt to gloss over the ills of the process of boundary 
making. As claimed by Griffiths, the boundary making process in Africa was 
dehumanising and just like colonialism, boundaries have remained epochal in 
shaping the geo-politics of the continent. 
The following set of literature presents a dissenting view of colonial 
boundaries in Africa, asserting that  boundaries determined and imposed are the 
best possible under the prevailing circumstances and that Africans indeed took 
part, either actively or passively in the process.   
Anene presents a paradox: the need for nation-states to consolidate 
national unity in spite of a disparate array of incongruous ethnic multiplicity on 
the one hand, while on the other, there exists a multitude of ethnic and language 
groups that are separated from their kith and kin by the nature of the European 
ordered boundaries. The process of national consolidation „will increasingly 
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outrage communities which the boundaries…sundered‟ (Anene, 1970: 23).  
Anene‟s work presents a sharp departure from the norm: he argues that „no 
one who goes through the documentary material of the boundary negotiations for 
Nigeria will fail to be impressed by the extent to which data on treaty with native 
rulers including the extensiveness of their states  figured in the negotiations‟ 
(Anene, 1970: 12). In other words, care was taken by the colonialists to factor into 
the boundary making process local peculiarities, local interests and pre-existing 
social order. However, it appears that Anene did not take into consideration the 
fact that many traditional rulers simply exploited the presence of the Europeans 
(with superior fire-power) to lay claim to contested territories, or territories they 
had long coveted but could not attain. An example is the King of Calabar who 
owing to his advantageous position in the palm trade with the Europeans, laid 
claim to outlying territories that had never belonged to his domain in his 
protective treaty with the British (Uzoigwe, 1985). Anene also alluded to treaties 
between native African rulers and the colonising Powers as a basis of African 
acquiescence and participation in the process of territorial acquisition by the 
colonialist. This, to me appears to be an over-simplification of the issue. 
Independent archival study (depended upon by Anene) shows that indeed some 
indigenous societies invited the colonial powers to extend their protection to them, 
but this would not in itself approximate African involvement (Colonial Office, 
1812-1880).  For many of these societies, the promise of European civilisation 
(not colonisation), and, more importantly, protection against rampaging and more 
powerful neighbouring states, were the motivating factors for the invitation. Had 
the rulers of the societies been aware of the fact that the treaty agreement 
constituted a ceding of their power and authority to the colonialists, they would 
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not have gleefully invited them. For instance, the Ijebu of present-day Nigeria 
refused to have any dealings with the Lagos authorities being aware that it would 
allow the colonialists the opportunity to take over the political control of the Ijebu 
Kingdom (Oduwobi, 2004). In spite of the resistance of the Ijebu, they were 
forcefully incorporated into the emergent Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. 
Furthermore, Anene‟s conclusions are at variance with claims raised in his 
work, especially the portion about „boundary sundered communities‟ referred to 
above. Indeed, field work involving interviews with members of the communities 
across the Nigeria/Benin boundary shows that the boundary cuts across culture 
areas of homogenous groups. Anene criticised Perham‟s analysis of Africa‟s 
colonial boundaries as an exaggeration, however, a closer look at Perham‟s view 
reflects an objective examination of the subject.
16
 Perham had claimed that the 
boundary making process in Africa was „a game in which the players on each side 
changed the rules to suit their position at any given time in the field, and as there 
was no umpire, confusion and bad temper, with the possibility of something 
worse, were the inevitable results‟ (Perham, 1956: 627). Anene (1970: 12) claims 
on the contrary, that „the existence of native states and the inclusiveness of their 
territorial dominion afforded a sort of “umpire”, though not necessarily always an 
effective one‟. His assertion is not supported by history as these „native states‟ 
were either defeated or subdued by the superior powers of the European 
expansionists and thus unable to be at all effective as umpires. Were they to be 
considered as umpires, of what purpose is an ineffective umpire in a game? 
Nugent attempts to present a dissenting view on colonial boundaries in 
West Africa. His argument hinges on the assumption that Africans could not have 
                                               
16 Sir Claude Macdonald‟s comments recorded above supports this assertion. 
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been isolated from the boundary making process. This argument is based on what 
he terms a „new revisionism‟ deriving from the questioning of borders elsewhere 
in the world and the threatened disintegration of many states in Africa.
17
 Rather 
than the threatened disintegration of the state system in Africa being a case for the 
participation of Africans in the partition of their territories, it is indeed a colonial 
legacy of external imposition and capitalist exploitation, which was at the roots of 
the imperialist expansion into Africa.  
Nugent‟s study reiterates the partition of African communities by the 
colonial imposition of boundaries. All through the chapter are instances of 
partitioned groups, from the Yoruba between Nigeria and Benin, to the Hausa of 
Nigeria and Niger, to the Ewe between Ghana and Togo, and so on.  The 
dissention he claims in the chapter revolves round the fact that Africans could not 
have been uninvolved in the process of the making of the boundaries of the 
continent. However, were Africans involved, either as some kind of umpires or 
stakeholders in the process, how then do we explain the haphazard and bizarre 
political map of the continent as well as the groundswell of oppositions to the 
boundaries by certain African elite, including traditional elite in the years prior to 
independence? For instance, the Alaketu of Ketu (the King of Ketu), a traditional 
Yoruba kingdom located in Benin Republic was reported as saying that the 
Nigeria-Benin boundary only partitioned the British and the French, and not the 
Yoruba (Prescott, 1971: 103-104).
18
 The same assertion was made   by the 
Onisakete of Sakete (the King of Sakete), another Yoruba town in Benin 
                                               
17 Indeed, the conventional wisdom has it that the failure of the state in Africa derived from its 
colonial origin: the lumping together of disparate ethnic nationalities, the deliberate colonial policy 
of divide and rule, among others, make impossible the emergence of a community from the medley 
of groups forced into the emergent state in Africa.  
18 This same  view was reported to the researcher by the present Alaketu during the fieldwork for 
this study (18.10.2008) 
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Republic.
19
 The present Alaketu on a recent visit to Abeokuta, Nigeria reiterated 
the connection between the Yoruba across the boundary calling for greater 
relations between the two fractions (Alaketu, on Ogun State Television, 2007).  
Herbst (1989) seeks to challenge the current perspectives that African 
boundaries are haphazard and arbitrary, and contends that the present boundary 
system represents a rational response by both the colonialists and independent 
African political leadership. To him, it is paradoxical that in spite of criticisms of 
external imposition and  the partition of pre-existing societies, as well as the high 
mortality of political institutions in the continent, these boundaries have not only 
survived but they have been reified as the basis for ordering interstate relations in 
independent Africa. This, to Herbst, is a mark of the appropriateness of these 
boundaries as markers of territorial limits. 
Herbst glosses over the „dehumanising‟ character of such a division 
excusing it on misinformation and exigency. He draws a linkage between the 
Berlin West African Conference of 1884-85 and the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU)
20
 as both initiating and sustaining the boundaries respectively. In 
other words, the inference of his claim is that the OAU ratified what was done at 
Berlin, thus ascribing credibility to the Berlin misadventure. On the contrary, the 
decision of the OAU to retain the inherited colonial boundaries as the limits of 
each state was borne out of the pressing need to contain the inevitable discontent 
that would ensue were Berlin to be unmade. This singular act of the OAU, rather 
than being construed as validating Berlin ought to be regarded as the only rational 
option available to the leadership of an abused and deeply divided continent. In 
                                               
19 Interview with the Onisakete in his palace (28.10.2008) 
20 The OAU in its solemn declaration in 1964 had supported the inherited colonial boundaries as 
reified them as the basis of territorial sovereignty in the continent 
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other words, how relevant is the OAU declaration of 1964 to the issues of 
cooperation, peace and security in the continent?  
2.4 Evolution of Boundaries in West Africa 
Following the abolition of slavery in the early years of the nineteenth century, 
European interests in Africa were diverted to the more humane transactions aptly 
regarded as „legitimate trade‟. This new venture in Africa necessarily expanded 
the scope of European interactions with the continent. Hitherto, while the object 
of trading was human, European traders did not need to venture beyond the 
coastal confines of the continent where the human cargoes changed hands from 
the native traders through middlemen to European traders who cargoed them 
across the Atlantic. However, with the change from human to legitimate trade, it 
became necessary that European prospectors, adventurers (discoverers) and 
missionaries moved beyond the shores into the hinterlands. This adventure into 
the hinterlands of Africa, albeit, commercially motivated, inadvertently laid the 
foundation for the partition of the „dark‟ continent between rival European 
powers. 
There is a dearth of current research activities and published works on the 
partition of West Africa, which is indicative of the gap in the literature. What is 
available, even though dated focuses scanty attention on the impact of the 
partition on, and the reactions of the local population. As much of early Africa‟s 
colonial history was either commissioned by the colonial offices of the respective 
metropolitan governments or by missionary groups, the lack of attention paid to 
the impact of colonial rule (in this instance, boundaries) reflected the colonial 
policy of exploitation and extraction. Indeed, a focus on the population of Africa 
would be counter-productive to the imperialists as the ills of the partition process 
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would be bare before the whole world. In spite of this criticism, the literature on 
the partition of West  Africa remains, still, indispensable in the study of African 
boundaries as they provide source materials to be examined and analysed in 
understanding the nature of boundaries.  
Hargreaves (1963, 1969 and 1974) perhaps presents the most 
comprehensive study of the partition of West African territories in a trilogy which 
covers every sphere and imperialist penetration of this part of Africa. Indeed, the 
most compelling attraction to Hargreaves lies in the fact of his comprehensive 
examination of the processes and dynamics leading to the partition and the period 
after it. Hargreaves‟ works cover all the imperial powers and their interchanges 
leading to the Scramble, the Berlin West African Conference and the eventual 
division of the continent. He highlights the bitter rivalries between colonial 
powers and the subsequent division of the continent. This body of scholarly 
research presents an „over-detailed‟ historiographic account of inter-imperial 
competitions, the reactions of the local population and the eventual imposition of 
foreign domination on Africa through spurious and extra-legal treaties on the 
largely unperceptive and ignorant African potentates. 
Hargreaves‟ work is a spirited effort to tread a path spurned by other 
Africanist scholars at the time. He seeks to present a dispassionate analysis of the 
African situation and the processes leading to the partition of the continent as well 
as the endurance of the emergent boundaries, in spite of their weaknesses. This 
collection of works remains crucial to the understanding of boundaries in the 
continent and it provides material which may contribute to further research on the 
theme.  
Prescott (1971) presents a geographical analysis of both Nigeria‟s 
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international and regional boundaries. Prescott agrees that the international 
boundaries were determined at different points during bilateral negotiations 
between Britain and France, or Britain or Germany. However, he claims that the 
view that the evolution of international boundaries in Africa did not take account 
of local realities is not supported in the case of Nigeria as there was a genuine 
attempt in each case to reflect tribal land use patterns in the process (Prescott, 
1971: 10). Prescott goes to a great length to support this assertion relying largely 
on historical accounts of European adventurers, missionaries and colonial officers. 
However, in view of the boundary delimitation agreement between France and 
Britain, reported by Brownlie (1979: 171-172) presented in section 2.3 of this 
chapter, the emergent boundary did not reflect the social and cultural realities 
existing in the region at the time. Indeed, Prescott (1971: 102) argues that „the 
Nigerian villages of Tobolo, Ibiyan and Igbaw Kawfin have farms in Dahomey 
(Benin), and the Dahomean villages of Ibate and Oke Awo have farms in 
Nigeria‟. This clearly shows a disruption of social and economic patterns by the 
boundary as these villages are all Yoruba villages. Furthermore, regarding Ipobe, 
Prescott is uncertain „whether the boundary divided political units‟ (Prescott, 
1971: 103). 
In McEwen‟s (1991) work on the establishment of the Nigeria/Benin 
boundary, McEwen presents a cartographical examination of this specific 
boundary beginning with the Convention dated 1 August 1863 establishing the 
eastern limits of Porto Novo and culminating in the Anglo-French agreement of 
1889 (McEwen, 1991: 62). The boundary-line was drawn employing a mixture of 
natural features and artificial limits that included rectilinear segments, arcs, and 
astronomical lines, which cuts through sections of the Yoruba communities, 
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thereby placing them in opposing spheres of European influence. McEwen makes 
reference to inter-imperial relations, especially relating to the boundary 
determined through inter-imperial treaties and conventions (McEwen, 1991). His 
claim that „once the European powers had completed their partition of Africa, 
they adopted a fairly liberal attitude towards the regulation of colonial boundaries‟ 
(McEwen, 1991: 62) is misleading. Given the „Scramble‟ that prefaced the 
partition as well as the need to contain and control territories, adopting „a fairly 
liberal attitude towards boundaries…‟ could only be counter-productive to the 
colonial administration. Though the agreement delimiting the boundary 
incorporated liberal outlooks, for instance, Africans whose territories were 
partitioned and thus separated from their sources of livelihood and religious 
observation, were allowed to cross these lines unimpeded to access these 
resources (Brownlie, 1979). However, in practice, the borders were strictly 
regulated, especially following different tariff regimes and subsequent illegal 
exchange of goods and services across the boundary. Furthermore, different 
colonial administration (especially of justice) engendered forced migration largely 
from the French regions to British colonies which compelled a strict enforcement 
of the boundary (Asiwaju, 1976b). 
Asiwaju (1976a) presents one of the earliest African perspectives on 
partitioned groups in Africa from a comparative study of French and British 
colonial policies in western Yorubaland. This work reiterates the partition view of 
the evolution of the Nigeria-Benin boundary. Asiwaju notes: 
the boundary separated all Egbado kingdoms from Porto Novo and 
Dahome and placed them within the British sphere. The Anago 
kingdom of Ipokia was in a similar situation to that of Egbado. The 
boundary placed Itakete (Sakete), Ohori Ije and Ipobe exclusively 
within the French sphere. It then drove through and split into two the 
areas of the kingdoms of Ifonyin, Ketu, and Sabe, leaving the capitals 
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and the former metropolitan districts of these ancient Yoruba 
kingdoms and the bulk  (except in the case of Sabe) of their former 
subordinate towns and villages in the British territory (Asiwaju, 
1976a: 45). 
 
 Again, Asiwaju (1984) presents a checklist of partitioned groups in Africa 
and their trans-boundary relationships. This work provides additional evidence in 
support of the colonial partition of Africa, which paid scant attention to prevailing 
social and cultural realities at the time of the partition. Although, there are specific 
case studies, the book presents a rather general overview of partitioned groups 
which are cloaked in the traditional state-oriented approach.  
In his later works, Asiwaju (2001 and 2003) reflects on the growing need 
for a change of perspective in the study of boundaries.  Asiwaju charts a novel, 
but a brave attempt at studying the people and society at the boundary, rather than 
the boundaries themselves in an attempt to overcome the problems associated 
with boundaries in Africa. Much of the literature on African boundaries is state-
centric in perspective neglecting the people whose daily lives are affected by state 
boundary politics and policies. Asiwaju (2001) analyses the impact of contrasting 
French and British colonial policies in West Africa as well as the reactions of the 
subject population to these impositions. Significantly, Asiwaju presents an 
ambivalent attitude of the local population to the boundary: on the one hand, the 
people treated the boundary line as irritants; a foreign imposition hindering intra-
group relations, and so on. On the other hand, they crossed the lines in order to 
avoid harsh state policies in one territory while seeking refuge in the other. They 
further exploit the price differential across the boundary for economic gains. 
Asiwaju (2003) engages with the issues of regional integration in the 
continent. He rehearses the axiomatic characters of African boundaries and their 
implications for peaceful coexistence and integration and concludes that though 
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African boundaries are fraught with problems and are potentially conflict prone, 
they have remained an unchangeable reality of the African geopolitical scene. 
Rather than continue to bemoan the inadequacies of the boundaries, state policies 
towards them should exploit their bridge-building characteristics to promote 
greater regional integration, modelled after the European Union.  
Asiwaju‟s work presents a maturity over the years beginning from a state-
centric perspective and culminating in a socio-cultural perspective on African 
boundaries as evidenced by his 2001 and 2003 collections of works. For him, 
understanding the African boundary situation would entail a lot more reliance on 
the socio-cultural perspective than typically presently obtains.  
Miles (1994) presents a comparative study of specific impacts of 
boundaries on the Hausa partitioned between Nigeria and Niger. This study 
presents the closest parallel analogue to the present study as it does to the Hausa 
what this study seeks to do to the Yoruba. Miles‟ work, though similar to the 
present research is located almost exclusively in the realm of inter-state relations, 
diplomacy and territoriality. However, this present study argues that the problem 
with territoriality in Africa stems from the neglect of the people at the border 
region with the preoccupation of the state with issues of high politik. This study 
seeks to move beyond Miles‟ to explore the rationale for the absence of conflicts 
in the boundary area given its significant potentials for irredentism as well as the 
integrative potentials across almost all the boundaries in the sub region. Another 
point of departure from Miles is in relation to the scope and methodology of 
study; while Miles‟ focus was on two Hausa villages, one each in Nigeria and 
Niger, the scope of this present study is wider incorporating the communities at 
the borderland between Nigeria and Benin, up to the Ketu section of the 
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international boundary.  
Flynn (1997) is an analysis of the borderland Yoruba group astride the 
Nigeria - Benin boundary. Flynn‟s work provides a close parallel analogue to this 
present study.  The work, mainly anthropological, explores the economic 
adaptation and exploitation of this boundary by the border-partitioned group. She 
analyses the process which transformed Africa‟s arbitrary borders into being 
embedded and entrenched in the local communities that surround them. She 
argues that though, the borders were imposed by the colonialists, and disruptive, 
the borderland communities can not now imagine their existence without the same 
border. Indeed, Flynn (1997: 313) contends further that the border, rather than 
separate the partitioned group, binds them together as they both rely on it for 
economic advantage. She claims that the borderland people are able to exploit the 
arbitrage opportunity provided by the boundary, as they maintained a certain 
degree of freedom of movement across and around the border. They have 
appropriated the boundary and emphasised their deep placement within the 
borderland that they are able to, not only control their own movement, but also the 
movement of others (non locals) across and around the border. Flynn (1997: 317) 
argues that this freedom to control movements is responsible for the ability of the 
Yoruba to avoid the „borderland hysteria‟, or the crises of identity, similar to those 
being experienced at the US – Mexico borderlands.  
Flynn‟s work provides very critical references for this present study. It 
provides, by far, the closest parallel analogue. The functional slant of this work 
shares the focus of Flynn on the borderland people, however, the scope of this 
study extends beyond basically anthropological and economic, to include 
interstate relations. 
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For most of the literature on African boundaries, the tendency has been a 
preoccupation with the statist perspective which prevents local cooperation efforts 
across the boundaries (Zartman, 1965; Anene, 1970; Touval, 1972; Prescott, 
1971; Miles, 1994; Kacowicz, 1997). A more appropriate approach, deriving from 
Asiwaju (2003) and Stoddard (2002), which this study employs is (structural) 
functionalism guided by the doctrine of mutual necessity, which sees boundaries 
as points of symbiotic reciprocity rather than the rigid line of separation espoused 
by the Structuralist school. According to the Functionalist perspective, boundaries 
are points that act as „differential converters‟ to ameliorate economic, political and 
cultural disparities between people of the same stock divided by foreign imposed 
boundaries (Stoddard 1982). On the other hand, the Structuralist perspective treats 
boundaries as the point of the exercise of state power and control. 
In addition, the received wisdom in the literature, particularly on the eve 
of, and immediately after independence was full of apocalyptic „predictions‟ of a 
pan-African crisis arising from boundary-related issues (Hargreaves, 1963, 1985; 
Zartman, 1965; Cukwurah, 1967; Anene 1970). Yet, almost fifty years after, this 
has not been the case. Part of the rationale for this study is to provide the reasons 
for this negation of the received wisdom in the literature concerning boundaries in 
Africa.  
There remain vocal and influential voices calling for the revision of these 
colonial boundaries. Wole Soyinka and Ali Mazrui have both lent their voices to 
the redrawing of African boundaries. Soyinka argues that the colonial powers 
„divvied up Africa like some demented tailor who paid no attention to the 
fabric…‟; he consequently suggested that „we should sit down with square rule 
and compass and redesign the boundaries of African nations‟ (Soyinka, in 
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Asiwaju, 2003: 433). On his part Mazrui (1994) avers that „over the next century, 
the outlines of most present day African states will change one way or the 
other…‟ (Mazrui, in Asiwaju, 2003: 431). 
However, as cogent as these claims are, the solution to the products of the 
„demented‟ tailor is not to redesign the „fabric‟. Were boundaries to be revised, 
what parameters should be adopted? Should ethnic nationality boundaries be the 
basis as much of the criticisms against the present boundary regime borders on 
ethnic groups? Were this criterion to be used, Africa will be further divided into 
bits and pieces and many existing states would cease to exist. What the revision of 
the present boundary would achieve would be further confusion, discontentment 
and upheaval all over the continent, which was what early independent African 
leaders sought to prevent by their solemn declaration in Cairo in 1964.
21
  
The line of argument which this study pursues hinges on the assertion that 
these boundaries are a geopolitical reality that has crystallised over the decades, 
being the basis of territoriality and inter-territorial relations in Africa. Hence, 
attempting to redraw them would only create more problems than it seeks to 
solve. The solution to the issues about them would begin with an examination of 
the approach to the treatment of boundaries in the continent. Though, it has been 
claimed that Africa is the most partitioned continent, yet other continents are also 
partitioned if not balkanised. Indeed, the intensity of partition is greater in Europe 
than in Africa considering the number of boundaries and small states that exist 
due to intense nationalism, self determination and expansionist projects. However, 
many of the issues that Africa still grapples with have become history in Europe, 
                                               
21 It was at the Cairo Summit of heads of states and governments in 1964 that the OAU adopted the 
declaration that the sanctity of inherited colonial boundaries should be upheld and maintained as the 
basis of post-independent territoriality and interstate relations 
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which really is a consequence of the re-examination and re-interpretation of the 
concepts of territoriality and sovereignty in the latter. 
There is a need for a shift of perspective by policy makers in Africa; if for 
almost fifty years after the (regional) integration initiatives were started, without 
any appreciable progress on the horizon, perhaps it is time to change approaches. 
This study claims that the problem with African boundaries is located in the state-
centric approach of policy-decision makers, which curiously has shaped the 
literature on the subject. The dual character of boundaries, that is, their ability to 
unite and to divide simultaneously, ought to be regarded as a major consideration 
in fashioning an appropriate theoretical framework for international boundary 
studies, particularly those that partition culture groups and areas between 
contiguous states. Structurally-induced (statist, formal) and practical behaviours 
(non-statist, informal) operate simultaneously across most international 
boundaries and they both deserve almost equal attention in designing boundary-
related policies.  
2.5 The Yoruba Geo-cultural Space 
This last subsection reviews literature on the Yoruba with a special focus 
on their spatial spread. This is needful to set the geographic scope of this study in 
order to determine whether indeed the boundary under consideration actually cuts 
through the Yoruba culture area. Furthermore, some authors (e.g. Prescott, 1965: 
52) have argued that the westernmost pre-colonial Yoruba kingdom is the Egba 
kingdom,
22
 effectively questioning the basis of this thesis, namely that the 
territories occupied by the Yoruba extend beyond the Nigerian boundary into 
                                               
22 Egba is not even the westernmost Yoruba group in Nigeria. Lying between the territory of the 
Egba and the international boundary with Benin are the Yoruba sub-groups of Ketu, and Ifonyin. 
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Benin and certain enclaves in Togo. 
Law‟s (1977) The Oyo Empire is a history of Oyo, the Yoruba Empire that 
exercised suzerainty over almost the entire geographic space covered by this 
study.
23
 Even though, this region was composed of several sub-groups of the 
Yoruba and Oyo control was not completely imperial, its influence over the 
region was such that it was possible to ascribe a common identity and community 
to these groups of people.
24
 The work presents the prevailing situation of the 
research area prior to the colonial intervention and highlights the reactions 
following the imposition of colonial rule. According to Law (1977: 4), the 
„Yoruba is today applied to a group of peoples who inhabit a large area of south-
western Nigeria…and parts of the neighbouring republics of Benin (Dahomey) 
and Togo…‟. The title Yoruba was originally designated only for the Oyo as the 
name which the Hausa people to the north used in referring to this group. 
However, owing to the overarching influence of Oyo over the rest of the group, 
Christian missionaries who worked in this region in the nineteenth century 
ascribed the title to the whole region.
25
  
The major contribution of Law‟s study to this work is the establishment of 
a Yoruba identity for the group of peoples found in the research area. This 
reinforces the partitioning of the group as they are found across the boundary in 
Nigeria and Benin, contrary to certain authors who claimed that the boundary 
determination was mindful of the social and political situations prevailing at the 
                                               
23 There were stretches of territories that did not come under Oyo control (the Ijebu and Egba 
territories). In the other regions, especially those far removed from metropolitan Oyo, its control, in 
the main, was not more than reducing these places to vassals where tributes were exacted. 
24 This was the thinking of the Church Missionary Society at the advent of colonial rule: the Mission 
adopted the Oyo brand of Yoruba as the Yoruba language owing to the extant influence of Oyo in 
the region. 
25 There were oppositions to this appellation initially by the rest of the group, but gradually, they 
became used to it and the title remains in use till the present 
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time of the imposition of the boundary. 
Adediran (1994) studies western Yoruba territories and their socio-
political history from 1600-1889. Much of the study is based on oral tradition. As 
Fage (1965: 4) point out, „the sense of history, the need for history can be quite 
independent of the ability to write‟; many African societies, in the absence of 
writing „developed formal oral records of their past and elaborate methods of 
maintaining these records for their posterity‟. Smith (1969: ix) argues that in the 
case of the Yoruba, the use of oral tradition as a source of history is quite 
plausible as they are a people „unusually rich in tradition, expressed and 
conserved in many ways‟. Alagoa (1966) has further shown the usefulness of oral 
tradition as a scientific tool of investigating the unrecorded past.  
Adediran establishes a spatial spread for the Yoruba extending from south-
western Nigeria through the mid-latitudes of Benin to specific locations in Togo. 
He further analyses the various waves of migration of the Yoruba groups, initially 
from a central location in Ile Ife (Nigeria) and subsequently from other points in 
the course of the evolution of this group of peoples. This position is also validated 
by field work to the locations identified by this researcher.  
Smith (1969) presents the south-western part of Nigeria through the 
southern tip up to the middle of Benin and specific locations in Togo as being 
home to the Yoruba before the colonisation. He submits that there is a „Yoruba 
“irredenta” in Benin and Togo, cut off from their brethren by the European 
frontier makers in the Scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century…‟ 
(Smith, 1969: 7) To Smith, the homeland of the Yoruba (Ile Yoruba) „stretches 
from the swamps and lagoons of the coast across the rainforests, rising gradually 
towards the oil palm bush and woodland savannah and the distant bend of the 
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Niger‟ (Smith, 1969: 7). Just like Adediran, Smith was able to identify the Yoruba 
homeland as coterminous with the area identified as such by this study. 
Akinjogbin in Dahomey and its Neighbours also supports the spatial 
spread of Oyo‟s political influence to include the entire research area of this study, 
stretching from Nigeria to Benin and even beyond to Togo. It details the 
relationship between Oyo and its vassal kingdoms as well as the eventual 
liberation of these vassals owing to the weakening of the power of Oyo. Indeed, 
there is consensus in the literature of the partitioning of the Yoruba into three 
states.
26
  
Inter-colonial as well as inter-service correspondences are awash with 
evidence of the geographic spread of the Yoruba from their „homeland‟ modern 
Nigeria to the Sabe and especially Ketu regions of present day Benin (Colonial 
Office, 1886). 
2.6 Conclusion 
Existing literature leads to an expectation that the colonial partition would 
have a disruptive effect on the Yoruba identity and group relations. Given their 
separation into different spheres of influence and exposure to distinct socialisation 
processes, beginning with colonisation, this expectation of disruption could be 
taken for granted. However, the particular characteristics of the Yoruba geo-
cultural space, reinforced by the maintenance of traditional authority structures, 
question the basis of the disruptive impact of partition on the Yoruba. Hence, the 
research hypothesis of the thesis is: the partition of the Yoruba geo-cultural space, 
                                               
26 Even where the author seeks to present a contrary opinion like Nugent, the fact of the partition 
could not be wished away. As earlier stated, the Alaketu of Ketu, a prominent Yoruba king in Benin 
claimed that the partition only separated the British and the French, not the Yoruba. Evidence from 
field work, supplied not only by the traditional elite, but also by the people and government 
agencies supports the fact of the partition. 
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and the subsequent contrasting socialisation processes have not led to the 
disruption of Yoruba group affinity and identity. 
There are obvious gaps in the study of border partitioned groups in West 
Africa, especially the Yoruba which straddle the Nigeria – Benin boundary; 
several questions and issues are left unresolved, while some others are curiously 
left unaddressed. For the focus of this study, as with other boundary making 
processes in the continent, the literature is divided regarding the manner of the 
partition. One school of thought championed by Perham (1956), Asiwaju (1976), 
and Griffiths (1986) contends that the boundary making process did not consider 
prevailing local social realities at the time. On the other hand, another school 
(Anene, 1970; Herbst, 1989) argue that Africans were part of the process, either as 
passive umpires or active collaborators. This debate has direct significance for the 
sub-research questions relating to the manner of the boundary making process and 
the role played by Africans. Part of the challenge for this study is the need to 
investigate the boundary making process, especially by field study and archival 
research, in order to be able to unearth the reality about the process.  
Another unresolved question arising from the literature review relates to the 
location of the boundary vis-à-vis the Yoruba culture area. Some authors (e.g., 
Prescott, 1965, Anene, 1970) argue that the boundary did not partition the 
territorial area of the Yoruba, as it was deliberately positioned in the frontier zone 
between the warring kingdoms of Dahomey and Egba (Mills, 1970). On the other 
hand, several other authors, the most prominent among whom being Asiwaju 
(1984, 1989, 2001, 2003) and Griffiths (1986), have argued that the boundary 
actually partitioned the culture area. The primary research method adopted in this 
study allows ethnographic surveys as well as the examination of the instruments 
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of the boundary making, in order to contribute original knowledge about this 
particular question. 
 A related issue is the debate over the Yoruba identity. Granted, a Yoruba 
identity as we have come to know it today was non-existent prior to colonial rule; 
indeed, many of the subgroups which make up the Yoruba today were organised 
as semi-autonomous kingdoms. Is it possible then to talk of a Yoruba identity 
prior to colonisation? The Empire of Oyo was influential in the process of 
determining and mapping the Yoruba identity. However, while Johnson (1921) 
have claimed an overarching political authority for the Oyo Empire, some have 
indeed, queried, and charted a contrasting extent of its territorial sovereignty 
(Akinjogbin, 1967; Law, 1977).   This study seeks to examine and analyse the 
historiography of the Yoruba with a focus on the Yoruba „community‟ and 
identity before, during and after colonial rule in order to answer the sub-research 
question regarding the impact of the boundary as well as contrasting colonial 
administrations of the Yoruba. 
Owing to conflicting perspectives, the boundary under study has been a source 
of significant tension between the neighbouring states,
27
 with Nigeria being 
always the aggrieved party. Governments consider boundaries as immutable part 
of the state and treat them as such, while the people, especially borderland 
inhabitants whose territories are partitioned by the boundary regard them as 
merely administrative and carry on as though the boundaries are not there. Indeed, 
for some of these people, the boundary is an irritant and thus, they engage in 
activities (for example, smuggling) as a reaction to the arbitrary imposition 
                                               
27 Every interstate boundary in Africa possesses the potentiality for conflict as they are largely 
ambiguous, challengeable and un-patrollable. 
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(Flynn, 1997). The question that the literature has failed to provide answer to is: in 
the face of such pressure and tension, why has this boundary been peaceful and 
territories treated as settled realities? There is also the related issue of irredentism, 
which is capable of unsettling the „settled‟ realities of boundaries. 
Just as the debate over the process of their determination continues, there also 
remains a growing controversy over the fate of these boundaries. While authors 
and commentators like Soyinka and Mazrui continue to provide support for the 
need to redraw the boundaries, other authors contend that the issue is not with the 
redrawing of African boundaries, but with the use to which the boundaries are 
deployed (Asiwaju, 2003). However, given the groundswell of opposition against 
the boundaries by nationalist African leaders, they (boundaries), as inherited at 
independence ought to have become history, yet, almost fifty years after 
independence, they remain strong; they remain the basis for ordering interstate 
relations. This study seeks to investigate this durability in spite of interests and 
forces which have consistently sought to abolish them. 
These questions and issues are at the core of this study. It is hoped that by the 
concluding chapter, these issues would have been thoroughly examined and 
analysed, adding to the knowledge base on the subject. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1   Introduction 
There is a dearth of research works on the assessment of the impact of 
partition on the identity and group affinity of the Yoruba partitioned between 
Nigeria and Benin. The most significant researches on these subjects are over 
thirty years old (Anene, 1970; Mills, 1970; Prescott, 1971; Asiwaju, 1976a) with 
the exception of (Flynn, 1997). While Anene‟s work focuses on the entire 
boundaries between Nigeria and all its neighbours, Mills‟ focus was on the 
geography of the entire Nigeria – Benin boundary. Prescott‟s work extends 
beyond the evolution of Nigeria‟s international boundaries to include its internal 
boundaries. Asiwaju‟s work compares the colonial policies of France and Britain 
in the partitioned western Yorubaland. The works of Asiwaju, Prescott and Flynn 
provide a close parallel analogue to this present study.  
Prescott (1971) is essentially a geographic analysis of Nigeria‟s 
international boundaries with the Yoruba area constituting a part of the study. The 
work relies mainly on historical reports of missionaries and explorers as well as 
an analysis of archival sources. For Asiwaju (1976a), the study is essentially a 
comparative historical analysis of colonial rule in western Yorubaland between 
1889 and 1945. Flynn (1997) is an anthropological analysis of the boundary in 
relation to the Yoruba borderland. Expectedly, the analysis focuses exclusively on 
the pattern of interactions across the boundary by the partitioned group.  
Methodologically, Asiwaju and Prescott adopt the historical approach, 
which is appropriate for their studies given the scope and subject of analysis. 
Flynn‟s approach reflects the cultural element of her discipline. However, for this 
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present study, which seeks to assess the implications of the evolution of the 
boundary on the successor states as well as the partitioned groups, the research 
methodology, while incorporating elements of the historical and cultural 
perspectives, includes a more comprehensive multidisciplinary approach which 
analyses not only current, but also historical practice of the State(s) and the 
Yoruba group. 
The thesis addresses the „how‟ of the boundary making process as well as 
the impact of how the Yoruba group have interacted with, and negotiated the 
boundary on the one hand, and how the State(s) have interacted with, and utilised 
the boundary, on the other. Hence, interrogating the boundary making process 
requires a political history of partition; the interaction of the Yoruba with the 
boundary requires the use of the anthropological approach; while the last requires 
more of political geography.  
Data about the partition, being historical, were collected using both the 
field work interviews of traditional rulers and the archives. Details of the data 
collection methods are presented in sections 3.2, 3.4 and 3.52 of this chapter. The 
dataset about how the Yoruba negotiate and interact with the boundary was both 
historical and contemporaneous; hence the data collection method adopted the 
horizontal case study approach, which collected data from the point of the 
partition, through colonial rule, and until the present. Data collection details are 
also presented in section 3.2 and 3.5 of this chapter. The dataset about the 
relationship between the State(s) and the boundary, being more recent, was 
collected from government publications, related research works, interview of 
relevant officials of government agencies, and the news media. Data collection 
details are presented in sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this chapter. 
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Furthermore, the earlier studies (Asiwaju and Prescott) are essentially 
located within the statist perspective, while Flynn‟s work is located, primarily 
within the functionalist perspective.   For this present study, however, an eclectic 
approach is adopted, incorporating the structuralist and the functionalist 
perspectives, in order to be able to examine and analyse the distinct and 
competing discourses of the boundary. 
Finally, these works are dated. Asiwaju‟s is a comparative study of French 
and British colonialism in western Yorubaland, between 1885 and 1945. 
Prescott‟s study, while also being largely colonial, extends into the first few years 
of independence. Flynn‟s is over a decade old, and the scope is limited to three 
borderland villages. This present study, while also concerned with the historical 
evolution of society and colonialism, examines contemporary developments in 
postcolonial Africa. The scope is much wider than Flynn‟s as it seeks a wider 
Yoruba perspective on the border. Furthermore, as society is dynamic, issues and 
challenges in international relations are similarly dynamic, this study is necessary 
in order to identify the impacts of the transformation of interstate relations since 
the time of these earlier works on this boundary. These issues and challenges 
inform the methodology adopted for this study, distinguishing it from the earlier 
works on the subject. 
Given the nature of the substantive and sub-research questions derived 
from the literature review, the most appropriate research methodology for this 
study is the historicised case study approach which included intensive field work 
collecting primary data (mainly interview technique) in the Yoruba area astride 
the Nigeria – Benin international boundary. It also included archival research at 
the British National Archives in London. In addition, relevant newspapers (and 
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electronic media) as well as original government (and intergovernmental) 
documents were content analysed for primary data for the study. Apart from 
primary sources of information, the study also relied secondary sources of data 
collection, which were mainly literature based, and provided relevant background 
information as well as theoretical and conceptual guidance. The multiple sources 
of information would afford the opportunity to validate data provided through the 
triangulation technique. 
3.2 Primary Data 
 Primary sources of data constitute an invaluable and indispensable aspect 
of the study. Indeed, Prescott (1965: 63) rightly contends that „field work is an 
indispensable source of information relating to boundary studies‟. Its main 
sources included archival search for a review of the evolution of the boundary as 
in treaties, inter-colonial correspondences, surveys and maps, resulting in its 
delimitation and demarcation. The National Archives in Ibadan (Nigeria) and the 
British National Archives at Kew Garden, London were particularly helpful.  
Essentially, the research involved field study in the designated study area, 
both in Nigeria and in Benin. The field study involved, in part, a great deal of 
semi-structured in-depth (individual) interviews (IDIs) of traditional rulers and 
members of certain traditional guilds of historians on both sides of the boundary 
to capture pre-colonial as well as contemporary situations in order to be able to 
highlight any discernible distinction in these periods. Traditional rulers are 
particularly important to this study as the bulk of pre-colonial African history is 
unrecorded; therefore, traditional rulers, considered as repositories and custodians 
of the history and culture of the people become invaluable as sources of 
information about the African past. Furthermore, the traditional guild of historians 
81 
 
represents a category of specially trained individuals, usually within particular 
family lineages, who serve as the official custodians of traditional history and 
culture, which are preserved in codes and in various forms, some of which are not 
discernible by the uninitiated. 
The case study is the Yoruba culture area (the so called Yorubaland) 
divided between Nigeria and Benin. The choice is informed by the long history of 
empire making of the Yoruba, their experience of colonial partition as well as 
their being one of the most populous ethnic groups in Africa. Thus, the findings 
here could be applied elsewhere in the understanding of boundary dynamics in the 
continent. Study sites at the boundary (or proximate to it) were the main focus of 
the study, however, historically significant sites (e.g. Oyo, Abeokuta (Nigeria) as 
well as Ketu and Porto Novo in Benin) also provided the necessary historical 
linkage. For instance, what is the place of Oyo in the construction of the Yoruba 
project? In the same vein, what is the significance of Ketu in the Yoruba project? 
These interrogations are necessary because what may be considered Yoruba may 
in fact be elite (royal) construction as distinct from the history of the people. 
Though the proximate locations are directly impacted by the boundary 
demarcation the historically significant towns are important to this study as they 
held suzerainty over the territorial area inhabited by the Yoruba. Furthermore, 
such government agencies as the departments of customs and immigration 
services and boundary commission were also included in the field of analysis. A 
specific border agency, the joint border patrol unit established by the governments 
of Nigeria and Benin was a veritable source of information. 
 Specifically, the field work was conducted in the following towns and 
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villages:
28
 Ketu, Ipobe, Ifonyin, Porto Novo, Ita-Ijebu, Sakete, Isale Eko, Cotonou 
and Seme in Benin Republic. In Nigeria, field work was conducted in Lagos, 
Ketu, Ijofin, Badagry, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Imeko, Ilara and Abuja.  
 The effective field work began on the 15
th
 of October 2008. However, owing 
to tension and insecurity at the border crossing at Seme,
29
 it was near impossible 
to collect data from officers of government agencies and borderland people at this 
very important border point. Following the passage of time, the researcher‟s 
research assistants were able to collect information from this category of 
respondents later between 4
th
 and 17
th
 January 2009. A total of 91 respondents (75 
during the substantive field work and 16 by research assistants) were interviewed.  
Data collected by the research assistants were validated by follow-up telephone 
interviews of randomly selected respondents (from among those interviewed by 
research assistants) by the researcher between 3
rd
 and 18
th
 of June 2009.
30
  
Below is a summary of the respondents interviewed: 
1. Six traditional rulers31 (two in Benin and four in Nigeria): The Alaketu of 
Ketu and two other principal chiefs; the Onisakete of Sakete (including three of 
his principal chiefs and advisers) in Benin; while in Nigeria, the following 
traditional rulers were selected owing to their location at the border region or their 
shared ethnic affinity with the Yoruba group across the boundary in Benin: the 
Onimeko of Imeko, the Oloola of Ilara, the Balogun of Ketu and the Balogun of 
Yewaland.
32
 
                                               
28 The research benefitted from the researcher‟s earlier work in this area as well as in the Yoruba 
speaking locations in Togo and Ghana. 
29 Details of the crisis are provided below. 
30 As part of measures to check on the veracity of data collected by the research assistants, the 
telephone numbers of the respondents were collected (of course with their expressed consent) with a 
view to further interview. 
31 The consent of these chiefs was sought and granted to be named in the study. 
32 Yewaland is the collection of Ketu speaking people in Ogun State of Nigeria. 
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2. Two borderland academics: the choice of these academics was deliberate; 
they were to provide objective views, which provided a basis for the validation of 
the views of the traditional elite and those of the people. The academics are 
borderlanders themselves with roots across the boundary. On the Nigerian side, 
Professor Asiwaju, whose paternal ancestral roots are located in Ketu (Benin), but 
he is a Nigerian national award winner and one-time Nigeria‟s National 
Boundaries Commissioner fitted the role of a borderland scholar for this study. On 
the Benin side attempts to reach an indigenous borderland academic was 
unsuccessful; however, at the Universite de Nationale, Lome, the search came up 
with a Yoruba professor of rural agriculture (John Ogoude) with links with the 
Yoruba of Nigeria.  
3. Two officials of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS): ECOWAS is crucial to the integration of the sub-region; its Protocol 
on free movement of ECOWAS nationals across national boundaries of member 
states is meant to be one of the pillars of this objective of regional integration. The 
officials, one each from the Political Affairs Department and Free Movement of 
Persons Department, provided information on the challenges to integration and 
efforts at overcoming them.  
4. Two senior officials of the Nigerian Boundaries Commission – a director in 
the international boundaries division and an official of the legal department. The 
Nigerian Boundaries Commission oversees the maintenance of the country‟s 
boundaries; it has organised joint boundary workshops with all of Nigeria‟s 
neighbours
33
 as well as being part of the mixed commissions set up in the wake of 
the Bakassi issue with Cameroun. The researcher had the good fortune of 
                                               
33 The proceedings of these joint workshops have been published and are easily available. 
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attending one of its public seminars organised in conjunction with the Nigerian 
Population Commission in 2006 to draw attention to the recurrent problems of 
non-nationals being enumerated in previous censuses as Nigerians. 
5. The Boundary Commissioner for Ogun State: the state boundary commission 
is the regional version of the national commission. Ogun State is a region in the 
Nigerian Federation whose territories are proximate to the study area in Nigeria 
6. Five Beninese customs officials34 
7. Four Beninese gendarmeries (member of the joint border patrol unit) 
8. Two Beninese Immigration officials 
9. Six Nigerian immigration officials 
10. Two Nigerian border Police officers 
11. Three Nigerian customs officers 
12. Four Nigerian secondary students in an international school in Cotonou,  
Benin 
13. a Nigerian teacher in the same school 
14. Five commercial vehicle drivers  
15. A group of commercial motorcycle riders (10) 
16. Five Nigerian students (borderlanders) 
17. Four elderly (over 70 years old) Beninese (1 in Isakete, 1 in Cotonou, 1 in  
Ipobe and 1 in Ketu 
18. Eight students of the Lagos State University (located about 40 miles from the  
border crossing) 
19. Four Yoruba businessmen at the international motor park in Cotonou 
                                               
34 One of these customs officials impounded the researcher‟s laptop computer allegedly for not 
carrying the purchase receipt. To release the computer, the researcher was asked to pay a certain 
amount of money, which is the usual practice at the border crossings between these two countries. 
The researcher‟s refusal led to his „detention‟ for a while until a senior official intervened and the 
computer was released without paying the „crossing‟ money. 
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20. Two Yoruba hoteliers in Sakete 
21. Two petty traders in Ilara 
22. Five people in Imeko (a gateman, a food seller, the young son of the oba, a  
Copy typist and a commercial motorcycle operator) 
23. Two people in Ketu, Nigeria (the Balogun‟s son  and a tailor) 
24. Five people in Ita Ijebu (a motor bike operator, 3 farmers and a petty trader) 
Table 1: Demographic distribution of respondents 
As mentioned above, the field study largely employed the in-depth 
individual interview strategy. The technique is one of the most important means 
of case study data collection. The choice of this strategy is the result of a careful 
consideration of the type of research questions posed, the extent of the 
researcher‟s control over actual behaviour of respondents and the 
historical/contemporaneous character of the data sought. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the respondent were also crucial in the choice of technique; the 
language barrier, as most Beninese respondents are French speaking while the 
researcher is not proficient in the language. Thus, interview in the Yoruba 
language best suited our purpose as both the researcher and respondents are 
Yoruba speakers. Again, as interviews afford the opportunity of immediate 
Age Frequ
ency 
Percen
tage 
Sex   
   Male Female 
>70 9 9.89 5 4  
60-69 11 12.08 7 4 
40-49 15 16.48 9 6 
30-39 19 20.87 9 10 
20-29 24 26.37 13 11 
<20 13 14.28 5 8 
Total 91 99.97 48 43 
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response, the problems of low percentage returns of questionnaires did not arise, 
as well as improperly filled questionnaires. Furthermore, as certain of the 
questions are quite sensitive, the interview method afforded the opportunity to ask 
follow up or probing questions, which would not be possible with the 
questionnaire strategy. 
 Essentially, the „why‟ and the „how‟ components of the research questions 
were subjected to the interview mode. Yin (2003: 1) asserts that „the “how” and 
“why” questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case 
studies… This is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be 
traced over time rather than mere frequencies‟ of occurrence, which is the strength 
of surveys. The other questions relating to the „what‟ and the „where‟, which 
obviously the interview methodology cannot adequately address were tackled by 
the other strands of the triangulation approach, namely, archival research as well 
as literature review and contemporary newspaper content analysis.  
The conduct of the field work was guided by a line of inquiries that was 
structured in a manner that was open-ended, friendly and non-threatening. For the 
interview in Benin, though the questions were prepared in English, the actual 
conduct of the interviews was in Yoruba as many of the respondents are non-
English speaking.
35
 The interviews in Nigeria were conducted both in English and 
Yoruba as some respondents cannot freely express themselves in English, while 
some others preferred to speak in Yoruba. The bulk of the interviews with 
officials of government in Nigeria were conducted in English. 
The interview technique adopted a mix of case study strategies, both target 
and accidental respondents. The target respondents included the traditional elite 
                                               
35 The whole research would have run into a hitch had the researcher not been able to communicate 
in Yoruba as he cannot speak French, which is the official language of Benin.  
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who were specifically sought out for the position they occupied both as rulers as 
well as the custodians of the culture, history and tradition of their people. The 
boundary specialists too were deliberately selected for their knowledge and 
expertise about the subject-matter. Government officials were also targeted in 
order to acquire information from the men-on-the-ground and to reflect official 
views on boundary dynamics. The other respondents were not so deliberately 
selected, but were interviewed on the basis of accessibility and availability. One 
of the high points of the field work was the group interview of ten commercial 
motorbike riders, which prompted the researcher to switch strategies from one-on-
one interview technique to a focus group strategy. These respondents also 
transformed into informants with lots of information that may not have been 
available in the one-on-one format. 
3.3 Secondary Data 
 Secondary data were sourced from libraries in the United Kingdom, 
especially the Durham University Library; the Library of the University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne; the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) 
Library at Durham University. In Nigeria, the libraries of the Universities of 
Ibadan, Lagos and Lagos State as well as the Library of the African Regional 
Institute
36
 were visited for their collections on colonial rule and the Yoruba 
groups. Private libraries and collections of certain traditional rulers and scholars 
(e.g., the Alaketu of Ketu and Professor Anthony Asiwaju
37
) were also very useful 
sources of information. The Library of the National Boundaries Commission in 
Abuja, Nigeria was also very useful for its collections on joint boundary 
                                               
36 The Library of the African Regional Institute was very useful for its collection of back issues of 
the Journal of Borderland.  The Institute is dedicated to border, borderland and regional integration 
studies and pointedly located at the Yoruba borderland town of Imeko, Nigeria.  
37 Professor Asiwaju is one of the foremost scholars of borderlands in Africa. He is the founder and 
president of the African Regional Institute. 
88 
 
workshops with neighbouring states as well as government documents (surveys 
and agreements) relating to boundary issues. In Benin, access to library 
information was restricted as the documents are published in French.
38
 Content 
analysis of newspaper articles, especially on contemporary issues on the subject 
matter also provided useful data for the research. Government documents, 
especially those of its agencies involved in boundary matters were useful sources 
of data as well.  
3.4 Study Design 
The field study was planned to last for sixty days, but it actually lasted for 
forty four days, largely due to tension and insecurity along the border region.
39
 It 
involved a great deal of travel back and forth across the boundary in order to 
undertake some degree of ethnographic study of the people (borderland 
inhabitants and government officials) in the study area. 
The study involved the use of various tools, mainly qualitative in both 
countries. The main tool of data collection was the semi structured in-depth 
(individual) interview (IDI) of respondents. The IDIs were audio-
taped/handwritten (shorthand) and later transcribed. At some point in the course 
of the field study, focus group discussion (FGD) was employed to take advantage 
of a group relevant to the study. Ethnographic survey was also used to collect data 
as the researcher exploited his firsthand experience in the borderland, at border 
crossings and observations of clandestine exchange and transportation of goods 
across the boundary.   
                                               
38 This limitation was overcome by using the library of the University of Togo in Lome where the 
researcher had the privilege of Yoruba-speaking „research assistants‟ who readily led him to the 
relevant shelves, books and articles, which were then translated into English. 
39
 The tension along was occasioned by the death of a customs officer by allegedly by smugglers. 
However, by the time the fieldwork was called off, sufficient ground had been covered coupled with 
a uniform pattern of answers to the question, which made further research unnecessary. 
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The study design was approved by the School of Government and 
International Affairs, Durham University following clarifications about ethical 
issues. Each respondent was also intimated with the subject and purpose of the 
study; the confidentiality and voluntariness of participation were made clear. In 
specific instances, the consent of respondents was sought and granted to be named 
in the report of the study. No inducements were given. A letter indicating 
authorisation and institutional affiliation was also made available to respondents.   
3.5 Methodology 
The methodology adopted for this study is the triangulation strategy, relying 
essentially on longitudinal case study, archival analysis and field study. 
Triangulation is a strategy which increases the validity/reliability of the outcome 
of research. This it does by the use of multiple methods or sources of data 
collection which compare and synthesise data from different sources or methods 
thereby corroborating or repudiating findings. Denzin (1978) identifies four types 
of triangulation, namely: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory 
triangulation and methodological triangulation. 
The strength of triangulation hinges on the fact that the weaknesses of one 
method are usually the strength of another. In other words, the shortcomings of 
one method are overcome by another method, hence combining methods helps 
overcome unique deficiencies. Furthermore, a multi-method strategy helps 
comparison of data sourced from different sources which strengthens the validity 
of research findings (Denzin, 1978). 
The most obvious expectation with triangulation is convergence among 
data collected through different sources. However, it is also likely that certain data 
may be inconsistent with the trend of findings and thus may compel alternative 
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propositions about the subject being studied. Yet another outcome of triangulation 
may necessitate a redirection of the scope and focus of the research when data are 
completely contradictory. In other words, the outcome of triangulation is not 
given, it may support and strengthen the research hypothesis, but it may also 
repudiate the hypothesis. The strength of triangulation lies in the ability to provide 
evidence – convergence, consistent or contradictory - such that the researcher is 
able to provide plausible explanation for social phenomena (Denzin, 1978). 
Following from Denzin‟s typology, this research employed the 
methodological triangulation type, hinged on the longitudinal case study method 
of primary data collection through: in-depth individual interview technique; 
archival search; and literature review. The longitudinal case study method is most 
useful for this study because it is a historicized method, which investigates the 
case study over different phases in the evolution of the society - the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post colonial situations - in a comparative manner, highlighting the 
status-quo ante, the evolution of the boundary, and the subsequent relationship 
between parts of the partitioned group, on the one hand and, between the states on 
the other. 
3.51 Participant Observation 
The field work required extensive travel, back and forth across the 
international boundary and afforded the researcher the invaluable opportunity of 
participant observation. The customs and immigrations officials were seen at 
work; the smugglers were observed in the process of outmaneuvering agencies of 
the state; ordinary borderland dwellers were seen exploiting their location at the 
periphery of the state, which adds an ethnographic quality to the research, albeit, 
unplanned.  
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3.52 Oral Tradition 
An integral component of the field work was a reliance on oral tradition, 
especially for the period prior to colonial rule and the advent of recorded history 
in much of Africa. Knowledge about the „indigenous‟ African past is shrouded in 
myths and fables as much of the pre-colonial history of the continent is 
unrecorded but preserved in tales, songs and fables.
40
 Hence, the recourse to this 
source of data (tradition and bearers of tradition have been described as a „talking 
book‟ (Tonkin, 1986: 205).  Oral tradition is crucial in eliciting information about 
pre-colonial Yoruba as tales (itan) remain a critical means of transmitting culture 
and history from generation to generation. Songs and folklores are woven round 
events which are then preserved and transmitted across time. Indeed, the task of 
transmitting tradition was entrusted to the nobility as the institution of traditional 
authority is regarded as the custodian of the history and culture of the society.
41
 In 
some Yoruba societies, just as in other professions, guilds evolved to oversee the 
preservation of the history and tradition of society. Thus, the target respondents 
here included the obas and members of this guild as well as older members of the 
society. 
In spite of the critical importance of the oral tradition in gathering data and 
collecting information on pre-colonial Africa, it has certain weaknesses.  Its 
criticisms include the lack of absolute chronology; it could be selective in its 
contents; it is more often than not compromised by human errors, unconscious or 
deliberate manipulation of facts and figures. However, these weaknesses were 
corrected through the triangulation approach which checks the validity of one data 
                                               
40 However, E.J. Alagoa has established oral tradition as a veritable source of information about the 
unrecorded past of Africa. His various works on the subject centring on the analysis of indigenous 
proverbs to unravel the past have remained the reference point for oral tradition in African history.   
41 While structuring colonial Yoruba for Indirect Rule, the British relied on the authority of the Ooni 
of Ife in determining the number and seniority of Yoruba kings. 
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collection method against two or more other methods and inconsistencies are 
identified and controlled. 
3.6      Limitations of Study 
The research for this study encountered certain limitations, which 
collectively hampered its conduct. Much of the limitations associated with data 
collection were taken care of by the triangulation technique adopted for the study. 
However, there were some other limiting factors which posed a great hindrance 
for the conduct of the study; they are presented below:  
Insecurity was of the greatest concern. Indeed, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office classified Nigeria (especially, the Niger Delta and the 
Lagos area) as high travel risk. As noted in section 3.2 of this chapter, insecurity 
at one of the most important border crossings (Seme) along the Nigeria-Benin 
boundary actually halted the conduct of the research. Furthermore, eliciting 
information from agents of the state at this border posts was hindered by the 
uncooperative stance of many of these officials due to the killing of a customs 
officer by smugglers. Similarly, road travel was perilous as smugglers drive 
recklessly on the stretch between Lagos in Nigeria and Cotonou in Benin. 
Language barrier was another significant limitation. The significance of 
the English/French divide in West Africa became highlighted during the field 
work. This limitation prevented access to government officials and academics in 
Benin where the lingua franca is French. The literature sources in Benin were in 
French and relevant sources had to be translated into English for the purpose of 
this study. In certain instances, one of the research assistants acted as an 
interpreter between the researcher and officials of government agents. 
Time was also a limiting factor. Many of the target respondents are 
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important traditional rulers who are difficult to commit to appointments. 
Similarly, one of the target academics had to travel for an international conference 
at the time of the scheduled visit. That appointment had to be rescheduled costing 
the researcher valuable time and money. Generally, ethnographic research of this 
kind would benefit from a more liberal time latitude which would afford more in-
depth interviews, as well as participant observations of some of the phenomena 
under consideration. However, given the time-bound nature of a doctoral research, 
such privileges were unaffordable luxuries. 
    3.7 Structure of Chapters and Research Question 
The aim of this study, as identified above, is to assess the impact of the 
partition on Yoruba identity, beginning from the partition to the present. The study is 
therefore best conducted using a multidisciplinary approach, which enables the 
analysis of the different periods and issues associated with the transformation or 
otherwise of the Yoruba. Multidisciplinarity is best suited for this study as a 
unidisciplinary approach would be unable to effectively address the various issues 
(political history, anthropology, and political geography) and nuances associated 
with the study.  
The purpose of this section is to lay out the functions of the subsequent 
chapters in answering the research question, highlighting the multidisciplinary 
approach. Chapter four is largely focused on the dynamics of the partition. The 
analysis of the issues, actors and factors surrounding the partition demands a political 
history approach to the partition. Thus, history plays a major role in examining and 
analysing the pre-colonial situation, which the colonial partition „disordered‟ and 
transformed, as well as the processes that led to the determination of the boundary. 
Chapter five addresses the impact of partition on the Yoruba as well as their 
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reactions to the foreign imposition. This chapter also relies partly on history in 
analysing the reactions and response of the Yoruba to the colonial partition. It also 
relies on anthropology to address issues relating to perception and the (ab)use of the 
boundary as well as intra-group relations. Chapter six mainly uses the analytical tools 
of political geography in addressing the official discourses of the boundary. The 
reality of contiguity engenders the need for inter-state relations between Nigeria and 
Benin, which was driven largely by geo-political considerations. However, in the 
context of the partition and the continuity of traditional Yoruba cultural practices in 
the borderland between the two states, strictly geopolitical considerations alone 
would be insufficient as analytical tool. Hence, anthropological tools become 
necessary in order to offer a more robust analysis of the relations between Nigeria 
and Benin. As commerce is also an important element of the relations between the 
two states, understanding the pattern of their relationship also requires some 
understanding of the economic imperative of cross-border trade and exchanges. 
Chapter seven addresses the weakness of these two states in a globalised world. It 
analyses the territorial sovereignty of these states in the context of contemporary 
globalisation. This would require a political approach to the issues of the weak state 
and their resistance to globalising forces which then challenges their sovereignty. 
Chapter eight offers the summary of the findings of the study as well as its main 
contributions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WEST AFRICA BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE PARTITION AND PARTITIONING THE YORUBA 
4.1    Introduction 
The colonial epoch
42
 in West Africa led to a fundamental transformation of 
the region, both in terms of territoriality as well as the organisation of society, 
replacing traditional modes of territoriality, administration, commerce and 
exchange, justice, education, etc with new, and more importantly foreign, social 
formations (Ekeh, 1983). The manner of the imperial advance, in the form of 
„pacification‟ and „protection‟ led to the overthrow of traditional African political, 
economic, judicial and social systems which were considered incompatible with 
modern civilised norms, imported by the imperialists. As Ekeh (1983: 11-12) has 
identified, colonialism engendered three kinds of social formations in Africa, 
namely: transformed pre-colonial indigenous social structures; migrated social 
structures; and emergent social structures. In other words, colonialism not only 
transformed indigenous social structures, it imported into Africa European social 
structures as well as fostered the emergence of entirely new social structures. The 
implications of these could hardly be ephemeral, but revolutionary and permanent. 
 In this Chapter, I intend to provide an analysis of the pre-colonial and the 
colonial social and political situations in West Africa generally, and in the Yoruba 
geo-cultural space, in particular, highlighting the transformations that were 
fostered by the intervention of colonialism. The objective of this chapter is to 
contribute to answering the main research question of this thesis, through the 
                                               
42 Colonialism has been described as epochal as distinct from the more popular characterisation as a 
phase owing to the revolutionary transformations engendered by the process. 
96 
 
specific supplementary research questions relating to the nature and the extent of 
the geo-cultural space of pre-colonial Yoruba society and identity; the sub-
research question on the „how‟ of, and actors in the partition; the impact of the 
partition on the kin (ebi) consciousness of the Yoruba sub-groups; and the roles of 
the African (Yoruba) elite in the boundary making process. 
4.2 West Africa before the Partition 
This section presents the characteristics of pre-colonial West African 
societies in order to establish the pattern of pre-colonial situation against which 
the impact of colonisation will be gauged. The objective being to answer the 
research questions on the nature of pre-colonial social and political situations in 
order to determine the subsequent impacts of colonial rule especially, the 
imposition of boundaries on largely homogenous societies.  
West Africa is situated in the north-western corner of the continent. The 
region extends from Senegal to Nigeria along the coast, and between Niger on the 
Northeast to Mauretania on the Northwest. West Africa is one of the most 
ethnically diverse regions of the world with over three hundred ethnic groups 
located in sixteen countries.
43
 In spite of the vast cultural differences expected 
from such a wide array of groups, there exist general similarities
44
 which 
distinguish the people of this region from elsewhere in the continent.  
Historically, the evolution of West Africa can be divided into three or four 
phases (Rotberg, 1965), namely: prehistory, which represents the earliest 
civilisation, characterised by sedentary agricultural practises as well as the 
                                               
43
 Nigeria alone is reported to host over 250 ethnic groups.  
44 The most significant distinguishing feature of West Africans is linguistic; unlike the rest of sub-
Saharan Africans (almost), the West African groups are non-Bantu speakers, though they all belong 
to the Niger-Congo language group. 
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domestication of wildlife. The next historical phase in West Africa developed 
from advances in human social organisation occasioned by advancements in the 
means of production that transformed sedentary agriculture to a more large-scaled 
practise to support the demands of growing population. Thus evolved centralised 
states and empires, notable among which were the empires of Mali, Songhai, 
Ghana and Oyo. The later part of this period witnessed the beginning of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade.  
The period just prior to the advent of colonial rule in West Africa was 
characterised by kingdoms and political organisations such as Dahomey, Benin
45
 
and Asante which thrived on the trade in slaves. Slave trading had turned the 
entire region into a state of chaos as intra- and inter- group conflicts were 
contrived in order to keep a steady flow of supply in slave commodities. Apart 
from the chaos engendered by slaving, in the savannah stretch of the region, from 
Senegal through the Futa Djallon Hills to the Hausa city states in present day 
Nigeria and Niger, the revolutionary spread of Islam had sprung up and steadily 
gained momentum.
46
 The political turmoil caused by this jihad added to that 
produced by slaving kingdoms in the southern part of the region. The territories of 
West Africa can thus be described as one in turmoil, shaped by the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade and the radical spread of Islam. 
The final phase in this historiography is the colonial era, which will be 
                                               
45 The Benin Kingdom is distinct from the Republic of Benin. The kingdom of Benin was a 
prosperous slaving kingdom which thrived on the ruins of the Old Oyo Empire until the superior 
fire-power of the British ended its growth in 1897. 
46 Indeed, the Sokoto Caliphate, which emerged from the Jihad of the early 19th century in present-
day Northern Nigeria and southern Niger, had spread as far south as Ikirun after overrunning Offa in 
the Yoruba region in southern Nigeria. The aim of the southern spread of the Jihad was to touch the 
flag of Sokoto to the sea, symbolising the spread of Islam over the entire region south of Sokoto. 
This grand design was halted directly by the imposition of European rule, which „pacified‟ the 
warring parties in the region.  
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more critically analysed later in the thesis.  For the purpose of this study, the later 
part of the history of this region, that is, the period just before and after the 
establishment of colonial rule will be analysed in details while the two earlier 
periods will only be referenced where necessary. 
Geopolitically, the pre-colonial political societies were organised around 
the capital, with political influence and authority petering out the further one went 
from the core of the kingdom. As wars and conquests were recurring factors 
during this period, many pre-colonial West African states were in a constant state 
of flux, growing and ebbing, depending on their fortunes at the warfronts. 
Therefore, political boundaries were also unstable. Indeed, territorial extents were 
not gauged in terms of boundaries, but in terms of frontiers, representing „no 
man‟s land‟ and targets of future expansion by more dominant groups. 
Frontiers in pre-colonial West Africa have been categorised by Momoh 
(1989) into three, namely: minimal borderland; zero borderland and maximal 
borderland. A minimal frontier is characterised by the absence of cultural and 
ethnic affinity between the groups on both sides of the frontier. Here there was 
little or no interaction among the people on opposite sides of the frontier. Such a 
frontier was, therefore, a target of encroachment by the more powerful group as it 
represented a „no man‟s land‟. However where people on the opposite sides of a 
frontier are „diametrically opposed ideologically and even religiously, the 
borderland space will be zero. It is also likely to be a zone of friction and tension 
especially when the borderland people are goaded from the centre‟ (Momoh, 
1989: 52). The final category of frontiers in pre-colonial West Africa is the 
maximal borderland, representing a wide expanse of interactions between 
populations on opposite sides of a territorial divide. Such contacts as commerce, 
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emotional and kinship affinities tended to foster cooperation
47
 among states which 
indeed led to the formation of alliances between groups of neighbouring states.
48
 
For instance, the Ashanti Empire in present day Ghana forged a loose alliance 
with other Akan societies of Bekwai, Kokofu Mapong and Nsuata for collective 
defence under a common leadership (Burns and Collins, 2007: 138-39). 
Politically, West African societies in pre-colonial times can be grouped 
into two broad categories: centralised, hierarchical political societies and the so-
called „stateless‟ societies. The centralised, hierarchical political societies were 
organised in an intricately stratified manner usually centred on the person of the 
king or emperor who was usually regarded as the essence of the group. Among 
the Yoruba, the king or oba was regarded as „he who must be obeyed‟, whose 
words were law, but he was not an autocrat as he was constitutionally checked by 
a group of powerful chiefs who together with the oba exercised territorial 
sovereignty in the kingdom.
49
 The same was true of Dahomey, whose kingship 
was fashioned after that of the neighbouring Yoruba (Akinjogbin, 1967). In the 
Ashanti Empire, political leadership was vested in the Asantehene (the king) 
supported by an elite córps of civil servants whose progress was measured in 
terms of merit rather than by birth. The power of the king was guaranteed by a 
special police force, Ankobia which was permanently stationed at the capital 
(Burns and Collins, 2007). 
                                               
47 In many pre-colonial maximal frontiers, joint markets are usually located here, thus strengthening 
trans-frontier relations. 
48 However, not all maximal border relations were peaceful and cooperative. Many Yoruba 
kingdoms, in spite of historical and cultural affinities were engaged in warfare during much of this 
period. 
49
 The power of the Yoruba obas was only checked by and subject to colonial powers. Indeed, in the 
British section of Yorubaland, the oba was propped by colonial authority in indirect rule. On the 
other side in French Yorubaland, the power of the oba was significantly diminished owing to the 
French policy of direct rule and later, that of assimilation.  
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In the northern fringes as well as the savannah stretch of the region, the 
most dominant feature was Islam, which influenced the organisation and 
administration of society. From Kanem Bornu through the Hausa/Fulani to the 
Futa Djallon empires, Islam and the Islamic culture permeated the society. In 
these Islamic states, the emir was the theocratic ruler around whom the society 
revolved while the Islamic legal code (Sharia) provided the legal basis for the 
society. 
The „stateless‟ societies were so called owing to the absence of „successive 
institutions of political authority‟. Political control was exercised by ritual experts 
or big men „who were more mediators than rulers among the residents, whose 
associations were bound by kin, secret societies…that control the affairs of the 
village without a hierarchical administration‟ (Burns and Collins, 2007: 129-30). 
Example of „stateless‟ societies in West Africa included the Igbo, Ballanta, and 
the Tiv.
50
 
Inter-African relations in pre-colonial times were manifold, sometimes 
conflictual, while at other times, cooperative. The conflictual aspect of inter-
African relations has been discussed in a previous section of this chapter, 
engendered largely by the drive for slave commodities, Islamic Jihad and 
hegemonic tendencies of strong states. On the cooperative part, there are records 
of exchanges of diplomats and ambassadors among African states and between 
African and European states before colonisation. Smith (1973) catalogues 
diplomatic relationships between African societies, on the one hand and between 
African and European societies on the other. Ryder (1961: 258-259) published a 
                                               
50 In these societies, the British policy of indirect rule encountered great difficulties as there were no 
institutions of traditional authority in place. „Warrant chiefs‟ were therefore created by the 
colonialists, which engendered stiff opposition from the natives. 
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full translation of a 1539 letter written by three Portuguese missionaries in the 
Benin Kingdom to their King, John III regarding the ill-treatment meted out to 
John‟s ambassadors in the kingdom. There was a Congolese embassy in Rome by 
1514 (Bontink, 1970). The Yoruba Empire of Oyo mastered the practice of 
ambassadorial postings with its custom of posting Ilaris (representatives of the 
Oba) to vassal kingdoms in order to enforce Oyo rule and demands for tributes. 
Between Oyo and Dahomey, there were regular exchanges of ambassadors to 
negotiate peace and cooperation between the two power neighbouring states 
(Smith, 1973). The alliance formed between the Ashanti Empire and neighbouring 
Akan political societies mentioned above was facilitated by the diplomatic 
activities of pre-colonial African potentates. Indeed, one of the linguists
51
 of the 
Asantehene in the early nineteenth century, one Agyei, was described by Bowdich 
as the „Foreign Minister‟ of Ashanti, „always employed in difficult foreign 
palavers‟ (in Smith, 1973: 604). 
Treaty agreements
52
 were integral parts of inter-African relations during 
this period. There are records of two treaty agreements between Oyo and 
Dahomey in 1730 and 1748 with the objectives of a comprehensive settlement of 
issues as well as prescribing the annual tribute payable to Oyo by Dahomey 
(Smith 1973: 611). Smith also records the treaty agreement between the Sokoto 
Caliphate and the Hausa city-state of Kebbi signalling a period of peace between 
these hardened enemies (Smith, 1973: 611). 
In sum, West Africa at the advent of colonial rule was a territory in 
turmoil, occasioned by widespread insecurity and political instability, which were 
                                               
51
 A linguist to the king in pre-colonial Asante was the interpreter between the king and foreign 
officials and/or businessmen operating in the empire. 
52 These treaties and agreements were broken at will, thus heightening the condition of insecurity 
and instability in the region. 
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caused by intra- and inter-group conflicts and the revolutionary spread of Islam 
originating from the savannah belt of the region. It is therefore no misnomer that 
the colonial incursion into this region of Africa was referred to in some of the 
colonial literature as „pacifying‟ missions (Hutchinson, 1957; Ajayi, 1965; 
Abraham, 1978). Some of the treaties signed between indigenous African leaders 
and colonial officers were regarded in terms of protection, hence these territories 
were known as „protectorates‟. Indeed, in many places in the region, Europeans 
saw their involvement in native affairs as necessary in order to halt the carnage 
being perpetrated in inter-African wars.
53
 In several of these conflicts, officials of 
European powers sought vigorously to mediate in and prevent or halt hostilities 
between belligerent communities.
54
 In many places, European protections were 
sought by weak communities against their more aggressive neighbour. These 
weak communities indeed invited and sometimes begged for European 
protections, thus voluntarily placing themselves under European dominion 
(Colonial Office, 1861-1906).  
Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, almost every square metre of 
territory in West Africa had come under direct European control; territories either 
gained by outright conquest of by the agreements of protective treaties between 
African rulers and officials of European powers.
55
 
This section has shown that pre-colonial West Africa, though was 
                                               
53 It is important to note that the colonial adventure in Nigeria began with the intervention of the 
British Navy in the battle for succession in Lagos. This heralded direct British involvement in local 
affairs which ultimately culminated in the colonisation of the whole of present day Nigeria 
54 In the Yoruba wars of the 19th century, the British, after initial vacillation, were compelled to 
intervene to bring the wars to an end. Against the Dahomey Kingdom, the French had to use the 
force of arms to halt its belligerency and expansionist tendencies. In Lagos, prior to the treaty 
ceding the slaving coastal town to the British in 1861, British forces had to bombard the town to 
ensure peace following the succession problems between two rival claimants to the throne. 
55 With the exception of Liberia and the autonomous kingdom of the Egba, which came under 
effective European control shortly after, everywhere in West Africa had been „pacified‟ and 
incorporated into European spheres of influence by the end of the 19th century. 
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characterised by different types of political organisation of society, had evolved 
highly centralised political societies in many places. Some of these societies were 
organised as empires and kingdoms with identifiable territoriality and intergroup 
relations. In other words, West Africa was not the terra nullius claimed by the 
imperial powers in staking claims to these territories.  
4.3 The Scramble and the Partition of West Africa 
 John Reader‟s epitaph to the forty-eighth chapter in his Biography of Africa 
sums up the Scramble for, and the partition of, (West) African territories: 
Africa‟s colonial boundaries were decided upon in Europe by 
negotiators with little consideration for local conditions. The 
boundaries cut across 177 ethnic „culture areas‟, dividing pre-existing 
economic and social units and distorting the development of entire 
regions (Reader, 1997: 562). 
 
The imperial Scramble for African territories towards the end of the eighteenth 
century partitioned the continent among the major European Powers and an 
adventurous and „crazy‟ monarch (Pakenham, 1991). The process of the division 
of these territories is the subject of this section. The examination of the partition 
of West Africa would enable the study provide answers to the research questions 
on the manner as well as the impacts of the partition on the indigenous societies 
and peoples. 
Prior to the Scramble, European political influence in West Africa did not 
go beyond the coastal reaches of the region.
56
 Colonies were established and 
spheres of influence were carved out along the coast. However, following the 
abolition of slavery and the switch to „legitimate‟ commerce, the coastal regions 
                                               
56 This may not be unconnected with the perilous health conditions of the hinterlands characterised 
as it were by malaria bearing mosquitoes as well as the fact that European activities were largely 
coast-bound (slavery). 
104 
 
lost their importance as centres of commerce, and there was the need to get 
beyond these territories into the interior to exploit the „vast‟ riches of this „dark‟ 
continent.  The penetration of the interior was achieved through the „carrot and 
stick‟ initiative:  protective treaties were negotiated (usually unequal and 
exploitative) between the European invaders and local African rulers. However, 
wherever a local leader refused to enter into a treaty agreement, armed conflicts 
ensued from which the Europeans, with superior fire-power always emerged 
victorious. The local community was then subjugated and added to the sphere of 
influence of that particular European power. Simultaneous with the penetration of 
the interior of the continent was the accompanying civilising mission meant to 
expose the „uncivilised‟ Africans to the modernising European influence. The 
Christian religion was employed in this regard; conversion to the faith was the 
qualification for admission into the growing number of schools which were run by 
Christian missions (Ajayi, 1965; Ayandele, 1967).
57
    
Sphere of influence was crucially important in the expansion of empire 
and imperialism in Africa. Following the Scramble (propelled by mercantilism) 
for territorial acquisition in Africa and the fear that such unregulated competitions 
may ultimately lead to war in metropolitan Europe, the Berlin West African 
Conference was convened at the instance of Otto von Bismarck, ostensibly to 
provide a framework for the orderly partition of Africa.
58
 At the conference, the 
principle of effective occupation was adopted by rival European powers as the 
                                               
57 This became more significant following the establishment of colonial rule and the need to train a 
crop of native Africans to help in the administration of the colony. In Islamic societies, especially in 
Hausaland, part of the treaty agreement was the exclusion of Christianity and its influence from the 
region. 
58 Bismarck‟s ulterior motive for convening the conference was to get a leeway into the fray that 
was the scramble for African territories. Germany was a late entrant into scramble and wanted ways 
to grab some territories from Britain and France who were the major shareholders in the venture. 
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basis of territorial claims as well as for ordering inter-colonial relations. This 
principle had been developed around the mid 16
th
 century as sea-faring European 
powers sought to settle disputed claims to some „unoccupied‟ territories they were 
annexing. Such territories, usually isolated islands, (terra nullius) were deemed to 
belong to their first European occupant whether or not it was already inhabited by 
an indigenous race (Katzellenbogen, 1996). If the vast territories of Africa where 
people have lived for centuries could be regarded as „unoccupied‟, how then do 
we begin to talk about pre-partition boundaries? This misleading assumption has 
led to the claim in the literature (Alexander, 1963: 61) that international 
boundaries in Africa are antecedental,
59
 that is, drawn on previously uninhabited 
territories. 
 As spheres of influence became welded together with effective occupation, 
the nucleus of the modern state system emerged in Africa. The modern state 
system fashioned after the Westphalian model required the fusion of territoriality 
with sovereignty (Anderson, 1996). One of the defining features of territorial 
sovereignty is the international boundary separating one domain of power from 
another. Thus boundaries were determined, delimited and demarcated (rarely) 
between the colonial states. Before boundary-making is considered however, it is 
important to examine the rationale for the vicious Scramble for African territories 
by the supposedly „civilised‟ Powers. 
4.31 Rationale for the Scramble 
 This sub-section helps in answering the research question relating to the 
nature of the partition and the consequence on African societies. It examines the 
                                               
59
 Instead, international boundaries in Africa are subsequent, i.e., the boundaries were delimited 
after the region had fully developed and evolved distinct characters. The boundaries were 
superimposed on pre-existing social formations, thus cutting through many culturally homogeneous 
identities and disrupting age-long affinities and patterns of relationships in many places. 
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rationale for the partition and establishes the pre-eminence of, (if not exclusive) 
European considerations, stakes and interests in the partitioning of African 
territories. 
There are two distinct, but related schools regarding the justification of the 
scramble for African territories in the late 19
th
 century. The first school has two 
sets of rationales: strategic consideration and the entry of third parties into the 
competition for territory. For the strategic consideration school, the obsession 
with security and a fixation on safeguarding the routes to the East were the 
triggers of the scramble (Robinson and Gallagher, 1961). Strategic considerations 
impelled the British to seize the Cape (present-day Cape Town territory in South 
Africa); Egypt was even more important strategically with the Suez Canal being 
regarded as the spinal cord of the Empire. The British moved troops into Egypt in 
order to protect the seaways to India, which compelled their involvement in Sudan 
and Uganda (Gann and Duignan, 1969: 126). This action of the British also forced 
other countries, especially, France to seek compensations in Africa, and thereby 
played a major role in determining the context of the Scramble. 
 The argument regarding the entry of Third parties contends that the Scramble 
and partition was set off on the African scene by the appearance of two new 
entrants into the foray – Germany and Belgium. According to Fage and Oliver 
(1962: 182), „it was this that upset the pre-existing balance of power and 
influence, and precipitated a start of international hysteria in which all powers 
rushed to stake claims‟. 
 The second school argues that the crazy drive for a share of African territories 
was propelled by economic considerations. Britain had emerged as the leading 
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economic power of the time following the Industrial Revolution. This economic 
hegemony found expression in the carving out of the European „free trade‟ in 
Africa (Gann and Duignan, 1969). The free trade meant that other European 
Powers may not be involved in the economic exploitation of the continent. 
However, this British hegemony came under severe challenge in the 1860s with 
the emergence of France, Germany and the United States as economic 
powerhouses (Gann and Duignan, 1969). The Consequence of this was the 
saturation of the European market and the subsequent need to exploit other 
regions, especially Africa, became inevitable. With European industrial and 
trading competition approaching more equal terms, „free trade‟ gave way to 
„protectionism‟. Britain‟s rivals, France and Germany, realised that the only way 
to beat British competition was to establish colonies or „protected‟ areas in Africa, 
where the trade of other European nationals could be excluded or subjected to 
heavy taxation (Shillington, 1989: 307). 
 Another economic consideration for the Scramble was the famed resource 
deposit in the interior of Africa already mentioned above. These factors combined 
to prompt the Scramble for choice territories in the continent. 
4.4 Making the African Boundary 
 This section consolidates on the analysis of the preceding section by further 
examining the boundary making through the processes of delimitation and 
demarcation. It sheds further light on the research question on the colonial 
partition, the role of Africa elite as well as the impacts on pre-existing social 
formations in Africa. Contemporary international boundaries in Africa emerged 
largely in the 30 years following the Berlin West African Conference (1884-1885) 
where the groundwork for the partition of African territories was laid. The 
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boundaries that emerged „were drawn by Europeans, for Europeans and, apart 
from localised details, paid scant regard to Africa, let alone Africans‟ (Griffiths, 
1986: 204). 
Two types of boundaries can be identified in the process of boundary 
making in the continent. The first includes those boundaries between territorial 
holdings of different colonial powers. In fact, these boundaries may be regarded 
as inter-European boundaries (Anene, 1970) and are categorised here as 
„boundaries established by international agreements‟, borrowing from Touval 
(1972: 4). The second type of boundaries includes those between territorial 
possessions of the same colonial power. For instance the huge territorial 
possessions of France in West and Central Africa were partitioned into distinct 
administrative units, with the lines of division usually unilaterally determined by 
French colonial officials. They are therefore categorised here as „unilateral 
boundaries‟. 
4.41 Boundaries Established By International Conventions 
It is axiomatic that the ultimate authority concerning the determination and 
delimitation of African boundaries was a European prerogative. The Scramble 
was chaotic competition and struggles
60
 for choice territories and was conducted 
in such a manner that it was feared would lead to war in continental Europe 
(Hargreaves, 1963). The principle of effective occupation adopted as the ordering 
formula led to the haphazard and „bizarre‟ political map of present-day Africa. 
Territories were carved up and carved out in spite of pre-existing social formation 
and patterns of interactions. The resultant boundary regime on the one hand, 
                                               
60
 The famous race to Nikki between British and French colonial officials is a case in point. Nikki 
was a fabled „Eldorado‟, which both the French and the British sought to include within their 
respective sphere of control. The colonial officers of these two colonial powers concluded two 
different treaties with the rulers of the town with almost disastrous implications. 
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„lumped‟ together diverse (and at times, conflicting groups) in the same territorial 
configuration, while on the other hand, it sliced through homogenous culture 
areas, dividing some groups into contrasting spheres of European interests 
(Englebert, et al, 2002).  
However, there were few instances where attempts were made to reflect 
the prevailing political and social realities at the time of boundary making (Anene, 
1970; Touval, 1972, Katzellenbogen, 1996; Nugent, 1996). The colonialists 
attempted to incorporate pre-existing realities in the delimitation of boundaries by 
making the territorial extent
61
 of African societies included in their sphere of 
influence correspond to their boundaries with rival European powers. African 
territories were acquired through „protective‟ treaties between African rulers who 
barely understood the contents of the agreement, and colonial officers (who 
sought to exploit the ignorance of the ruler) (Touval, 1966). Therefore, in the 
situation of disputes, European powers relied on treaties concluded with African 
rulers to justify territorial claims.
62
 Treaties provided bargaining advantages in 
territorial negotiations. If a power had obtained a treaty with the African ruler of a 
territory, the territory could be ceded to another power in return for a counter-
concession. Even at that, treaties could not provide an effective panacea to 
boundary-making problems as African societies did not possess the European 
conception of boundary as a finite line of division between territorial domains, 
rather, pre-colonial African conception of boundaries was the frontier type; 
                                               
61 The problem was that pre-colonial conception of boundaries in Africa was distinct from that of 
Europe. 
62 In certain cases, the unreliability of these treaties have brought competing Powers to the brink of 
war. In Borgu, the British, through its colonial representative, Lord Lugard had concluded a treat 
agreement with a supposed ruler of Nikki, but the French, a few days later, concluded a treaty 
agreement with the authentic Emir of this kingdom, creating a face-off, which was eventually 
resolved. 
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regions of interactions, rather than those of separation (Kehinde, 2008b).
63
 
Furthermore, many such societies took advantage of colonial intervention to settle 
old scores and reclaim lost or long-coveted territories.
64
 Hence, territories claimed 
by these societies did not correspond to actual realities. Boundaries determined on 
the basis of such claims tended to be misrepresentative and hotly contested. Thus, 
the setting of African colonial boundaries reflected a wide range of political, 
strategic and economic considerations and hopes, as well as ignorance, and 
misconceptions. 
4.42 Unilaterally Determined Boundaries 
Unilateral boundaries separated territories belonging to one colonial power 
essentially for administrative purposes. The process of determining these 
boundaries did not involve any problematic negotiations with rival colonial 
powers but emanated from the unilateral decision of the power exercising control 
over both territories. Though it can be argued that in some isolated instances 
Africans were involved in the process of boundary making under the international 
agreement type, albeit marginally. However, their influence was much more 
marginal in the decisions regarding unilateral boundaries, as the boundary making 
process resulted from the unilateral decision of the government exercising control 
over both territories (Touval, 1972: 11). In other words, boundary making was an 
exclusive preserve of the colonialists as dictated by the exigencies of 
administering their colonial possessions (Griffiths, 1986). These boundaries were 
often changed or modified as demanded by the vagaries and exigencies of 
                                               
63 Pre-colonial boundaries of African societies were fluid, expanding and contrasting as a 
consequence of war and conquest. 
64 For example, the extent of Calabar „kingdom‟ in present-day Nigeria was constructed to include 
former autonomous societies it had always aspired to annex. The case of the Empire of Bornu 
represents the second scenario.  A great chunk of its territory had been lost to invading Fulani 
Jihadists from the west as well as the Barbers of North Africa, yet, at the time of boundary making, 
these territories were claimed to belong to Bornu and included in the British sphere of Nigeria  
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administering the territories determined unilaterally by the colonial authorities. A 
number of reasons and criteria were responsible for the determinations of these 
boundaries. In some instances, they were political and reflected the political 
considerations of metropolitan government back in Europe and in some other 
instances, they emanated from administrative and economic considerations in the 
colonies (Touval, 1972: 12). For instance, Mali established in 1890 as a distinct 
administrative unit in French West Africa, was dismembered in 1899 and its 
territory attached to each of the neighbouring territories. Between 1902 and 1947, 
when it was re-established, its territories were administered at different times as 
part of Upper Volta, Niger, Mauritania and Upper Senegal (Touval, 1972). The 
same is true for many other French territories as they experienced diminishing and 
expanding territories intermittently. Unilateral boundary determination was not 
limited to the French as the British also made and adjusted boundaries depending 
on the exigencies of the time. The Kenya-Uganda boundary presents another 
illustration of unilateral determination of boundaries. The eastern province of 
Uganda was transferred to Kenya in 1902 for purely administrative purpose.
65
 The 
transfer meant the delimitation of new boundaries, which was agreed upon by the 
colonial administrators from both territories to coincide with ethnic boundaries 
(Touval, 1972: 13).
66
  
The resolution of the problems associated with unilateral boundaries was 
easier than those between different colonial powers. Local interests may or may 
not be considered in the resolution of such problems, as the overarching interests 
                                               
65 The British Foreign Office believed that this measure would allow for closer supervision of the 
area than was possible while under Uganda‟s administration.  
66
 Ethnic boundaries were proposed as the boundary between the two territories. However, 
disagreements developed when it came to the application of the principle over whether the criterion 
should be a purely scientific classification of ethnic groups or whether the political connections 
among various tribal subunits should be considered. 
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of the metropolitan government were ultimately the driving force. On the other 
hand, negotiation and bargaining were the characteristics of inter-colonial 
boundary dispute resolution. 
 This section has examined and analysed the processes of boundary making at 
the beginning of colonial rule in Africa. It addresses the research question 
regarding the boundary making process driven entirely by exogenous forces to the 
territories and peoples being shared amongst the imperialists. It further identifies 
two different categories of boundary making, each of which possesses distinct 
consequences for the successor states. The boundary in this study falls within the 
category of boundaries „established by international conventions‟, which was 
subject to inter-colonial rivalries and control. This would help us in the 
understanding of the research question on identity and reactions to the boundary 
by the partitioned group which straddles this boundary. 
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Map 1: Map of West Africa, showing the location of the Yoruba astride the 
Nigeria – Benin boundary. 
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Map 2: Map of the „Yoruba country‟, showing its partition by the international 
boundary. 
 
4.5     Who are the Yoruba? 
The Yoruba are a large ethno-linguistic group or ethnic nation in Africa; 
the people share a common language, identical culture and a myth of common 
origin. The Yoruba have an approximate population of about 22 million 
throughout the West African region and in the Diaspora with Nigeria accounting 
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for over 80% of this number.
67
 They are located principally in southwest Nigeria 
and the mid-latitudes of Benin (partitioned by the boundary) as well as specific 
locations in Togo (principally in the Atakpame area of the Plateaux Region). In 
Ghana, they are located in the large cities of Accra and Kumasi where they are 
largely migrant traders as they are in Cote d‟Ivoire. They are also found in Sierra 
Leone where their history is quite unique. The bulk of the Yoruba in Sierra Leone 
were recaptive slaves rescued from slave ships in the mid-Atlantic as well as 
emancipated slaves from the Americas following the abolition of the slave trade in 
the early 19
th
 century.
68
 Elsewhere in the sub-region (Burkina Faso, Niger, 
Equatorial Guinea), the Yoruba population is largely composed of migrant traders. 
The Yoruba homeland is located in south-western part of present day 
Nigeria, including the states of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, Ondo, south-
eastern part of Kwara, western part of Kogi and a small section of northwest Edo; 
in Benin Republic, the Yoruba are found principally in the Ketu and Sabe 
Prefectures. In pre-colonial times, the territory occupied by the Yoruba stretched 
from present day Ondo State in Nigeria to the frontier with the Kingdom of 
Dahomey. At the advent of colonial rule, Ellis (1894: 10-11) identified the Yoruba 
„country‟ as consisting of the following political units: 
1. The Lagos Colony, including the kingdoms of Appa, Ipokia, Lagos, Badagry, 
Palma, Lekki Mahin, Ogbo and Jakri. 
2. Egba, with its capital at Abeokuta lies due north of the Colony of Lagos and 
southwest of „Yoruba proper‟. 
                                               
67 It is extremely difficult to arrive at a certain number for this group as population census is a very 
sensitive issue in Nigeria due to the fact that population size is a significant determinant of state 
patronage. Hence, owing to ethnic competition, ethnic groups manipulate population data and 
population censuses have remained unreliable. 
68 A significant proportion of this category eventually retraced their steps back home to the Yoruba 
region in Nigeria where they formed the bastion of resistance to colonial rule 
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3. „Yoruba Proper‟ was the old Empire of Oyo. The people were regarded as 
Yoruba proper owing to the overarching influence of the old Oyo Empire over the 
rest of the Yoruba „country.  
4. Ketu was the acknowledged western-most extreme of the Yoruba „country‟. It 
shared a frontier with Dahomey and was the focus of intermittent Dahomey raids 
and pillage. 
5. The Ijebu Kingdom is the southernmost part of the Yoruba territory. Its capital 
is Ijebu-Ode and was especially unfriendly to strangers. 
6. The Ekiti group located northeast of Ijebu, constituted one of the eastern 
Yoruba groups. 
7. Ibadan was a newly created state following the Yoruba wars of the 18
th
 century, 
but quickly gained pre-eminence owing to the fact that it was a war camp and 
made up of warrior elements. 
8. The Kingdom of Ife whose only attribute is that it is regarded as the origin of 
the Yoruba race from where the Yoruba „country‟ was subjugated and inhabited 
through waves of migration from Ife. 
9. Ijesa kingdom is situated to the southeast of Yoruba proper and shares 
territorial frontier with the Ekiti. 
10. Ondo is located southeast of Ife. Together with the Ekiti, Ondo was frequently 
harassed by the Benin Empire. These two groups still have elements of Benin 
influence in their socio-political organisation. 
There are two groups of the Yoruba which Ellis did not include in his 
classification. This may not be unconnected with the location of these groups, in 
the interior of the area, and far removed from the other Yoruba groups: the Sabe 
Yoruba and the group found in Atakpame of the Plateaux Region of Togo. Indeed, 
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as we will find out shortly, the Sabe are regarded as one of the core groups of the 
Yoruba, speaking a dialect of the language very close to that spoken by the 
„Yoruba proper‟. On the other hand, the Atakpame Yoruba are a later migrant 
group, probably escaping from the harassment and belligerency of Dahomey 
following its routing and sacking of Ketu (Akinjogbin, 1967). Their dialect of the 
Yoruba language is so different from the proper Yoruba spoken in the core 
Yoruba areas of Nigeria and Benin.
69
  
 There are conflicting accounts of the origin of the Yoruba;
70
 however, 
there are common factors in these accounts. Oduduwa and Ife feature prominently 
in the accounts of the origin of the group that one can safely conclude that 
Oduduwa was the founder and Ife was the first Yoruba settlement. It was from Ife 
that the group began to disperse in different waves of migration to found the 
several Yoruba kingdoms (Adediran, 1994: 59-74). Indeed, Ife is regarded as a 
„pristine‟ state which influenced developments in other parts of Yorubaland. 
Political leadership all over Yorubaland, depended on dynastic linkage with Ife. 
From here in Ife, the type of kingship institution established by Oduduwa was 
replicated all over Yorubaland through dynastic migrations of the sons and 
grandsons of Oduduwa (Akinjogbin and Ayandele, 1980: 125-30). The possession 
and the right to wear the ade ileke (beaded crown with fringe over the face), the 
symbol of political authority all over Yorubaland derived from Ife. The possession 
of the ade ileke by an individual or group was related primarily to kinship 
association with Oduduwa, which confers on that individual the rights and 
privileges of a king (Adediran, 1994).  
                                               
69
 On a field research to Atakpame, it took this researcher extra care to be able to understand the 
Atakpame Yoruba. The dialect is so infused with the Ewe and French that it becomes quite difficult 
to understand for the speaker of the Nigerian Yoruba. 
70 See Johnson, 1921; Eades, 1980; Akinjogbin and Ayandele, 1980. 
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Following several waves of migration from Ife,
71
 the Yoruba people 
spread to cover their present spatial locations across West Africa.
72
 In certain 
cases, the migrating bands met with indigenous settlers whom they either expelled 
or incorporated into their newly established kingdom. Where they were compelled 
to coexist with earlier settlers, there emerged a culture-mix, such that the Yoruba 
people became bilingual, becoming fluent in the use of the language of the other 
group and vice versa.
73
 Furthermore, this language contact led to the incorporation 
of some words of the other language into the Yoruba language, such that the 
Yoruba language spoken in these places are etymologically different from the 
„parent‟ language. In other words, in the course of the migration and separation 
one from another, as well as mingling with other ethnic groups, the different 
Yoruba groups evolved dialectical variations of the same language and 
autonomous kingdoms, though they were kept together by the Oduduwa bond. For 
instance, as recorded by Adediran (1994: 58), „invariably, the rulers of pre-19th 
century Yoruba kingdoms saw each other as belonging to the same family (ebi), 
within which inter-kingdom relations had to be conducted. As they were placed 
upon the same genealogy, their common descent from Oduduwa demanded 
friendship and cooperation‟. They regarded one another as „brothers‟ and the Ooni 
of Ife
74
 they saw as „father‟ being Oduduwa‟s successor in Ife (Adediran, 1994). 
Certain practices subsist till the present time among the Oduduwa princes to 
                                               
71 The source of migration was not limited to Ife as several states were founded from those 
originally founded from the first sets of migrations from Ife. In addition, political exigencies 
deriving from wars and conquests and the need to provide security from marauding groups led to 
new waves of migrations. 
72 This is limited to the indigenous groups in Nigeria, Benin and Togo. The others elsewhere are 
recent economic migrants who still keep in touch with home in Nigeria.  
73
 Observation on the field, which was further affirmed by the Yoruba respondents interviewed. 
74 Ooni is the title of the king of Ile (Ife). However, there is an unresolved controversy regarding the 
status of the Ooni vis a vis the Alafin (King) of Oyo owing largely to the ascendancy of Oyo as the 
most prominent Yoruba town which the defunct Oyo Empire depicted. 
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underline the perception of the same ebi: whenever any oba regarded as a direct 
descendant of Oduduwa died, his movable properties, especially his dresses were 
shared among the remaining surviving obas, his „brothers‟. This practice of 
inheritance sharing (ogun pinpin) is one of the strongest evidences of kinship 
relationship among the obas (Akinjogbin and Ayandele, 1980). When Ooni 
Adesoji Aderemi ascended the throne of Ife in 1930, he sent part of his 
predecessor‟s clothes to certain principal Yoruba obas: 
I waived my claims over my predecessor‟s clothes, trinkets, money, 
wives and other goods. The chiefs had no alternative but to acquiesce 
in my decision since I am the principal party concerned, but by the 
importunity of the chiefs, I agree to some clothes being sent to certain 
principal obas of Yorubaland with the consent of the family, their 
father having received many such legacies from abroad (Ooni 
Aderemi, in Akinjogbin and Ayandele, 1980: 132). 
 
Another practice, though defunct, is the referral of dynastic disputes to Ife 
for adjudication (Adediran, 1994). While this practice lasted, succession disputes 
in many places in Yorubaland were referred to the Ooni of Ife for resolution. The 
British acknowledged this practice by consulting the Ooni regarding the 
authenticity of kingship claims by other Yoruba obas during colonial rule.
75
 
One can therefore take the kinship relationship among Yoruba obas for 
granted; and the domains of these obas can be regarded as the extension of the 
Yoruba family. Granted, the Yoruba was organised into several autonomous sub-
groups, the Oduduwa factor was ever at the forefront of interactions among these 
groups, keeping the ebi alive. Thus, in spite of political autonomy, a semblance of 
overarching linkages subsisted among these groups in pre-colonial times. In other 
words, the only veneer of unity in this region is linguistic and cultural rather than 
                                               
75 In drawing up the list of crowned kings, ostensibly to aid its indirect rule system, the British 
administration consulted with the Ooni of Ife in the determination of the number of crowned kings 
as well as the validation of the claims of royalty of many pretenders. 
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political. Consequently, it is impossible to ascribe a national quality to the various 
sub-groups that emerged from the different waves of migration as they were 
organised into several autonomous political units speaking mutually intelligible 
dialects (Johnson, 1921). In spite of this dialectical affinity, the Yoruba spoke of 
themselves as Oyo, Ijebu, Ekiti, Ijesha, Egba, among others. Right across the 
centre of Yorubaland were a number of centralised states including Oyo, Ketu, 
Sabe, Owu, Ijebu, Ife and Ijesa. There are other lesser states such as Egba, Akoko, 
Kabba, ikale, and so on. Though, at the heights of its glory, the Oyo Empire 
embraced much of the areas mentioned above, it never was organised as a single 
political unit (Eades, 1980).
76
  
Indeed, the term Yoruba is European in origin as it came into the lexicon 
of the explorers, missionaries and traders in the mid-19
th
 century to describe the 
group of people found around and along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea in West 
Africa (Johnson, 1921). The name Yoruba, Anene (1970) argues is a corruption of 
the word Yarriba,
77
 adopted by the Hausa to describe the people of Oyo Kingdom. 
As an ethnic description, the word first appeared in a treatise written by the 
Songhai scholar Ahmed Baba (Willis, 1987) and is likely to derive from the 
indigenous ethnonyms Oyo or Yagba, two Yoruba-speaking groups along the 
southern borders of their territory.  
Across the boundary in Benin and Togo, the Yoruba speaking peoples are 
regarded as Anago and Ife respectively (Parrinder, 1947; Igue and Yai, 1973). 
They are found in the districts of Sabe, Dassa, Ketu, Bante, Djaloukou and 
Atakpame. Dassa claims an Egba origin while Sabe and Ketu claim dynastic 
                                               
76
 This was not borne out of a lack of attempt. The literature is awash of the belligerency and 
expansionist tendency of Oyo. However, the other groups would go to great extents to defend their 
independence, even though, some were overpowered and annexed by Oyo. 
77 Indeed, Yarriba was the name some pre-colonial maps used to describe this group of people. 
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linkage with Ife being sons of Oduduwa. The group in Atakpame (about 40% of 
the population) variously claims to originate from Ife and Ketu. However, given 
the history of Dahomey belligerency in this region, it is more plausible that the 
Atakpame Yoruba were refugees from the Ketu area who fled to their present 
location from Dahomey invasion than migration from Ife. 
The further west one moves away from the Yoruba in Nigeria the less 
intelligible the language becomes to the Oyo Yorubaman.
78
 This is especially so 
in those enclaves in Benin and Togo, which due to isolation from the main 
Yoruba groups, incorporated the language of their neighbours in their everyday 
language usage. Thus, some Ewe and Egun words are found in the dialects of 
Yoruba spoken by these peoples. Furthermore, many of these groups are bilingual, 
speaking languages of their neighbours together with their Yoruba tongue.
79
 
Linguistically, the Yoruba belongs to the Kwa group of West African 
languages, related to Igala, Edo, Igbo, Igbira, Idoma, among others (Eades, 1980). 
The glotto-chronological evidence suggests that these languages separated 
between 2000 to 10000 years ago (Armstrong, 1964 in Eades, 1980: 4). The 
different dialects of Yoruba in Nigeria form three main families: the northwest 
Yoruba spoken in Oyo (including those subgroups in Benin which claim links 
with Oyo - e.g. Sabe), Ibadan and northern Egba area; the southeastern Yoruba 
spoken in Ondo, Ikale and Ijebu areas; central Yoruba spoken by the Ife, Ijesa and 
Ekiti (Eades, 1980: 4).  
 
 
                                               
78 The Oyo Yoruba was adopted as the standardised Yoruba language and has since become the 
medium of official expression, education and media. 
79 Field research observation and interaction with the people support this claim. 
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4.6     Pre-colonial Yoruba and the Prevailing Conditions prior to Colonial 
Rule 
As noted earlier, at no time did there appear to be any single political 
authority effectively controlling all the Yoruba; it was never considered as one 
single unit, and at best can be considered a confederation (Mills, 1970). As 
Morton-Williams (1967: 37) notes, „the territory of the early empire…was not 
incorporated into a centrally administered unitary state, but consisted of a large 
number of internal autonomous kingdoms, whose rulers were said to have derived 
their crowns from Oyo and were vassals of the Alaafin‟.80 Referring to 
Yorubaland, Africanus Horton noted that for want of a more appropriate name, as 
well as the history of Oyo hegemonic rule over most of this region, the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS) designated it the Yoruba country (Horton, 1868).
81
 
This labelling however met with opposition from other Yoruba sub-groups who 
did not consider themselves Yoruba until very much later (Biobaku, 1957). 
 Pre-colonial Yoruba was made up of different sub-groups, namely: Oyo, 
Egba, Ijebu, Owu, Ife, Ketu, Sabe, Ijesa, Ekiti, Ije, Ohori, among others. Before 
the 19
th
 century, Oyo had emerged as the dominant Yoruba Empire covering more 
than half of the territories occupied by the Yoruba speaking groups. Apart from 
the Ekiti, Ijebu and perhaps, Ife, all other part of Yorubaland seemed to have 
accepted the ritual supremacy of the Alaafin and only perhaps a very vague 
political suzerainty of Oyo (Mills, 1970). Owing to its extent, Oyo was able to 
ascribe on a large part of Yorubaland both cultural coherence and political unity 
(Anene, 1970: 142). At the apogee of the empire, Oyo‟s political influence 
                                               
80 Alaafin is the official title of the Oba of Oyo. 
81
 More decisive in this labelling could be the influence of Ajayi Crowther and other repatriated 
slaves who had become clergymen of the CMS. These returnees were almost entirely from the Oyo 
region and in „determining‟ the history of the Yoruba, projected the Oyo version, hence, the 
dominance and adoption of Oyo Yoruba as the standardised form of the language. 
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extended as far east as the Niger and as far west as the Kingdom of Dahomey 
which was reduced to a vassal status following its defeat by Oyo cavalry.  
 For the purpose of this research, and in order to answer the research question 
regarding the partitioning of the Yoruba, the Yoruba sub-groups whose territories 
were directly affected by the location of the boundary are examined in details. For 
obvious reasons, the Old Oyo Empire would be included in the field of analysis 
given its influence in the area under consideration.
82
 Ethnographical maps of the 
region often show that the boundary split the Yoruba-speaking area into two. This 
has obvious implications for the boundary, the people and interstate relations. 
Those groups partitioned by the boundary include: Oyo (Yoruba proper), the 
Ketu, Ahori, Ifonyin (Nago), Sabe, and Egbado (Asiwaju, 1979; Eades, 1980). 
4.61 Oyo 
 The tradition of origin of Oyo claims that it was founded by one of the sons 
of Oduduwa, who being the youngest was denied any inheritance of value on the 
death of their father, except land. His heritage was later to gain for him pre-
eminence among his siblings who had to pay rent to him to farm or build new 
towns. This was meant to justify the extent of the old Oyo Empire and its over-
lordship over the rest of Yorubaland. Everywhere that the Yoruba Language was 
spoken, was either under the direct control of Oyo, or was subject to significant 
Oyo influence. Due to Oyo‟s military supremacy, several non-Yoruba states and 
kingdoms came under Oyo control at the height of its influence. 
The old Oyo Empire attained pre-eminence among the political units and 
organisations in the forest belt of West Africa around the 18
th
 century when its 
spatial spread and influence were recorded to stretch from the Niger in present 
                                               
82 Indeed, part of the Oyo Empire was affected by the delimitation of the boundary. 
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southern Nigeria to the fringes of the Volta in present day Ghana (Akinjogbin, 
1967: 126). The powerful kingdom of Dahomey was defeated and subjugated by 
Oyo for the greater part of the 18
th
 century till about 1830, when due to the 
disintegration of the once powerful kingdom, Dahomey gained its independence.  
The empire‟s influence over its wide expanse was effectively controlled by 
the Alaafin through the posting of ilaris as palace representatives everywhere Oyo 
had control (Akinjogbin, 1967; Asiwaju, 1976). This represented a sophisticated 
administrative style that was absent in the region in pre-colonial time. As noted 
above, political influence during this period was centred on the capital and petered 
out, as distance increased from this centre. This probably enabled the rulers of 
Oyo to export Oyo culture and values to conquered and subjugated territories, 
such that the missionaries who came to this region later found it easy to ascribe 
the Oyo identity to the groups of people located in the territories of the old 
empire.
83
 Indeed, the Oyo people were regarded as „Yoruba proper‟ and their 
variant of the Yoruba Language became the codified and standardised form of the 
language.
84
 
At the time of the partition, Oyo had lost its pre-eminence and been 
destroyed by several waves of external aggression from Borgu, Bornu and most 
especially the marauding Hausa/Fulani religious wars of that century. 
Unfortunately for the empire, it had been weakened by incessant internal political 
instability deriving from succession crisis and petty rivalry among the nobility. 
Oyo eventually crumbled and several small city-states emerged in its stead, chief 
                                               
83
 This was several years after the empire had collapsed and successor states had emerged. The force 
of Oyo‟s influence subsisted far beyond it actual existent. 
84 The standardisation of the Yoruba Language will be examined in greater details in the next 
chapter. 
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among which were Ibadan and Abeokuta.
85
 A new town of Oyo was founded deep 
in the forest region to provide some defence against the Hausa/Fulani cavalry, but 
this new settlement could not muster power and influence sufficient to re-enact 
the old Oyo supremacy. 
In spite of the fate of the empire at the dawn of colonisation, it was still 
possible to ascribe a „national‟ quality to the Yoruba people. Indeed, the Governor 
of the colony of Lagos, Moloney, in one of his letters to the Alaafin in 1886 
(decades after the collapse of Oyo) recognised the „Yoruba country‟ to include- 
Oyo, Ijebu, Egba and Ketu (Colonial Office, 1861-1906). 
4.62 Ketu 
 Parrinder (2005: 1) introduces Ketu as „traditionally a Yoruba town, one of 
the ancient offshoots from the Yoruba home of Ile Ife‟. The Ketu people also 
share historical links with Oyo and Egba. It is one of the older Yoruba kingdoms, 
and according to Asiwaju (1975), its establishment involved the expulsion and or 
incorporation of an existing Gun population. The frequent reference to Ketu by 
Oyo in the 19
th
 century as one of the „four corners of the Yoruba world‟ indicates 
the prominence of the Alaketu
86
 among Yoruba obas (Johnson, 1921). In one of 
the accounts of Ife regarding the sons of Oduduwa, the Alaketu (the king of Ketu) 
featured prominently. Adediran (1994: 67) records the account in Ife of the 
circumstances under which the first Alaketu left the town on his outward journey 
to found Ketu:  
A prince of Oduduwa. He got crowns. He blessed him. His mother 
was from Obawara of Ilode. He gave him a cord (rope) of oro… He 
was born hunchbacked. Then an Ifa man promised to straighten the 
child‟s back. Oduduwa gave to the man who took him away 
                                               
85 These cities were founded by Oyo refugees and held some degree of reverence for, but not 
dependence on Oyo. Indeed, Oyo relied on supports from Ibadan in times of military needs. 
86 Alaketu is the title of the oba of Ketu. 
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to…where he was cured, he grew up and later left to found his own 
city. He stayed where he was cured hence- Oniketu 
 
The Yorubaness of Ketu is beyond doubt; the people speak a dialect of 
Yoruba that is intelligible to the Oyo-Yoruba speaker; the capital town (also 
known as Ketu) exhibits characteristics of a traditional Yoruba town.
87
 The 
relationship that subsisted between Oyo and Ketu in the pre-colonial times 
remains fuzzy: according to sources in Ketu, it remained independent of Oyo, 
while in Oyo, Ketu was a subject kingdom. However, it is established that there 
existed some degree of relationship, largely friendly and cooperative, including 
exchange of gifts (Eades, 1980:11-12). 
In the nineteenth century, Ketu became a victim of the famed Dahomean 
belligerent expansionism. It was attacked at different times between the 18
th
 and 
19
th
 century culminating in its destruction in 1886. The kingdom was sacked and 
the surviving population was deported.
88
 Ketu (the capital) was however resettled 
in 1892 following the defeat of Dahomey by the French by which time the 
boundary between the French and the British had been determined. The town of 
Imeko (a former Ketu outpost) and the eastern half of the kingdom (which had 
pledged allegiance to Oyo in 1868) was cut off from the capital and included in 
the British sphere (Eades, 1980: 12). 
4.63 Sabe 
 According to Eades (1980), the Sabe Kingdom lies almost entirely within 
Benin Republic, however, a fraction is included as part of Nigeria by the 
international boundary (Igue and Yai, 1973: 6). Johnson (1921: 8) claims that the 
                                               
87 When this researcher visited Ketu in 2008, he had no doubt he was in any traditional Yoruba 
setting: the market located close to the palace; the houses mainly built of mud with rusting 
corrugated iron roofs; the ubiquitous courtesy typical of the Yoruba, among several typical Yoruba 
characteristics. 
88 Perhaps constituting the bulk of the Yoruba found in several locations in western Benin and in 
Togo, especially around Atakpame. 
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Onisabe (the king of Sabe) was the son of Oduduwa who inherited the cattle, 
establishing the vital Oduduwa link with the kingdom. Sabe appears on current Ife 
list
89
 of sons of Oduduwa and there is an Oduduwa shrine in Jabata, one of the 
early Sabe settlements. However, there are controversies regarding the dynastic 
link with Ife. According to Adediran (1994: 71-74), the claims of dynastic link 
with Ife is incredible noting that such claims are recent rationalisations. He hinges 
his claim on the chronology of the kings who were allegedly contemporaries of 
the Onisabe
90
- since traditions insist that the Onisabe and the Alaketu were in the 
same group as the Alaafin, it is expected that the length of the king-lists of these 
towns should be fairly equal, even though the source materials allow for natural 
omission (Adediran, 1994). It should be noted that the length of king list depends 
on historical realities of the particular kingdom as well as average lifespan of its 
ruler. However, Adediran (1994) argues that one would not expect a wide margin 
between king-lists of „brother kingdoms‟. The apparent discrepancy in the 
eighteen on the Sabe king-list and the thirty two for Oyo and thirty five for Ketu 
demands further explanation (Adediran, 1994). He concludes that the obvious 
explanation is that the kingdom of Sabe was established at a later date than those 
of Oyo and Ketu and hence a dynastic migration of the Onisabe at the same time 
with the founders of Oyo and Ketu remains unfounded. 
 However, in spite of this uncertainty regarding dynastic migration and link 
with Ife, Sabe remains definitely a Yoruba town, probably founded by migrants 
from Oyo. The Sabe speak a dialect of Yoruba that is identical to Oyo-Yoruba. 
Indeed, Adediran (1994) suggests that the founder of Sabe may be a member of 
                                               
89
 The Ife list of the sons of Oduduwa was drawn up upon request by the British at the dawn of 
indirect rule. It is therefore regarded as the authentic stamp of dynastic linkage between Ife and 
other Yoruba towns. 
90 Onisabe is the title of the oba of Sabe. 
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the royal family of Oyo, suggesting that the founder was an Oyo prince. 
 Sabe suffered a similar fate as Ketu regarding the ever expanding Dahomey.  
It was attacked and became a subject kingdom in 1884 (Asiwaju, 1976a). 
However, its population was not deported like that of Ketu (Akinjogbin, 1967). 
Thus, Sabe was under the effective political domination of Dahomey at the point 
when the boundary was determined. It is not clear what factors informed the 
location of a fraction of this kingdom in the British sphere unlike Ketu where the 
part cut off from the mother kingdom had shifted allegiance from the capital to 
Oyo long before the colonial intervention. 
4.64 Ifonyin 
The Ifonyin have varied sources of origin: Ipokia and Itakete (Sakete) 
were both founded by the Awori from the south (Eades, 1980: 11-13). However, 
oral interview with the Onisakete (the king of Sakete) claims an Oyo origin.
91
 
Ifonyin-Ile and Ihunmbo were founded from Oyo around 1700 (Morton-Williams, 
1967) in order to secure the slave route from Oyo to Porto-Novo on the lagoon. 
 The Ohori are located between Ketu and Ifonyin with Ipobe (Pobe) being the 
principal town. The Ohori around Ije and Ipobe claim an Oyo origin while others 
claim to have been founded by Ketu migrants (Asiwaju, 1975: 16). 
 The other Yoruba sub-groups further west include the Managri, Idaisa, Isa 
and Ife. These groups are isolated from the main Yoruba stock to the east. They 
are interspersed with such other non-Yoruba groups as the Ewe, Egun, Ibariba and 
the Kotokoh (Eades, 1980: 14). The Ife (also called Ana) are the most westerly 
                                               
91 Oral interview with the Onisakete on the 23.10.08 
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Yoruba sub-group and are located in a number of enclaves from Djakulou in 
western Benin to Atakpame in the Plateaux Region of Togo. The earliest settlers 
arrived from Ifita in the early 19
th
 century to be later joined by refugees from 
Ketu, Idaisa and Sabe fleeing from Dahomey invasion (Igue and Yai, 1973: 22). 
 Along the coast of West Africa, stretching from Lagos to Abidjan, through 
Cotonou, Lome, and Accra are found a large number of Yoruba migrant traders 
who have settled in these regions long before the colonial intervention. In Togo, 
there are two categories of Yoruba:
92
 those of the Atakpame region described 
above and those of the coastal regions of Agoue, Ilakounji and Lome. The 
distinction between these two groups is that the Atakpame Yoruba are regarded as 
autochthonous, aboriginal settlers because they arrived in their present location 
many years ago and they have integrated with other Togolese ethnic groups. 
Indeed, it is very difficult, for instance, to distinguish between the Yoruba and the 
Karie in the North.
93
 Those of the south, being late arrivals and itinerant traders 
did not initially integrate which became an issue when Togo became independent 
and they had to struggle to acquire the Togolese nationality. 
4.7  The Eve of Colonial Rule in Yorubaland 
Following the collapse of the Oyo Empire at the end of the 18
th
 century, the 
stage was set for the political instability witnessed all over Yorubaland in the 19
th
 
century. The Yoruba were engaged in fratricidal warfare which dragged on until 
the Pax Britannica which eventually put an end to hostilities and effectively 
established British control over the region. Simultaneously, in Dahomey, the 
French had to engage and defeat the Dahomean army in a war before its 
                                               
92 Interview with Dr. Ogounde, Lome, Togo, 20.11.2008 
93 Interview with Dr. Ogounde, Lome, Togo, 20.11.2008 
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expansionist agenda could be stopped and peace and order restored. While war 
raged in Yorubaland, Dahomey was also engaged in sacking and subjugating 
neighbouring kingdoms as well as confronting several Yoruba sub-groups 
including Oyo, Egba, Egbado and the aforementioned victims of Dahomey 
invasions. Indeed, Dahomey was considered a particularly hegemonic and warring 
state whose expansionist tendencies was manifested in the spate of Dahomean 
adventures in neighbouring communities (Akinjogbin, 1967). 
As noted above, while slaves remained the objects of trade, the Europeans 
needed not go beyond the coast, but with the shift to legitimate trade, it became 
expedient that the interiors be explored as the coast had little or no commodity of 
value.
94
 Thus, on the British sphere, the Niger Expedition was put together in 
1841 driven by evangelism, commerce and the abolition of slave trade. Its aim 
was to explore the interior, make treaties with local people, evangelise and 
establish a model farm at Lokoja (Crowder, 1966: 141). Bishop Ajayi Crowther 
visited Ketu in 1854 as part of the expansion into the Yorubaland hinterland on 
behalf of the CMS. 
The British were initially nonchalant regarding the raging warfare in the 
Yoruba interior. In fact, the Lagos government was under strict instruction not to 
interfere even though the fighting had grave effects on the economy of the colony 
(Colonial Office, 1864-1867).
95
 Thus, between 1882 and 1884, Britain did nothing 
about the war. However, following the Scramble and the changing status of Lagos 
as separated from the Gold Coast, and especially the fear of French incursion into 
                                               
94
 The rush for the interior was further fuelled by the perception that Africa held a vast deposit of 
natural resources, the utopian Eldorado. The discovery of gold and diamond in South Africa in the 
early years of the 19th century gave credence to this conception. 
95 Lagos had been annexed in 1861 and subsequently organised into a colony. 
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Yorubaland
96
 (regarded as the British sphere of influence), Britain did a volte-face 
(Colonial Office, 1864-1867). The British became involved with Yoruba affairs 
and had to hastily draw up the boundary separating its possession from that of the 
French to prevent French encroachment. 
4.8  Partitioning the Yoruba 
 The Nigeria-Benin boundary is a product of British-French agreements. The 
section of the boundary from the coast to latitude 9
o
N (roughly corresponding to 
the area covered by this study) was first defined in a treaty signed on 18 August 
1889. The treaty agreed to a straight line as the boundary and described in the 
following words: 
„On the Slave Coast, the line of demarcation between the spheres of influence of 
the Powers shall be identified with the meridian which intersects the territories of 
Porto Novo at the Ajarra Creek, leaving Pokrah or Pokea (Ipokia) to the British 
colony of Lagos.
97
 It follows the above mentioned meridian as far as the 9
o
N 
(latitude) where it shall stop‟ (Colonial Office, 1898). 
However, following the delimitation survey conducted later by officials of 
the two Powers, it was discovered that the boundary as described in the Treaty, at 
certain points, was unrealistic as it would cut through many coherent settlements
98
 
which fell along the straight line. Hence, river courses were preferred to the 
astronomical line as the mutual boundary. Even though attempts were made to 
                                               
96 The British fear of the French soon materialised with the attempt by French officers to sign a 
treaty with the Egba which provided the tempting offer of a rail link between Abeokuta and Porto-
Novo. 
97 What were the criteria used in this division of territories? It is clear that none was used, save 
expediency and the whims of the colonial administrators.  
98
 While this fact could be regarded as one of the few instances where colonial mapping considered 
pre-existing social realities, it is insufficient to claim a general consideration for prevailing realities 
at the time of the boundary making. Again, the consideration here was settlements, which in reality 
were parts of established political organisations.  
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correct the errors of the initial delimitation, river courses are unreliable delimiters 
of territories. In addition, rivers may indeed be integral to territories and their 
employment as markers of territories may indeed, be as disrupting as the initial 
delimitation attempt. Indeed, the main rationale for the on-the-spot modification 
of the delimitation agreement was the fact that the ravine so crucial to the 
determination of the boundary was found to be non-existent. The boundary 
delimitation was accepted by the Anglo-French convention of 1898 and was later 
ratified in 1906 (Balogun, 1989: 187-188). 
 To underscore the arbitrariness and artificiality of the boundary, when actual 
demarcation began in 1912, certain alterations had to be made due to the fact that 
some of the villages used as landmarks in the treaty agreement were nonexistent 
and could not be located on the map. Villages of Ikotun, Ilore, Okoto and Ijalu 
that had been designated reference points in the treaty agreement could not be 
found on the ground (Anene, 1970). 
 It must be stated here for emphasis that the colonialists appreciated and 
acknowledged the arbitrariness of the boundary they had just conjured and 
devised means of ameliorating its impacts on the population affected by it. Thus, 
part of the 1906 agreement stated in Article III: 
The villages situated in proximity to the frontier shall retain its right 
to use the arable and pasturelands, springs and watering places which 
they have heretofore used, even in the cases in which such arable and 
pasturelands, springs and watering places are situated within the 
territory of the one Power and the village within the territory of the 
other (HMS Office, in Brownlie, 1979: 171-72). 
 
It is important to note here that the famed Dahomey belligerency and the 
consequent instability and insecurity that this engendered in the neighbouring 
political units, played a significant part in the location of the boundary between 
the French and the British, especially in the kingdom of Ketu. Ketu had recently 
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been re-occupied following the latest Dahomey invasion and the destruction of the 
capital, Ketu in 1886, however, during the period of Ketu‟s subjugation, Dahomey 
had been defeated by the French in 1892 and a boundary had been agreed between 
the two colonial Powers that had conflicting interests in this region (Parrinder, 
1947: 72-74).
99
 Following Dahomey‟s defeat by the French, it became a French 
territory and all its satellites and tributary territories were incorporated under the 
sphere of the French. Thus, Ketu having been incorporated into Dahomey came 
under the sphere of influence of France, separated from the main Yoruba body in 
British controlled Nigeria. 
In the spirit of the rivalry between France and Britain over territories in 
this region, Governor Moloney of Lagos in 1888 wrote to the Alaafin regarding 
the fate of Yorubaland especially Ketu following its destruction, in order to whip 
support for British control over the entire Yoruba territories (Colonial Office, 
1861-1906). This was in response to the threat of French encroachment into 
Yorubaland (supposedly a sphere of British influence). This rivalry led to the 
hastily determined boundaries between these two Powers in 1889 (Parrinder, 
1947).  
So much has been written about the arbitrariness of the colonial boundary 
in Africa as external impositions with little or no regards given to pre-existing 
social and political realities. However, the instance of the determination of the 
French – British boundary in Ketuland shows local participation and some level of 
vindictiveness on the part of the leadership of this kingdom. In appreciation of the 
role of the French in dealing once and for all with the Dahomey threat, the 
                                               
99 Ketu was reoccupied and rebuilt beginning from 1893 
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Regent
100
 of Ketu unilaterally ceded Ketu to the French, in spite of public opinion 
in support of the British.
101
 However, in determining the location of the boundary 
between the French and the British, the town of Ilara (an outpost of Ketu) decided 
unilaterally in favour of the British which was considered an affront by the Ketu 
leadership. As a punishment therefore, the Regent selected the shrine
102
 site of the 
town as the boundary, thus cutting the town into two spheres, one British and the 
other French.
103
 
4.81 Colonising the Yoruba: the British and the French 
Following the determination of the Anglo-French boundary in Yorubaland in 
1889, and its demarcation with the erection of concrete pillars in 1896 (Asiwaju, 
1975: 51-52), the stage was set for the effective domination of these territories by 
the two Powers. In a bid to consolidate their holdings, these Powers resorted to 
similar methods - forceful imposition in the face of native oppositions on the one 
hand exemplified by the French expedition to Dahomey and the British against the 
Ijebu in 1892. On the other hand, protective treaties were entered into between 
these Powers and the native communities to effectively bring them under colonial 
control.
104
 
Ruling the Yoruba was left to the colonial officers on the ground directed by 
the colonial bureaucracies back in the metropolitan states. The British adopted the 
                                               
100 The Alaketu informed this researcher that a regent is a temporary leader in the absence or 
incapacitation of a substantive king. In Ketu at this time, there was no Alaketu as the previous one, 
Ojeku had been killed in one of Dahomey‟s attacks. His wife, who had emerged as a leader of the 
people in captivity led a return to Ketu and became the regent. 
101 Oral interview with the Alaketu, 10.11.2008. 
102 In Yorubaland, the shrine is sacred, representing the „soul‟ of society and located in the centre of 
the settlement. 
103 Oral interview with the Oloola of Ilara, 10.11.2008. It is important to note that the views of both 
kings correspond regarding the partition of Ketuland, and especially the peculiarity of the town of 
Ilara divided by an international boundary. 
104
 Many African leaders did not understand the wordings of the treaties and merely appended their 
X marks in agreement, either to prevent the might of the colonial arms from descending on 
themselves, or to hide under the protection of these Powers against aggression from neighbouring 
communities. 
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indirect rule system owing to inadequate officers to administer the vast tract of 
territories gained for the British Empire. For the French, it began with direct 
administration, which proved ineffective and they had to adopt a variant of the 
British indirect administrative style, albeit not in quite the same manner and 
extent.  
The indirect rule system was perfected in the region of Northern Nigeria by 
Lord Lugard, the British Governor of this territory prior to 1914 when the system 
was extended to the rest of the British possession following the amalgamation of 
the northern and southern protectorates and the Colony of Lagos to form 
Nigeria.
105
 This system of rule, in the opinion of Lugard should employ local 
traditional institutions of authority „as the main agency for administering the 
territory‟ (Kirk-Greene, 1968: 69). It hinged on three pillars: a Native Court, a 
Native Administration and a Native Treasury (Mamdani, 2002: 78). Lugard 
explains the rationale of this administrative system in his 1919 Report of the 
Amalgamation of Nigeria thus: 
The policy of the Government was that these chiefs should govern 
their people, not as independent, but dependent Rulers. The orders of 
Government are not conveyed to the people through them, but 
emanate from them in accordance where necessary with instructions 
received through the Resident. While they themselves are controlled 
by Government in matters of policy and importance, their people are 
controlled in accordance with that policy by themselves. A political 
officer would consider it as irregular to issue direct orders to an 
individual native, or even to a village head, as a General commanding 
a division would to a private soldier, except through his commanding 
officers. The courts administer native law, and are presided over by 
native judges (417 in all). Their punishments do not conform to the 
criminal code, but on the other hand, native laws must not be in 
opposition to the Ordinances of Government, which are operative 
everywhere, and the courts… are under close supervision of the 
District staff. Their rules of evidence and their procedures are not 
based on British standards, but their sentences, if manifestly faulty, 
                                               
105 The Colony was exempted from indirect rule as it was governed as a Crown territory directly by 
British officials, of course with the aid of local personnel. 
136 
 
are subject to revision. Their prisoners are confined in their own 
native gaols, which are under the supervision of the British staff. The 
taxes are raised in the name of the native ruler and by his agents, but 
he surrenders the fixed proportion to the Native Administration, from 
which fixed salaries to all native officials are paid, is subject to the 
advice of the Resident, and the ultimate control of the Governor. The 
attitude of the Resident is that of a watchful advisor not of an 
interfering ruler, but he is jealous of the rights of the peasantry, and of 
any injustice towards them (Lugard, cited in Kirk-Greene, 1968: 70-
71). 
 
4.9  Conclusion 
Given the intense rivalries and competition that predated the imposition of 
boundaries marking off the territories of one colonial power from the other, post 
partition administrative policies were understandably protectionist and „national‟ 
integrative. Each power sought to jealously protect its „prize‟ to the exclusion of 
the other. The implication of this were severe for the fractions of this group as the 
dynamic centripetal forces of integration inherent in national political units
106
 
compelled a „pulling apart‟ of these fractions, engendering new identities, new 
neighbours, new values and cultures.  
This chapter clearly contributes to answering the substantive research 
question through the sub-research questions identified at the beginning of the 
chapter. It establishes, through field research and archival study, a kin (ebi) 
relationship for the Yoruba. It also identifies a geo-cultural space for the Yoruba 
which evolved out of several waves of migration, initially from the Yoruba centre 
of Ife. Field work at the borderland astride the Nigeria-Benin boundary in the 
study area reveals a continuous spread of the Yoruba across this boundary.  
Furthermore, evidence presented in this chapter establishes the fact of the 
colonial partition. Evidence provided by the traditional custodians of the history 
of the people clearly reports the partition. In addition, ethnographic survey 
                                               
106 Especially in an emergent state, theses forces are stronger and more compelling. 
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unambiguously supports the fact of the partition of the Yoruba into these two 
countries. These empirical evidences provide answers to the sub-research question 
on the partition as well as partly provide answer to the substantive research 
question on the impact of the partition on the subgroups. 
Finally, the chapter answers the research question relating to the manner of 
boundary making by showing that the process was an exclusive prerogative of the 
imperialists. Though in many instances, the „power‟ of the colonialists „derived‟ 
from treaties concluded between them and local African rules, the ultimate 
interests in the process was European. In other words, though the subjects were 
Africa and Africans, the decisions were exogenous to Africa. Consequently, the 
emergent boundary regime has remained, not only contentious, but potentially a 
trigger of conflict between states.  
The next chapter examines and analyses the imposition and consolidation 
of colonial rule in this part of West Africa – the new, modified and migrated 
social formations as well as the reactions of the local population to these 
impositions. Furthermore, and more especially, the chapter examines the 
perception and reactions of the Yoruba to the sudden imposition of a wall or 
barrier between them; the transformation or otherwise of the Yoruba identity, 
especially among those subgroups whose territories were divided by the colonial 
boundary. In the same light, the chapter also analyses the issues of irredentism 
and territorial revision as consequences of the anomalies associated with the 
colonially determined boundaries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CLASH OF ‘CIVILISATIONS’: STATE RATIONALITY VERSUS GROUP 
SUBJECTIVITY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to answering the main research question through 
the sub-research questions on the impact of contrasting colonial practices 
(socialisations); the reactions of the Yoruba to the stark reality of the colonial 
partition; and the various ways through which the Yoruba negotiate the boundary. 
It begins by analysing the impact of the partition on the subgroups of the Yoruba, 
divided, as it were, by an international boundary into two distinct states under 
contrasting colonial administrations on the one hand. On the other hand, the 
chapter examines and analyses the reactions of these groups to these 
„impositions‟, especially as it affects their „Yorubaness‟ or the Yoruba identity. 
Finally, the chapter also seeks to answer the research question by examining the 
sub-research question on the various ways through which the partitioned-Yoruba 
negotiate the externally superimposed boundary. 
5.2  Consolidation of Colonial Possessions 
The boundary
107
 between the territorial possessions of France and Britain 
in Yorubaland had to be demarcated rather hurriedly given the competition and 
rivalry that preceded the acquisitions of these territories (McEwen, 1991). The 
boundary was determined in the Anglo-French Arrangements of 1889, while the 
demarcation commission was set up in 1895. The actual demarcation of the 
boundary line was completed between 1911 and 1912 (McEwen, 1991: 67).  
Imperial control was established, with each Power pursuing policies aimed at not 
                                               
107 Yorubaland extends inland up to about latitude 90 North which is equivalent to the only part of 
the French/British boundary that was demarcated. 
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only consolidating their hold, but also at long-term domination of these territories. 
The British fraction of Yorubaland was incorporated gradually into the Colony 
and Protectorate of Nigeria, while the French part was also incorporated into the 
French West African Federation. 
Imperial consolidation and control entailed the systematic subjugation of 
these territories through imperial administrative, judicial, economic and value 
systems, which were in the main, imported from Europe,
108
 while some were 
deliberately designed for the exigencies of administering the large tracts of 
territories as the colonial holdings in Africa.
109
 Finally, there were those social 
structures which evolved from the interaction between imperial Europe and 
traditional Africa.
110
 All these, in the opinion of Ekeh (1983), gave form and 
character, not only to the colonial state, but to the successor African state. Indeed, 
for Ekeh, colonialism has eternal consequences for Africa as it has been 
fundamental in the shaping of the colonial, as well as the successor post-colonial 
state in the continent. 
Following the establishment of colonial rule in the dying days of the 
nineteenth century, there began a process of systematic consolidation of foreign 
rule in West Africa, which produced varying forms of reactions from the native 
populations. Foreign domination, bearing the nucleus of western civilisation 
encountered and sought to tame traditional African civilisation with varying 
consequences.  
Given the fierce competition and „scrambling‟ that preceded the partition 
of Yorubaland, inter-colonial policies were expectedly protectionist and 
                                               
108 Imported social structures included: the cash economy, the penal system, taxation and forced 
labour, among other. 
109 An example of deliberate colonial construction was the Indirect Rule system. 
110 The organised labour and the nationalist movements were two chief examples of social structures 
that emerged as a reaction to colonial rule. 
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simultaneously „national‟ integrative. In other words, as the colonial regimes 
became involved in the process of state-building, which required the creation of a 
sense of national „belonging‟, they also needed to protect what constituted the 
„national‟ from competitors from across the boundary.  This became even more 
crucial given the „irredentist‟ aspirations of the Yoruba elite in the French sphere. 
In the early years of colonial rule, the French colonial authorities had to repress 
irredentist aspirations by exiling leaders of such movements. In the words of 
Noufflard, the Lt. Governor of Dahomey against Louis Hounkanrin, a pioneer 
nationalist in the same territory: „…is a supporter of Mekpon and leads his fight 
against the French administration in order to annex Porto Novo to Nigeria under 
the rule of Mekpon‟ (Ronen, 1974: 64). Even as late as 1942, irredentist 
tendencies remained ever strong (and ever strongly viewed by the French 
authorities) when one local leader in Porto Novo committed suicide following 
accusation of plotting with the allies in Nigeria (Parrinder, 1989: 269). Thus,  
there was a pressing need to foster the sense of „us‟ versus „them‟ across the 
boundary in order for each colonial power to consolidate its hold on its domain, 
keeping it distinct from the domain of the other colonial power. Again, due to the 
competition and rivalry that preceded the determination of this boundary, each 
colonial authority embarked on policies that distinguished the territory of one 
from the other. One major policy was that of the imposition of differing customs 
regimes and border patrols in order to keep out „aliens‟, control „subjects‟ and 
maintain the „difference‟. 
5.21 The French and Yoruba Traditional Authority 
The administrative styles of the colonising powers were instrumental in the 
subjugation and exploitation of the colonies; indeed, these styles gave form and 
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character to the territories under colonial rule. It is noteworthy, for the purpose of 
this study, that the British and the French adopted contrasting (sometimes, 
competitive) administrative styles in their territories in Africa
111
. It has been noted 
above that the French began their colonial adventure in Africa by employing a 
direct administrative style,
112
 whose objectives included making Frenchmen out of 
„civilised‟ Africans through the policy of assimilation. The aim of assimilation 
was to make French colonies more like France, through education and 
acculturation in the „high‟ culture of France, thus making these territories 
extensions of France rather than outposts.  
We need not be bothered by the policy of assimilation as it did not apply to 
the area under consideration by this study, rather, the successive policy of 
association, which was the policy adopted to govern the vast territories of French 
possessions in (West) Africa of which the Yoruba region of Benin Republic fell 
would be examined in details. 
Even though the policy of assimilation was regarded by politicians and 
publicists in France as the best style for administering its vast overseas territories 
in order to secure for the people of the colonies, irrespective of colour, liberty and 
equality, the policy ran into troubled waters and had to be jettisoned for the more 
realistic policy of association.
113
 In the words of Jules Harmand, „the social 
                                               
111 Even though, the French later adopted the indirect rule system of the British, this does not infer a 
similar administrative style, as the mode of administration adopted was different. For instance, the 
French system was highly centralised with local chiefs being subordinated to the control of French 
officials. In the British sphere on the other hand, administration was localised, woven around the 
personality of the local political authority who was regarded by the British as the de facto ruler 
under the guidance of the local district officer. Furthermore, the British traditional ruler was 
consulted on a number of issues regarding the administration of the colony.   
112 In sub-Saharan Africa, assimilation was restricted to the three French Communes of St. Louis, 
Rufisque and Dakar. The reason for this may not be un-connected with the size of these 
communities as direct administration characteristic of assimilation would not be feasible in the 
larger expanse of French territorial holdings in West Africa. Indeed, assimilation was associated 
with early French colonisation which these communes represent. 
113
 Critics of assimilation argued that unlike Physics, unlike poles do not attract; rather, only people 
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standards of the Native inhabitants were too remote from those of France for 
assimilation to be practicable‟ (in Mamdani, 2002: 83). In its place, Harmand 
suggested a „policy of association‟, which he defined as „indirect administration, 
with the preservation but improved governance of the institutions of the 
conquered peoples, and with respect for their past‟ (in Mamdani, 2002: 83).  Thus 
since 1923, with the publication of Sarraut‟s La Mise en Valeur des Colonies 
Francaises, the French colonial policy in (West) Africa was officially changed to 
that of association which was seen by a French official in the following light: 
„...Natives will retain their traditions and their genius in order to associate 
themselves with our great work of national greatness in which they will be our 
faithful and loyal helpers‟ (Labouret, 1940: 27). The aim of the policy of 
association was to seek to improve the Native in every respect in his own 
environment. He was to be allowed a free rein, employing his own organisations 
(not repugnant to civilised norms) to attain these objectives (Labouret, 1940). This 
represented a direct opposite approach to that of assimilation with local chiefs 
becoming more relevant and, indeed, crucial in the administration of the colony. 
The chief „represented his community in its dealings with the administration‟ and 
„even more importantly‟, he represented „the administration vis-à-vis the 
community‟ (Delaignette in Mamadani, 2002: 82). 
Labouret (1940: 30-31) identifies the functions of the African chief in the 
                                                                                                                                      
of similar cultures and dispositions can be assimilated, not dissimilar people as typified by Africans 
who were intent on speaking their own language and following their cultural norms. Thus, 
assimilation could only produce a few Frenchified African elite who were supposed to be 
intermediaries between the French and the Natives thereby propagating the idea of assimilation. 
However, this group was so preoccupied with its own interests that it could not help the cause of 
assimilation. In addition, there were inadequate French personnel to administer directly these vast 
territories. For example, in 1912, there were only 341 colonial administrators in the whole of French 
West Africa, an area extending from Senegal to the western boundary of Nigeria and extending 
inland to the territories of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. In 1930s, years after the introduction of 
indirect administration, territorial administration revolved around 118 cercle commanders who 
supervised 48,000 village chiefs and 2200 canton chiefs (Mamdani, 2002: 82). Without these chiefs, 
French colonial administration would have been grossly ineffective. 
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French indirect rule system to include: 
1. Tax collection on behalf of the colonial authority. He is eligible to a very 
small percentage of  the total tax collected as salary; 
2. Recruitment for the colonial army. Conscription, by the very nature of 
colonial rule, was forced and was very unpopular among the natives. Indeed, 
one of the rationales for protest migration from the French colonial territories 
to the British was forced conscription; 
3. Supply of forced labour (covées de presta taires) for building and  
maintenance of public utilities (roads, toilets, portage, bridges, etc); 
4. Led by example and propaganda in contributing to the development of 
cultivation and production; 
5. The chief must wait on the local French administrator, whose auxiliary he 
was. 
In return for such responsibilities, reflecting his „auxiliary‟ role, the chief was: 
1. Badly paid or in some cases, not even paid at all. He had no choice, in any 
case as dissent was treated as treasonable felony with the unpleasant 
consequences of deposition, exile or imprisonment; 
2. He was shorn of any form of authority and power. Indeed, he was no more 
than an errand boy for the local French official 
3. As the chief had no power or authority to carry out his colonial-ordered 
responsibilities, he was provided with a Garde de Cercle (native police) to 
enforce his instructions. However, in practice, the police usually supplanted 
the chief, further diminishing his power.  
It is important to examine the fortunes of local chiefs in the two 
Yorubalands in order to determine the impact of these contrasting administrative 
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styles on this crucial element of the Yoruba culture. In pre-colonial Yorubaland, 
the institution of the obaship was highly revered with the king regarded as the 
human representative of the gods. He held an exalted position in society; he was 
considered the father and protector of the community; his words were laws 
(though there were in-built checks and balances). However, with the introduction 
of colonial rule, this changed, albeit in varying degrees on both sides of the 
boundary. The difference in the status of the oba was no more than a function of 
the difference in colonial policies. During the era of direct rule in French 
Yorubaland, Yoruba obas were relegated to the background. France governed its 
territories directly employing French nationals and those very few privileged 
Africans who had attained the „high culture‟ of France through education and had 
been granted full French citizenship.
114
 Traditional chiefs were relegated as 
primitive and relics of a pre-modern social order. French cultural values were 
espoused and proposed to replace African values, which were considered 
„barbaric, retrogressive and primitive‟ (Wallerstein, 1961: 66).  Indeed, the oba 
was reduced to a mere elected agent of the central colonial administration with 
clearly defined delegated duties (Crowder, 1968: 199). The French were intolerant 
of a rival locus of power, and made spirited efforts to „crush and destroy‟ the 
traditional chieftaincy, especially in the early days of colonial rule (Miles, 1987: 
239). The French were thus high handed and insensitive to traditional culture in 
replacing obas in disregard of traditional modes. Traditional norms of legitimacy 
were much less important than the ability to speak French or prior service to the 
colonial regime. The powers of the obas were further diminished as the French 
policy tended to carve up large dominions into smaller administrative districts.  
                                               
114 Indeed, this category of Africans was to become invaluable in the administrative machine of the 
French as they provided a significant proportion of the civil service in French West Africa. 
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However, with the shift in the pattern of administration from direct to indirect 
rule in the early years of the 20
th
 century, the French were compelled to govern 
their vast territories through the institution of traditional authority. The native 
traditions and customs that were previously regarded as completely repugnant to 
civilised principles had to be adopted as the basis of indirect rule. However, the 
adoption of customary law did not simply mean a continuation of things as they 
had been as it had to conform to „acceptable practices‟ all over the civilised world. 
Custom in other words was state-ordained and state-enforced (Wallerstein, 1961). 
Even with the adoption of more liberal attitude to traditional rulers, the fortunes of 
Yoruba obas under French rule did not change appreciably, rather the Native 
perception of the oba suffered greatly owing to the demands of the colonial state 
on him (the oba). The French may have been compelled by political exigency to 
depend on the obas for administration, they never did grant them the authority to 
initiate actions or drive change as they were merely agents of the colonial state 
whose power and authority (derived from the state) alienated him from his people. 
In the words of Michael Crowder: 
the chief in French West Africa progressively lost his traditional 
authority while his new functions of taxation, recruiting of forced 
labour and troops and checking on anti-French movements within his 
area of supervision, together with the authoritarian way in which he 
was treated by the Commandant, transformed him from the 
embodiment of the collective will of the community into an agent of 
the most hated aspects of French colonial rule (Crowder, 1968: 139) 
 
The oba not only lost his traditional authority, status and territory, he was 
treated with scorn by the French on the one hand, and on the other, by his people; 
people who were bound by tradition and custom to revere the person and office of 
the oba. While the French reduced him to a mere agent of the „state‟, he was 
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alienated from his people as he was seen as nothing more than an agent of the 
oppressor. 
 The cumulative effect of French paternalism was the gradual disappearance 
of the Native traditional authority system. Granted, certain Native practices had 
undeniable flaws, which could be reformed under French „civilising‟ guidance, 
however, colonial officials tended to „pull down‟ and „crush‟ local cultures and 
replace them with structures similar to those they were familiar with. Thus, the 
vast majority of pre-colonial political organisations like the Kingdom of Dahomey 
were reduced to a shadow of their former glory. Uncooperative traditional rulers 
were deposed and exiled or jailed, while his territory was split into small 
administrative units as punishment (Labouret, 1940). Native chiefs had no real 
authority and the aura surrounding the office in pre-colonial times was eroded as 
they were regarded as officials of the colonial administration (rather than divinely 
ordained by the gods); traditional structures of hierarchy became undermined, 
such that a junior chief, simply due to the ability to speak French and possession 
of administrative experience, could be upgraded over and above senior chiefs. 
This practice posed grave dangers to the institution of traditional authority and the 
French administration.  
5.22 The British and Yoruba Traditional Authority 
In the British sphere however, the situation was different. The British adopted 
the policy of indirect rule where, though Britain was ultimately sovereign in its 
colonies, it sought to govern through the institution of traditional rulership already 
in place.
115
 The obas were to oversee and monitor the day-to-day activities of their 
subjects based on customary law on behalf of the colonial authorities who were to 
                                               
115 Where there existed no pre colonial traditional rulership, one was created to cater to the colonial 
need for native authority  
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guide and „advise‟ the Native rulers. Unlike the situation across the boundary in 
the French possession, greater care was taken to avoid the wholesale disruption of 
native culture, tradition and legitimacy. Again, as Michael Crowder explains: 
„indirect rule…implied the government of the African peoples through their 
traditional political institutions, shorn of those features that conflicted with British 
concept of civilised behaviour, the extraction of taxes and the establishment of 
regularised treasuries‟ (Crowder, 1968: 211). 
 In many places in Yorubaland, British rule enhanced the authority and power 
of the obas. Indirect rule strengthened the power of the oba in two ways that 
marked a departure from what obtained in the pre-colonial period. For the first 
time, the scope of the power of the traditional ruler became all embracing. 
Previously autonomous social domains like the household, age groups, traditional 
councils, and so on, now fell under the power of the king (Mamdani, 2002: 110). 
Secondly, he was backed by the armed might of the colonial state; any challenge 
to the power of the king was considered as a challenge on the colonial authority. 
Furthermore, the territories of the oba’s domain were often enlarged in conformity 
with British colonial mapping. Colonial administration was territorially organised 
into provinces and districts, which were organised around native authorities. For 
instance, the Ijebu Province was organised under the native authority of the 
Awujale (the oba) of pre-colonial Ijebu Kingdom where every other oba and 
territory (some with competing claims with the Awujale) within the District were 
brought under the control of the Awujale.
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Unlike the practice in French Yorubaland, when appointing new obas, the 
British took great pains to follow the tradition and culture of the people. The 
                                               
116 At the Provincial level, the House of Chiefs was instituted as an umbrella body of first-class 
chiefs whose responsibilities included advisory roles to the colonial administration. 
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impact of the indirect rule policy was especially beneficial to British Yoruba obas, 
as many of them had already lost credibility owing to the protracted internecine 
warfare prevalent in the period around the advent of the colonial intervention. The 
policy reified the institution of the obaship and restored its lost esteem and values. 
However, in certain instances, just as in the French sphere, uncompromising obas 
were deposed and sent into exile. 
 While the authority and power of the oba in French Yorubaland were greatly 
diminished, the lots of the obas in British Yorubaland were highly enhanced. In 
his study of Ketu and Imeko, two towns of the pre-colonial Ketu Kingdom whose 
territory was partitioned by the international boundary into Benin and Nigeria 
respectively, Asiwaju shows that Ketu, the capital of the kingdom fared worse 
than Imeko, an outpost town. Indeed, their fortunes were reversed with Imeko 
becoming more prominent and its bale (junior chief) elevated to the position of an 
oba while the oba of Ketu was reduced to an elected representative subject to 
periodic elections in conformity with French policy (Asiwaju, 2001: 134-137). 
 Following independence, the lots of the obas were to continue on different 
planes. In Nigeria, traditional authority initially continued to enjoy great roles in 
the polity with the second chamber of the regional parliaments (House of Chiefs) 
made up of traditional rulers with the most senior traditional ruler in each region 
constituting the ceremonial head of government (governor) enjoying 
unprecedented power and influence. However, following the coup d‟état of 1966 
and subsequent coups, their influence was gradually eroded and their roles 
became increasingly advisory.
117
  
                                               
117 However, recent developments in Nigeria may yet restore the powers of the obas and other 
traditional authorities as the ongoing (early 2010) constitutional review consultations have 
highlighted the need to provide constitutional roles for obas and chiefs 
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In Benin, the colonial policy of repression of the traditional institution 
continued and indeed became codified in the Republican Constitution of 1958 
(Asiwaju, 2001: 149). The obas are no more than mere custodians of the culture 
and tradition of the people. 
5.3  Contrasting Administration and Socialisation 
Another decisive feature of colonial administration was the territorial 
structure of administration. While the French favoured a centralised structure with 
its entire West African territories organised into the French West African 
Federation with the capital in Dakar, the British organised their spheres of 
influence on a decentralised mode, employing the territorial domains of Native 
authority as basis. This has implications for identity as it appears that the French 
colonial subjects were oriented to consider themselves first as West Africans 
rather than Senegalese or Guineans (these were indeed non-existent markers of 
identity for much of colonial rule). On the other hand in British Nigeria, localised 
administration reified the sense of the ethnic identity as customary law of ethnic 
groups was the basis of governance. The issues of identity shall be further 
explored at a later stage in this chapter. 
Given the intensive inter-colonial competition for footholds in each other‟s 
territories, as well as the relatively high level of „community‟ and kinship in 
Yorubaland, each colonial administration embarked on rigorous propaganda to 
build the sense of oneness and belonging in its respective sphere. The fear of the 
pull of ethnic consciousness, making for irredentism, compelled deliberate 
misinformation (propaganda) by both States as one major tool of state building. 
This is usually beneficial to the originating state which constitutes the „in-group‟ 
(us) but at the detriment of the targeted neighbouring state - the „out-group‟ 
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(them). Therefore, the need to create contrasting (differentiated) identities became 
compelling. The school system was the most prominent setting for the 
socialisation so direly needed to foster the „imagination of the nation', one distinct 
from the other across the boundary. Education meant a certain separation, a 
contrasting process of differential socialisation into two distinct states (Asiwaju, 
2001: 213-214).   
The educational policies of both powers sought to deny full access to western 
education to Africans (Asiwaju, 2001: 214). However, the restrictions which the 
French policy imposed were greater than the British. Consistent with French 
administrative policy, education was centrally controlled by the state; government 
owned most of the schools and exercised very strict supervision over the few 
privately run schools, chiefly by the Roman Catholic Mission. This was consistent 
with the Law of Separation of 1904, which separated the realm of the state from 
that of the Church and secularised education both in France and all over its 
colonial possessions (Asiwaju, 2001).  
The quality of educational facilities was very poor in the Yoruba areas under 
French rule as was the case all over the entire French West African Federation. 
Furthermore, the French policy included a specification strictly limiting school 
eligibility to age fifteen. At this age, students had to withdraw from school 
irrespective of the level of education attained. The significance of all these was an 
extremely low rate of school attendance throughout the colonial period in French 
Yorubaland (Asiwaju, 2001: 215). 
In the British territory, a contrasting situation prevailed where Christian 
missionaries were more involved in education than the government and had 
greater leeway in terms of contents and curricula. Later on, in the course of 
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colonial rule, local initiatives in education were also introduced in Nigeria with 
several community groups and associations becoming involved in the 
establishment of schools. As the country moved towards independence, 
federalism (regional) was introduced with each regional government (made up of 
the indigenous elite) responsible for education among other responsibilities. The 
Regional government in the West (Yorubaland) introduced free universal primary 
education, which witnessed unprecedented enrolment and founding of schools that 
formed the foundation of the educational pre-eminence of the region in 
independent Nigeria.   
The distinction in educational policies had contrasting impact on the two 
Yoruba groups. First, the members of the two educational elites
118
 were mutually 
estranged as schooling in the traditions of two distinct western civilisations had 
alienated members of the same African culture (Asiwaju, 2001: 214). The Yoruba 
elite in Dahomey communicated in French and associated more with their 
counterparts from other parts of Francophone Africa than they did with their 
kinsmen just across the boundary in Nigeria.
119
 The survival of Yoruba language 
as the mother tongue of the two elite groups has not nullified the barrier imposed 
by the two different official languages, but remains significant still in their 
identity as Yoruba, in spite of the centrifugal effects of contrasting colonial 
(official) languages (Asiwaju, 2001).   
                                               
118 The estrangement of the elite did not significantly affect the Yoruba ethnic affinity as they 
constitute a small minority whose influence was not strong enough to adversely affect the loyalty of 
the masses of the people to Yoruba values and custom. Indeed, the educated elite ended up being 
alienated from the general population as they became so Europeanised that they could no longer fit 
into the traditional mould. 
119
 This was more so given the centralised administrative style of the French, precluding the 
development of national or ethnic identities. However, following the granting of independence to 
new states based on the former administrative divides, national identities emerged and so did ethnic 
identities, which had been suppressed under colonial rule.  
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Secondly, as the French educational system was geared toward making 
French-men out of Africans, school curricula were decidedly oriented towards this 
end. The implication of this for the products of the educational system was the 
creation of a docile elite group, apathetic to the French administrative system. The 
French policy of assimilation permitted qualified Africans to become members of 
the French parliament, which was considered the height of frenchification and 
assimilation. For a while, the elite considered French policy as satisfactory as it 
allowed assimilation; however, with the shift from assimilation to association and 
the replacement of the elite by native authority, the elite perception of colonial 
rule change dramatically and they worked assiduously to end colonial rule. 
However, the relatively late shift of focus to nationalism by the elite in French 
West Africa affected the response of France to independence movements such 
that by the mid-1950s when France began preparation to hand over power to the 
native elite, Britain was already far gone in instituting reforms and processes for 
transfer of power.
120
  
Across the boundary in British Nigeria, the objective of the educational 
policy was chiefly to produce labour for the administration of the colony, as it was 
in the French colonies, and no more. However, as British policy was non-
assimilationist, foreclosing any opportunity for Nigerians to become Britons, as 
well as the sidelining of the elite from the colonial bureaucracy, the educated elite 
saw colonialism for what it was without the distracting idea of assimilation. Thus, 
the educated elite saw the exploitative tendencies of colonialism, which propelled 
huge nationalist sentiments earlier than in the French territory to the west. The 
nationalist movement in Yorubaland was propelled by the Yoruba culture and 
                                               
120 Indeed, Nigeria‟s first constitution (the Clifford Constitution of 1922) was deliberately made to 
begin the preparation of the natives for self government. 
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tradition. Though nationalist activism in Nigeria began as truly national, owing to 
ethnicity and ethnic rivalry, nationalism soon became ethnic and the political 
parties that evolved were ethnically based. The foremost political party in 
Yorubaland during this period, the Action Group evolved from a pan-Yoruba 
socio-cultural association, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. In other words, the Yoruba 
identity became a political tool, which was possible because of the affinity among 
the Yoruba groups. Indeed, during this period, the Action Group advocated the 
readjustment of the Nigerian western boundary to incorporate the Yoruba 
speaking people in Benin. This marked a novel, but short-lived, idea originating 
from the Nigerian Yoruba for irredentism. The significance of this agitation was 
the consciousness among the people of the oneness of the Yoruba group, the 
affinity among the group irrespective of location. Indeed, Prescott (1971: 104) 
reports that the Alaketu of Ketu acknowledged this consciousness by welcoming 
the reunification of the Yoruba groups within the same geopolitical space, 
however, the initiative must be taken by the Nigerian Yoruba. 
5.4  Reactions of the Yoruba to the Partition and Colonisation 
This section seeks to provide answer to the research question through the sub-
research question on the reactions of the Yoruba people as divided, to their 
partition and colonisation. Did the Yoruba on both sides of the boundary simply 
accept their partition, and colonisation as an „act of God‟ without protestation and 
rebellion? Would the imperial subjugation, repression and exploitation of these 
peoples have been met with simple acquiescence? The imposition of alien rule 
with its alien social structures and formations, which displaced traditional African 
structures and formations, elicited varying types of reactions from every corner of 
West Africa. These reactions, which reflected localised details, included the 
154 
 
adaptation and exploitation of the economic and political opportunities afforded 
by colonial rule. Another form of reaction was active protest and resistance 
movements against the novel forms of political and economic organisations which 
did not correspond to Native forms of political, ethnic, economic, social and 
religious patterns (Kastfelt, 1976: 1). Indeed, what colonialism (especially 
determination of boundaries) did to traditional African norms was to foster a 
„disordering‟ of settled patterns and simultaneously foster new, but alien modes. 
African reactions to these stimuli were a manifestation of their resentment and 
opposition to the colonial intervention.  
Perception is of crucial importance in understanding the reactions of the 
Yoruba sub-groups whose daily lives were directly affected by the position and 
positioning of the boundary line. The general proclivity was (is) ambivalent: on 
the one hand, they treat the line as though it is non-existent, especially regarding 
its character as a wall and barrier. On the other hand, they treat the line as a point 
of opportunity; circumventing the state and its strictures largely because the line 
provides a point of arbitrage opportunities. Indeed the perception of the people is 
captured in the words of the late Alaketu to Prescott in 1971: „the boundary was 
between the British and the French, not between the Yoruba‟. Interestingly, 
almost forty years later, the current Alaketu echoed these same words to this 
researcher during a research visit in 2008. This reflects a deep-seated perception 
of the boundary as a mere administrative line, and no more.  
At one point along the boundary, the Yoruba town of Ilara is divided in half 
by the international boundary. In other words, the town lies astride the boundary, 
with a fraction in Nigeria and the other fraction in Benin; making the inhabitants 
either Nigerians or Beninese depending on which side of the boundary they fall. 
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This town is headed by an oba, the Oloola located on the Nigerian side, but he 
exercises rulership over the entire town. This provided a veritable laboratory for 
testing questions relating to perception among other crucial issues about boundary 
during the field work. The field research questions: „how would you describe the 
boundary?‟; „how often do you cross the boundary?‟ and so on, did not make 
sense as the inhabitants of this town cross the boundary as often as they 
desire/need without hassle from anyone. Granted, there is a boundary, but it does 
not perform the traditional functions of boundaries as wall and barriers at this 
particular border crossing.
121
    
For the purpose of this study, those reactions that derived from, and related 
generally to the colonially ordered international boundaries, with a particular 
focus on the Yoruba territory are the subjects of analysis. For the purpose of 
analysis, the period under consideration is divided into colonial and post-
independence phases. During the colonial period, the two kinds of reactions to 
colonial rule were exhibited by Africans, namely, adaptation and exploitation of 
the colonial condition for political and economic gains as well as active protest 
and resistance to colonial rule. Active protest and resistance took various forms, 
but for our purpose, protest migration from the region of one colonial power to 
that of another is the focus. This is due to the fact that this was a cross-border 
inter-imperial movement which demonstrated one of the extreme forms of 
resistance to colonial rule. It was relatively easy for people to migrate from one 
colonial possession to another, especially for borderland people whose cultural 
                                               
121 Indeed, it appears as though there is some kind of tacit agreement by the two states to treat this 
particular boundary line as merely administrative; the immigration barriers here are almost non-
existent. During the field work visit to this town, the researcher was left wondering whether he had 
actually crossed an international boundary usually characterised by massive state presence and 
hindrances to movement in this part of the world. The immigration posts were located at the border 
quite alright, but located in such a way as to be out of the way. Compared to the other crossing 
points at this segment of the boundary, the Ilara border crossing is relatively stress-free. 
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territories were split by the colonial boundary.
122
 Given the contrasting colonial 
policies, especially of administration, taxation, justice and education, there existed 
contrasting sociopolitical conditions across colonial boundaries, making the 
prospect of cross-border migration alluring. 
5.41 Migration as Revolt 
Migration as a reaction to unfavourable political and social conditions was a 
common phenomenon in pre-colonial Africa, the so-called „traditional primacy of 
exit in Africa‟ (Herbst, 1990: 183).  There is significant evidence to support 
„migration as revolt‟ in pre-colonial Africa which suggests that the colonial 
manifestation of protest migration was simply a re-enactment of age-old practice 
in the continent. This was especially common among the Yoruba and the Edo 
peoples of present day Nigeria. As Kopytoff (1987: 10) suggests, the ability to 
migrate was inherent to the African in pre-colonial times: 
Established societies were surrounded by large tracts of land that 
were open politically or physically or both. Together these tracts 
made up a continent-wide interstitial network of thousands of 
potential frontiers. Settlers wishing to leave the established societies 
could move into this internal African frontiers and set up their own 
social order in the midst of what was effectively an institutional 
vacuum. 
 
During colonial rule, faced with adverse conditions, the Africans simply 
relocated as they had always done. The factors responsible for the protest 
migrations were manifold. It was generally regarded by the Natives that 
conditions were better-off in British controlled territories than they were in the 
French sphere and they gravitated towards the British controlled regions.
123
 
                                               
122 In spite of the views of Asiwaju (1976) and Smith (1967) of the exaggeration of the ethnic 
connection in migration across colonial boundaries, the existence of a group with similar culture and 
tradition would, no doubt assist the émigrés in settling down and being integrated into their host 
communities more easily than if the group had been one with which they had no affinity.  
123 In the course of the field work, the researcher was informed by a prominent traditional ruler in 
the Yoruba section of Benin that he had to migrate to the British side around 1947 when there was 
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Indeed, the recourse to protest migration was a reaction by the people to the harsh 
and insensitive colonial policies of the French. According to Asiwaju (1976b), 
French West Africa showed the best examples of manifestations of discontent to 
colonial rule and witnessed varying degrees of „migration as revolt‟ to British 
controlled territories. However, as he further points out, even the British territories 
which offered refuge for most subject people fleeing French high-handedness, 
also witnessed occasional protest migrations.
124
 
The French colonial policy in (West) Africa was characterised by forced 
conscription, harsh capitation tax, forced labour, forestry regulation and the forced 
cultivation of certain crops, and cultural alienation, which provided the necessary 
„push factors‟ for forced or protest migration to the British administered areas 
given their less-harsh conditions, constituting the „pull-factors‟. While the features 
of colonial administration prevalent in French colonies were also present in the 
British sphere, the high-handedness of French colonial laws and administrators 
made the ills of British administration pale into insignificance. French policies 
were mercantilists as opposed to the laissez faire approach of the British 
(Asiwaju, 1976a). Just like the British territories, the burden of administering the 
colony was borne by Africans, however, unlike the British, the French exacted 
this cost through a harsh fiscal policy. For example, children of ten years old and 
above had statutory obligations to pay tax (Asiwaju, 1976a: 584).  
Furthermore, as noted above, the French administration in Africa was 
centralised with its entire territories in West Africa organised into the French 
West African Federation administered from Dakar. The implication of this for the 
                                                                                                                                      
famine in the French controlled territory. Some elderly respondents in Sakete also talked about their 
migration to the British side to avoid forced labour and taxation.  
124 In protest to the evils of House Rule in Eastern and Central Nigeria in 1912, some people fled to 
the Spanish territory of Fernando Po. The Emir of Borgu also migrated with scores of his people in 
protest to French Borgu in 1904. 
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fiscal system was the centralisation of fiscal control which deprived the 
component units of the much needed custom revenues and other forms of income, 
forcing them to depend on direct taxation, which really was an extra fiscal burden 
on the Natives.  
French colonial administrative policy was guided by French paternalism 
(Wallerstein, 1961), which in spite of indirect rule, supplanted African norms of 
interaction and political organisation with the French conception and norms of 
civilisation, unlike in British colonies which were administered through the 
medium of traditional African political authority system. In addition, the French 
further assaulted the sensitivity of the Natives by creating warrant chiefs 
(chiefferie) where no such existed previously or even more crucially, appointing 
those perceived by the people to lack the authority, or through processes that are 
alien to the custom and tradition of the Africans.
125
 The French system of 
relocation of entire populations also contributed to the perception of the French as 
the worse evil by the colonised people of Africa. The system literally dislocated 
entire settlements to meet the colonial demands for labour at public work sites, 
without considerations for the costs and implication to the people. 
To underscore the push factors in the French territories, it is instructive to 
examine the French legal regime of the indigenat. The indigenat was described as 
a „charter of modern slave trade‟ for subjecting Africans to „horrifying acts of 
brutality and inhumanity against Africans‟ (Rene Maran, in Egonu, 1981: 249). 
The underlying principle of this legal order lay in the early colonial assumption 
that almost all the whites „had the authority to inflict punishment‟ on any native 
                                               
125 Though the British also created warrant chiefs where none existed before due to their reliance on 
the Native authority system, they generally tended to respect native customs regarding the 
appointment and office of Native chiefs. 
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(Mamdani, 2002: 126). It was formally adopted as the colonial „rule by decree‟ in 
the 1870s in Algeria from where it was exported elsewhere, reaching West Africa 
in the 1880s (Asiwaju, 1976b: 125). The indigenat was characterised by summary 
justice and arbitrary and inhuman imposition of sentences without the option of 
appeal. The exercise of the indigenat was limited to white officials in 1924 and 
extended to non-administrative chiefs whose privilege was limited to the 
imposition of five days‟ imprisonment and a fine of twenty five francs. 
Mamdani (2002: 126) further characterised the indigenat as „white privilege, 
rule by decree, or administrative justice‟, which codified rather ordinary day-to-
day practice in the colonies. It was the exercise of administrative justice without 
judicial restraints. Mamdani (2002: 127) reproduces a list of charges extracted 
from a colonial court book: 
 four lashes for „wasting time instead of buying food‟ 
 five to ten lashes for „sitting around fire instead of working‟ 
 one man was fined for „absenting himself from hospital while 
under treatment‟ 
 another man was fined for „singing near the native church at 
11.30pm‟ 
 some were fined for „being late to work‟ 
 others were fined for „gross disrespect‟ 
 
The scope of the indigenat was all-embracing, irrespective of the status of the 
offender or non-offender (the important index was the skin colour), every one was 
subject to that rule of law.  
The legal system was so harsh that faced with the choice of „voice‟ or „exit‟, 
the peasants simply walked across the boundary into the warm embrace of kith 
and kin on the other side. In any case, the „voice‟ was not an option as the French 
were known to crush every form of opposition, no matter how benign with heavy 
fine, exile or imprisonment. Thus, the main reaction to the harsh legal regime of 
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the French system was protest migration to British territories; from the Ivory 
Coast, Mali and Burkina Faso to Ghana; from Senegal to the Gambia and from 
Benin to Nigeria. This trend became so pervasive in colonial West Africa that the 
two Powers had to meet several times to resolve the issue of trans-border 
migration as it had negative impacts on production and taxation in the French 
colony (Asiwaju, 1976b: 146-146). 
While the harsh and inhuman policies of the French constituted the necessary 
„push‟ factors, the more „conducive‟ policies of the British as well as the presence 
of related groups on the other side of the boundary constituted the „pull‟ factors. 
As it has been pointed out above, the British were regarded as the lesser of two 
devils, whose rather laissez faire attitude to colonial administration characterised 
by the employment of Native Authority as well as their more humane policies 
tended to attract revolt migrants from the French sphere. In addition, British 
territories were usually more prosperous (Crowder, 1968; Asiwaju, 1976a) than 
French territories, which naturally attracted folks escaping from the indigenat and 
the rather harsh French fiscal policies. Furthermore, the presence of related groups 
across the boundary provided further impetus for protest migration as the migrants 
simply „returned‟ to the warm embrace of kith and kin. As in the case of the 
French Yoruba, relations with the fractions of the group in the British sphere were 
never severed in spite of the colonial boundary and indeed, they moved up and 
down across the boundary for sundry reasons. Thus, when the movement became 
forced, the people simply crossed over as they had always done, with little or no 
disruption to their normal lives.
126
  
                                               
126 Field interviews over two months in 2008. Almost every respondent, over 70 years old, both 
traditional elite and the ordinary people alluded to periods when they migrated, either as a result of 
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However, the employment of structural violence and coercive measures was 
not restricted to the French in Africa. As the essence was to teach the recalcitrant 
Africans a lesson, to ensure they learned to respect constituted authority, colonial 
policy all over the continent was based on a command and control system. In the 
words of Lord Lugard, the architect of indirect rule in Nigeria, „…occasions may 
arise when the strictly legal aspect may give way to expediency‟ (Lugard, in 
Mamdani, 2002: 125). Comparatively though, the French institution of the 
indigenat as a state policy and its practice raised the employment of structural 
violence in French colonies to the level of statecraft which made the practice in 
British colonies child‟s play in comparison. 
5.42 Smuggling 
The other kind of reaction to the arbitrary imposition of the French/British 
boundary on Yorubaland was the adaptation and exploitation of the „social fact‟ of 
the boundary. The most significant adaptation of boundary is smuggling
127
 which 
could be seen as either a reaction (protest) to the imposition of boundary or its 
exploitation for personal gains (Flynn, 1997: 313). As a reaction to the boundary, 
local borderlanders deliberately engage in clandestine activities to sabotage border 
policies as the border was/is regarded as an irritant, imposed to cause dislocation 
between kith and kin. However, this attitude to the boundary was not as popular as 
that which takes advantage of boundaries for personal gains. For the Yoruba, the 
people have so adapted and domesticated the boundary in spite of the partition of 
their culture area that they cannot imagine life without it (Flynn, 1997). The 
                                                                                                                                      
famine or revolt against forced labour and conscription. Some claimed they moved over to their 
father‟s compound or their family farmland, which made integration easy for the migrants.  
127 Smuggling refers to those trans- border business transactions conducted outside the framework 
of the institutions of the state, thereby depriving the state of valuable revenues from custom duties 
and tariffs. 
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boundary has become entrenched and thoroughly embedded in the local 
borderland communities and regarded as sites of arbitrage opportunities. 
Flynn (1997: 320) in her study of the Yoruba borderland people of the 
Nigeria and Benin border areas argues that the people have been able to 
appropriate the border, emphasising their „deep placement‟ within the border. The 
people did not see the boundary as a fence or barrier, rather, they saw it as an 
opportunity for wealth creation as they exploited their location at the „periphery‟ 
of national states.  
Smuggling could actually be located in the pre-colonial modes of interactions 
between and among these peoples. It has been established that this region was 
home to the Yoruba groups and pre-colonial interaction was indeed heavy along 
the border region. Mills (1970) shows that the boundary region has a dense 
network of communication which the colonially imposed boundary (and related 
state policies) could not undo. Traditional (trade) routes had been well developed 
before colonial rule which is a reflection of a wide variety of interactions among 
the people without the „unnecessary‟ encumbrance of border structures. However, 
with the imposition of colonial boundaries, new realities had to be negotiated - 
impediment to movement of people and goods and custom duties - which were 
nonexistent prior to this time. This led to the development of trade by „other 
routes‟. 
The character of the colonial state aided the growth and sustenance of 
smuggling. The sheer size of the borders coupled with the well-developed 
network of communication along this border made securing and patrolling them 
difficult, if not impossible. The colonial infrastructural pattern of neglecting the 
border region as per development of infrastructure compounded the arduous tasks 
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of patrolling the border. Furthermore, price differentials across boundary lines, 
occasioned by competing state policies, increased the allure of traders to 
smuggling, especially with the institution of custom posts
128
 along at the border. 
For example, tariffs in the French region were deliberately reduced in competition 
with the British for a share of the sea-trade (Dioka, 1994). He further submits that 
„in the 1860s, import duties in the French sphere were about 4% while it stood at 
10% across the boundary in Nigeria‟ (Dioka, 1994: 38). This made goods cheaper 
in the French territories than in Nigeria, which attracted businessmen to the 
French territories where goods were brought into Nigeria while avoiding customs 
duties, thus maximising gains.   
The adaptation and exploitation of the boundary was not limited to smuggling 
as other forms of adaptation were contrived by the borderlanders to benefit from 
their peculiar location at the periphery of the state. Infrastructural facilities were 
also exploited, irrespective of their location. Educational and health facilities as 
well as ritual symbolic linkages across international boundary lines were also 
exploited by the border region people. In order to adequately analyse this 
phenomenon, it is necessary to compare educational and health facilities across 
the boundary; the comparison will focus on number and content (for educational 
facilities) and number and standard (for health facilities). This will highlight the 
need by the people to cross borders in order to access these facilities. 
Between 1890 and 1939, there were only six schools in the whole of French 
Yorubaland, all of which (excluding one) were primary schools (classe primaire) 
- all founded by 1934 (Asiwaju, 2001: 215). In spite of growing demands for 
schools, the French administration deliberately prevented the provision of more 
                                               
128 The first custom post between Nigeria and the French West African Federation was established 
at Badagry in 1866 (Dioka, 1994: 38) 
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schools on ideological grounds (Babatunde, 1994: 51). In tune with the French 
system of administration, the educational system was centralised and hinged on 
stiff control and selection, not necessarily aimed at making education available to 
the largest number of people. Indeed, at age fifteen, all pupils must be withdrawn 
from school irrespective of achievement (Asiwaju, 2001). The aim of the French 
educational system by the 1930s, as stated by the Governor General of the West 
African Federation was: 
The recruitment of the cadres of native more vigorous and more 
content and more and more assured, and by a vigorous and progressive 
selection more and more advanced. It is the diffusion of the French 
language, by the contact established more intimately and completely 
with French life and activities; it is the constitution of a native elite to 
the greatest possible extent, in whom the passionate thriving towards a 
culture completely and jealously French could be strengthened 
(Babatunde, 1994: 51). 
 
 As late as the 1930s, the aim of the educational policy in French West Africa 
was still couched in paternalistic moulds. Not surprisingly, the curriculum of these 
schools was taught in the French language right from the first day.  The pattern 
was a whole day affair with a two hour break in the afternoon (Babatunde, 1994: 
52). This was incompatible with traditional Yoruba child rearing culture where 
children assist adult members by running chores, etc. This led to a high rate of 
dropouts in the French system. In Ketu, the nature of the French educational 
policy compelled many to send their wards to school across the boundary in 
Nigeria. In the words of the immediate past Alaketu (1988): 
The manner in which the French behaved was completely different. 
They turned our customary ways of behaviour upside down. They 
started to provide education in a half-hearted manner. The British 
took care of the king and the chiefs. They also established sharp 
education. That is why our people send their children to receive 
proper education over there (meaning Nigeria) (Babatunde, 1994: 52). 
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 The British on the other hand adopted a partnership ideology to the provision 
of educational facilities; partnership between the state and charitable 
organisations, especially Christian missions. Government established few schools 
as models of standards, while charitable organisations established the majority of 
the schools in the region. Thus, in the western Yorubaland of Nigeria, there were 
thirty six primary schools, thirty of which were mission owned by 1934. Between 
1934 and 1939, fifteen additional native schools were founded (Babatunde, 1994). 
The British style allowed instruction in the vernacular until a certain stage which 
allowed the gradual integration of the child into an alien system and language. 
Regarding healthcare infrastructure and delivery, there existed a reversal of 
routes as the French were regarded by the people to possess more effective 
healthcare methods and medicines. Again, due to inadequate provision of facilities 
in the British sector, as well as the proximity of the facility on the French side to 
the Nigerian Yoruba, they tended to attend the health centre at Idirin (close to the 
boundary) rather than have to travel to Abeokuta (nearest general hospital) 
incurring additional cost and time (Babatunde, 1988).  
5.5 Impact on the Yoruba Identity 
This section addresses the core research question, that is, the impact of the 
colonial partition on the Yoruba identity, or the Yorubaness of the partitioned 
groups. It examines and analyses the consequences of the partition on the Yoruba 
group identity and affinity. It also addresses the debate regarding the 
transformation or otherwise of the identities of boundary partitioned groups. 
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Citizenship
129
 and nationality, just as the nation state (characterised by 
definite boundary lines) emerged with colonialism as the Westphalian state model 
was absent in Africa prior to colonisation. Thus these identity markers imposed a 
novel form of identity on colonised Africans, which required specific duties, 
obligations and rights, contrary to what obtained hitherto. As Miles (1994: 42) so 
cerebrally posits, „to colonise is to alter identity‟. Nigeria is not only a British 
contraption the people who became Nigerians were not so identified before 
colonialism.
130
 Identity in pre-colonial Africa was not tied to territorial space as 
people tended to migrate either as a reaction to unfavourable socio-political 
conditions or to famine, drought or conflict (Asiwaju, 1976a; Kopytoff, 1987). 
Indeed, following colonisation, roles have been swapped between groups and 
territories. In pre-colonial Africa, socially cohesive groups once defined their 
territories, however, through colonialism politically bounded territory came to 
define the people. The transference of loyalty and allegiance from the local 
community to the nation-state was a product of colonial rule. Thus identity shifted 
from association with the ethnic group to the colonial state. However, the sense of 
community engendered by the nation-state in Europe was missing in the state in 
Africa.
131
 And this dissonance between the ethnic group and the nation-state has 
significant implications for identity and immigration in the continent. This is more 
significant considering that the modern state is an embodiment of several groups, 
many of which, having been partitioned by the colonial boundaries, have kith and 
                                               
129 Africans attained citizenship at independence as they were regarded as subjects under colonial 
rule. However, for analytical purpose, no distinction is made here of citizen and subject as the 
present analysis does not require such classification. 
130 The same is true of Benin; the inhabitants of the territory that became Benin were not classified 
as such before colonial rule. Indeed, the different groups protested their identity as Dahomeans (old 
name for Benin) at the onset of independent rule. 
131 This may probably be connected with the different historical backgrounds of these regions. The 
situation may have been further aggravated by the colonial administration style which actively 
promoted disunity through divide and rule. 
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kin on the other side of their state boundaries. During colonial rule, pre-colonial 
networks of communication were kept alive and active and were useful as people 
migrated from one colonial territory to another in search of „greener pastures‟ or 
„exiting‟ from repressive rule. However, the colonial era migration had 
implications that the earlier kind of migration did not have; the people were now 
subjects tied to a particular region, under a particular ruler, which unlike the pre-
colonial ruler was interested in keeping its people and territorial extent intact. For 
instance, the French had to negotiate with the British over the spate of protest 
migration from the Ivory Coast region to the Gold Coast (Asiwaju, 1976b). 
Before a detailed analysis of identity and its (non) transformation, it is helpful 
to examine the nature of the emergent state as this will provide an invaluable 
background to understanding identity in this part of Africa. The state can been 
described as a bounded „container‟ for the „contents‟ of a given geographic space 
(Anderson and O‟Dowd, 1999: 594); it monitors, controls and arbitrates territory 
– what Sack (1986: 21-34) refers to as territoriality. Territoriality is the exercise of 
control over geographical space; determining who enters and who exits the 
domain of a particular power. Thus, territoriality is contingent upon sovereignty, 
that is, the ability to control boundaries is an attribute of territorial sovereignty. As 
submitted by Giddens (1985), it is only with the institutionalisation of sovereignty 
as a structural attribute of the system that boundaries could clearly demarcate 
internal and external political spaces. Before sovereignty, it was „unusual for state 
administrative power to coincide with territorial boundaries‟. Boundaries of 
contemporary state distinguish between „inside‟ and „outside‟; between nationals 
and foreigners. The consequence of this attribute of boundary defines and unifies 
national identity by alienating others (Der Derian, 1992).  For the state and the 
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governors of the state, „borders are a potent “ideological symbol” of national 
identity‟, and statecraft thus remains a „practice of differentiation‟ (Ashley, 1989: 
259). The practice of differentiation is conducted through the performance of 
„surveillance and intelligence operations‟. Foucault in his concept of 
governmentality, explains how the state conducts the practices of discipline and 
exclusion to engender the homogeneity of the state (1977). In effect the state 
could be regarded as an effect of both disciplinary practices which seek to 
„normalise and homogenise a population, giving it a sense of internal unity, and 
exclusionary practices which seek to guarantee the security of this domestic 
society by differentiating it from, and securing it against, a threatening outside‟ 
(Devetak, 1995: 31). 
Inclusion (of the inside) and exclusion (of the outside) ascribe character to 
identity. In other words, those individuals located within the bounded space of the 
state (representing „us‟) are regarded as nationals or citizens who qualify for the 
protection and patronage of the state while those individuals who are located 
beyond the borders of the state are regarded as foreigners who must be prevented 
(or sifted) from the inside in order that they may not benefit from the benevolence 
of the state. This is one of the justifications for strong borders which function as 
fences/walls and barriers to differentiate between those who qualify for state 
protection and benevolence and those who do not and must be prevented from 
„gate-crashing‟. 
Colonial rule engendered a wholesale transformation of the totality of society 
in West Africa. Indeed, colonial rule as experienced in this region had contrasting 
impacts on indigenous groups especially those divided between two different (and 
most times, competing) spheres of influence. In other words, as fractions of 
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partitioned groups fell under different colonial administrations, it is expected that 
these fractions would follow different trajectories and may in fact evolve different 
identities from their pre-colonial identity. However, before considering the 
difference, there are areas of convergence of colonialism irrespective of the 
coloniser on West Africa. The colonial situation
132
 was the same everywhere, 
bearing as it were, the nucleus of the modern state system characterised by 
territorial sovereignty, population welded to the territory of the sovereign and 
boundary lines that were closely guarded and controlled. Such epochal 
developments could only have lasting impacts on not only specific segments of 
the society, but on the entire society as a whole. 
Underlying the theory and practice of colonialism was European paternalism, 
that is, the superiority of the European and his civilisation over and above every 
other kind of civilisation. Hence, through the instrumentality of colonial education 
and Christianity, the European sought to civilise the „barbaric‟ Africans, whose 
custom and practice were „repugnant to civilised practices‟. One of the most 
significant impacts of colonial education and Christianity was the creation of a 
class of educated and „civilised‟ Africans - distinct from the mass of uneducated 
natives - who aspired to become Europeans. This created identity problems for 
this category of Africans who on the one hand have become alienated and 
delinked from the rest of their society; while on the other hand, they were not 
regarded by the Europeans as being really Europeans, in spite of their European 
socialisation (Spinner, 1996).  
As noted above, the two Powers adopted different administrative, economic, 
                                               
132 Balandier defined the colonial situation as the „proper sociological conception of colonialism … 
encompassing the activities and even the dispositions of both the coloniser and the colonised, 
especially in their interactions‟ (Ekeh, 1983: 4). 
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legal and educational policies, which effectively gave distinct character, form and 
identity to territories and peoples within their boundaries. In tune with the French 
policy of assimilation (aimed at making Frenchmen out of Africans) at the onset 
of colonisation, the Yoruba in Benin became Frenchified, developing a distinct 
identity from the group across the boundary in the British territory.
133
 Coupled 
with this European socialisation was the French ordered onslaught on the core of 
the Yoruba cultural value and identity - the institution of the obaship. As noted 
above, the traditional institution of the oba was the essence of the Yoruba 
community in pre-colonial times but due to French policy, that institution was all 
but destroyed by French colonialism. Indeed, the unifying force which the oba 
signified was demeaned and could no longer function in that capacity. 
 The Yoruba identity in Nigeria, while being „British‟ remained 
comparatively intact. Yoruba remained the language of instruction in schools (at 
least at the primary level, and bilingual beyond this level). The language was 
taught in schools, up to university level and Yoruba dress culture was accepted in 
the public domain (Asiwaju, 2001). Thus, as early as the 1900s, there was already 
a discernible difference in the identities of the two Yoruba groups. The forces of 
integration in the two countries further drove a wedge between the groups as they 
were exposed to opposing centripetal forces of state building.  
The deliberate invention of the nation in the two colonies reflected the 
distinction in colonial administrative policies. Given the strength of French 
paternalism, the nation that was projected in the French sphere was the French 
national identity. Thus, the Yoruba identity was deliberately undermined, and 
                                               
133
 This was particularly so among the educated elite who were oriented towards Paris, while on the 
other hand, the educated elite in Nigeria were oriented towards London.  However, owing to the 
strength of ethnic affinity, the colonial civilisation was unable to entirely delink the Yoruba across 
the boundary. 
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sought to be replaced by the French. Indeed, the French pattern of administration 
did not favour such group labelling as its vast territory in West Africa was 
administered as a single entity (the French West African Federation
134
). 
Furthermore, as nationalism presents a rallying point for the advancement and 
projection of a people and civilisation, brooking such sentiments and movements 
would only negate the ideals of French paternalism.  
On the contrary, the British policy not only strengthened the Yoruba identity, 
it also encouraged it. The main pillar of indirect rule was customary law, and the 
bearer of custom was identified to be the tribe. There was not one unified 
customary law for the whole colony, but distinct customary law for each tribe. 
The more custom was enforced, „the more the tribe was restructured and 
conserved as more or less self-contained community - autonomous but not 
independent - as never before. Encased by custom, frozen into many tribes, the 
subject population was containerised, heightening ethnic self-consciousness and 
identity‟ (Mamdani, 2002: 51).  
Furthermore, it was in the early years of colonisation that the Yoruba 
language evolved as a written form and newspapers and school texts were 
produced in Yoruba. This helped the „imagination‟ of the Yoruba nation as local 
dialects gave way to the standardised form in general usage all over the territorial 
space occupied by the various Yoruba sub-groups. Print-capitalism aided the 
imagination of the nation in Yorubaland just as it did earlier in Europe and Latin 
America by creating a universe of homogenised experiences, histories and 
destinies through the collective experience of homogeneous empty time 
(Anderson, 1983). Indeed, beyond the immediate confines of Yorubaland, 
                                               
134 There were not supposed to be Malians, Senegalese, Ivorians, and so on, as these identities only 
emerged towards independence.  
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neighbouring ethnic groups began to identify with the Yoruba identity largely 
because the British colonial mapping included them in the same regional grouping 
as the Yoruba (where Yoruba was the spoken language and language of 
instruction in schools). Thus, while the Yoruba identity in Benin suffered due to 
stifling policies that across the border in Nigeria enjoyed a leeway and blossomed 
due to a more favourable colonial policy. 
The Yoruba, both in Nigeria and Benin faced one common and important 
challenge – ethnicity. Yorubaland had been partitioned into two different colonial 
entities, both of which comprised of groups and peoples the Yoruba had had little 
(most time, conflicting) or no contact with in pre-colonial days. In Nigeria, the 
Yoruba were grouped with the Hausa, Ibo, Ibibio, Kanuri, and so on while in 
Benin, they were grouped with the Aja, Fon, Ewe, Wese, among others; groups 
whose destinies have become tied to theirs and with whom they have to contend 
for space - political and economic. In none of these two states does the Yoruba 
constitute the majority. Indeed, in Benin, they constitute an oppressed minority 
while their lot in Nigeria is better as they constitute the second most populous 
group.  
This has significant implications on their access to the apparatuses of state in 
both countries, especially in the post-colonial era. As ethnic identity is a major 
determinant of access to state power in Africa,
135
 ethnic mobilisation becomes a 
powerful tool in this regard. In post-independent Africa, where the state is the 
most important and biggest actor in the economy, access to the apparatuses of 
state and control of resources are important sources of ethnic competition as the 
                                               
135
 Owing to the crucial roles played by (tribal) ethnic groups during indirect rule, as well as their 
employment as the basis of regional federalism toward the twilight of colonial rule, they emerged as 
the main platform for political participation in independent Nigeria. Indeed, political parties had to 
be ethnically based to be relevant. 
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group that captures the state has control of an enormous amount of resources and 
thus, can reward its supporters, provide for group members and proceed to install 
barriers to entry into political and economic markets (Mbaku, 2001). 
Primordialism, clientelism and neopatrimonialism are the hallmarks of the African 
state. 
Four main consequences of ethnic competition for resources are identifiable 
from the literature: „increased ethnic identification and group formations, 
increased racism and prejudice, increased inter-ethnic conflicts, and ethnic 
mobilisation and activism‟ (Nagel, 1995: 955-961). This is a picture of what the 
Yoruba were (are) exposed to in both countries. The fraction in Benin, due to its 
small size could not muster adequate political clout to influence state policies in 
its favour. The fraction in Nigeria, even though it does not constitute the majority, 
is well placed by reason of its size to negotiate concessions in public policy 
decision-making.  
Ethnicity reinforces ethnic or group identity; how does this affect the Yoruba 
identity? Miles (1994) has argued severally that contrary to received wisdom 
group identity is subsumed under the national identity in groups partitioned by 
international boundaries. In his study of the Hausa partitioned between Nigeria 
and Niger, Miles concludes that national identity either as Nigerians and 
Nigeriens is stronger than ethnic affinities as Hausa. He further argues that the 
Hausa, either in Nigeria or Niger showed a stronger affinity to other non-Hausa 
co-citizens than to „foreign‟ Hausa. In other words, the national identity fostered 
by integrative state-building processes overshadows the Hausa ethnic solidarity. 
This same position is also projected in his joint work with Rochefort when they 
assert that „part and parcel of the conventional wisdom about rural publics in 
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Africa is that the populations on the periphery will accord ethnic solidarity greater 
significance than national consciousness. A survey of neighbouring Hausa 
villages on different sides of the Niger/ Nigeria boundary counters this myth‟ 
(Miles and Rochefort, 1991: 393). In their view, the Hausa identity is subsumed 
under the national identity; affinity with co-citizens, they claim is greater than 
cross-boundary inter-Hausa relations. This is a reflection of the success of 
integrative state- building and penetration process, they claim. This assertion runs 
counter to conventional wisdom as well as this researcher‟s findings on the field, 
as relating to the Yoruba identity and ethnic affinity vis-à-vis national identity. 
In Nigeria, ethnicity has remained a potent marker of identity. The Nigerian 
federalism acknowledges and reinforces ethnic differentiation; the component 
units of the federation reflect the colonial geopolitical structure which was based 
on ethnic groups and customary laws; political competition through the party 
system is based on ethnicity; access to state benevolence and patronage is also a 
function of ethnicity.
136
 Given such a system, inter-ethnic relations would be far 
from cooperative but rather competitive as they struggle for access to the 
resources of state. Over the years, the relationship between the Hausa and the 
other groups in Nigeria has been one of mutual distrust fraught with violent 
exchanges. Furthermore, the Hausa is largely Islamic and they regard everyone 
else as kaffirs (unbelievers) who even when they are converted to Islam, could 
only be second rate Muslims.
137
 The spate of ethnic violence prevalent in Nigeria 
                                               
136 The federal character principle (read ethnic balancing) is a system by which every identifiable 
ethnic group (state) is fairly represented in the share of federal patronage. 
137 Interview with a southern Nigerian Muslim cleric who points out that the Hausa Muslim in 
Yoruba communities prefers to queue behind a Hausa rather than a Yoruba Imam during Jumaat or 
any other prayer. This explains why the Hausa congregation organises separate prayer groups, even 
in Muslim Yoruba communities (10.04.2010). This may not be unconnected with the fact that the 
Hausa historically considered the Yoruba as non-Muslim whom it is legitimate to enslave (Ahmed 
Baba, in Law, 1977: 14)  
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stems from the irreconcilable differences between the various groups forced 
together in the „merely geographical expression‟ that is called Nigeria.  
The state has failed to properly penetrate to foster national integration. There 
is an absence of a linkage between the state and the groups in Africa. In spite of 
the so-called centripetal state-building influence of the state, the average African 
state has failed to really foster a sense of community and has remained just a 
collection of disparate groups that are in constant competition for resources. 
Where access to state patronage is ethnically based, identification with the ethnic 
becomes the ticket to the „national cake‟. Thus this identity becomes more 
important than the national; indeed, the ethnic identity is a prerequisite for the 
national. Consequently, the claim that the Hausa identity is subordinated to the 
Nigerian identity and that the Hausa prefer their non-Hausa co-citizens to their 
Hausa kith and kin across the boundary in Niger appears far-fetched.  
However, Miles‟ claim may not be without basis though, considering the 
controversies surrounding the Hausa ethnic identity. Some Hausa scholars do not 
regard Hausa as an ethnic group, but merely as a linguistic group. Their claim 
hinges on the diverse cultural and historical experiences of the different Hausa 
groups, which are only connected by the Hausa language (Smith, 1959; Hill, 
1972). This may be responsible for the survey outcome Miles‟ analysis and 
conclusion were premised on. Had the groups shared a common historical 
antecedent, fears and aspirations, a truly cohesive Hausa ethnic group may have 
evolved a sense of community that in spite of the fundamental impacts of 
colonialism and differential state building processes, ethnic loyalty would be 
strong enough to compel inter-ethnic relations and affinity that Miles claimed are 
missing among the Hausa. 
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For the Yoruba, evidence from field work shows that ethnic solidarity is 
accorded greater place than the national identity and solidarity. This is summed up 
in the words of the current Alaketu that „the boundary was between the French and 
the British. We are kith and kin and cannot be separated by foreign powers.
138
 It is 
important at this point to revisit and analyse some of the field work findings to 
buttress this point. 
As the case study is the Yoruba group, the interview subjects were carefully 
selected to reflect the subject of interrogation. All the respondents were Yoruba 
except for some officials of the agencies of the state with responsibilities for 
border control. Consequently, the interview subjects possess high proficiency in 
the Yoruba language, except of course, the non-Yoruba state officials. 
All the respondents demonstrated sufficient awareness of the presence of the 
Yoruba ethnic group and culture area across the international boundary. They 
further demonstrated knowledge about the historical and cultural linkages 
amongst the Yoruba sub-groups in spite of the partition. As many of the 
respondents are borderland Yoruba, they are not only aware of the Yoruba on the 
other side, they actually claimed to have relatives on both sides of the boundary. 
In the interview with one of the principal obas in Benin Republic, he claimed to 
have migrated to his mother‟s side across the boundary during the famine of 1947 
- 1949. The degree of awareness of the historical and cultural linkages was 
                                               
138 Interview with the Alaketu in his palace in Ketu in October 2008 
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especially true for the groups at Ketu, Ilara and Ifonyin
139
 than for those at Sakete, 
Ipobe, Porto Novo and Ita-Ijebu.
140
  
Given the ethnic affinity among the Yoruba, a wide gamut of interactions 
ranging from cultural to economic exists among the people of shared history and 
culture across the boundary. The population of Ketu in Lagos, Nigeria regularly 
make visits „home‟ to Ketu in Benin from where the group migrated from in the 
19
th
 century apparently escaping from Dahomey harassment. A high ranking chief 
of the Ketu group in Lagos confirmed their relationship with Ketu (Benin) in 
these words: „we consider Ile Ketu as our home; we were only forced to relocate 
and become refugees and pilgrims elsewhere‟. When installing a new chief, 
„approval‟ is sought from the Alaketu who is considered as the father of all the 
Ketu people, irrespective of national identity.
141
 
The people exchange visits routinely; some cross the border for economic 
activities, some for farming, some others cross the border to benefit from public 
services on the other side. Indeed, during civic activities like elections and census, 
the people often migrate to swell the population of their kith and kin on the other 
side.
142
  
This perception of the people, which is at variance with official perception, 
has great implications for immigration, citizenship and identity. It has indeed 
created a whole lot of problems and has also afforded politicians tools with which 
                                               
139 These (both the Nigerian and Benin) are the groups whose territories were partitioned by the 
colonial boundary. They represent the groups acknowledged in the partition documents who are to 
be accorded the privilege of cross-border farming, access to water and grazing for their cattle. 
140 These Yoruba locations were not partitioned as they are located some distance from the 
boundary. In other words, their culture areas remained intact, however, they share close cultural and 
historical linkages with the Nigerian Yoruba.  
141 Interview with the Balogun of Ketu in Lagos in November 2008. 
142
 Field work interviews with members of the borderland Yoruba, especially at Ilara in October - 
November 2008. Again, the Nigerian Census Commission in conjunction with the Nigerian 
Boundary Commission in 2005 organised a sensitisation seminar to draw attention to the illegal 
activities of borderland peoples during census exercises in Nigeria. 
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to exclude credible oppositions. In the Nigeria‟s Second Republic, one Alhaji 
Shugaba the majority leader of the Borno State House of Assembly was deported 
from Nigeria on the claims that he was not a Nigerian. Borno is a state in the 
northeastern corner of the country sharing boundaries with Chad, Niger and 
Cameroun. Shugaba was born in a Nigerian village by a father who had migrated 
from the territories of Chad in pre-colonial times. His father had also served in the 
army of the local potentate, the Shehu of Borno in 1911. Shugaba‟s mother was a 
Kanuri from Borno in Nigeria and no one doubted his Nigerian identity until 
political expediency warranted his being labelled a foreigner. Shugaba eventually 
won his identity case at a Nigerian court and was reinstated with his Nigerian 
passport and returned to his position at the House of Assembly (Mackenzie, 
1981).  
The import of the Shugaba case, which unfortunately was replicated in Cote 
d‟Ivoire in the 1990s between Alasane Ouattara and Kona Bedie, reflected the 
„dehumanising‟ character of the boundary inherited by Africa at independence. 
Ouattara, a former prime minister was denied political participation when the 
Ivorian National Assembly approved an electoral code which prevented 
candidates whose parents were of foreign nationality. Ouattara, whose parents had 
migrated from the regions of Burkina Faso in the period before independence is a 
reflection of the crisis of identity and citizenship fostered by the haphazard nature 
of the determination of boundaries in West Africa. Indeed, Ouattara was born in 
Cote d‟Ivoire and had risen in that country to become the prime minister, yet, by 
the contrivance of an intolerant despot exploiting the „dehumanising‟ geopolitical 
arrangements of the colonialists, he was declared a foreigner and precluded from 
political participation (Monga, 1997). 
179 
 
The Yoruba identity and ethnic affinity play significant roles in cross-border 
(trans-border) relations among members of the group. Even for those respondents, 
who by reason of distance from the border do not have kith and kin across the 
border, they still have a close affinity with the Yoruba across the boundary. Some 
respondents, including the Onisakete in Sakete claimed to have grown up on the 
other side in Nigeria. Indeed, the Onisakete claimed to have been educated in 
Lagos while living with his uncle who was a trader in that city. Many other 
respondents claimed to have either been educated or benefitted one way or the 
other from close relationship with the Yoruba in Nigeria. The Onisakete 
confirmed that the electricity project gifted to Benin Republic by the Nigerian 
Government in 2007, but located in Sakete was made possible by the affinity 
between the Yoruba groups of which the Nigerian leader at the time was a 
member. 
By reason of location at this margin, a complex array of cross-boundary 
activities abound. As the study is concerned with the use and abuse of the 
boundary by the borderlanders, interview questions were asked focused on the 
subject. Smuggling and currency and human trafficking are aided by the 
knowledge of the informal networks of communication that are centuries old. In 
her study of the Yoruba of Sabe, Flynn (1997) claims that the Yoruba have so 
internalised and been so embedded with the boundary owing to their location at 
the periphery of the state that they benefit economically from that location. 
However, many respondents claimed not to be involved in cross-border activities 
which they equated with smuggling.
143
 
                                               
143 Smuggling remains an illegal activity and in spite of assurances of anonymity of respondents, 
they remained non-forthcoming with answers to this question. 
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The borderland people cross the boundary as often as necessary. In order to 
elicit further response to the question about cross-border activities, respondents 
were asked if they cross the border at official border posts. Some of them saw 
through the question and preferred not to answer. However, for those who were 
able to provide answers, they claimed they only cross at official crossing points 
when it is safe to do so. Otherwise, they resort to the numerous footpaths and 
waterways that are unknown to, or difficult to patrol by, customs and immigration 
agents. 
 When the respondents do cross at official border points, they do not tender 
travel documents as many do not possess such. Again, they claimed that they may 
be required to cross the border several times in a day; at that rate they would 
require a passport per week. In any case, there are several other means of border 
crossing should passport become an issue. Immigration agents allow them to cross 
the border without travel documents on the „payment‟ of some inducement. 
 The Yoruba respondents claimed to prefer dealing with fellow Yoruba across 
the border than relating with non-Yoruba co-citizens. In other words, the ethnic 
affinity amongst the Yoruba compels greater intra-ethnic relations than relations 
with non-members of the group. Eliciting non-political answers to this question 
was really difficult; many respondents would want to provide politically correct 
answers. However, by asking probing or follow-up questions, answers were 
coaxed from respondents. The follow-up question that more often than not did the 
trick was: „I am a Yoruba man; does that influence your reception of me?‟ Or 
„even though I am a stranger here, suppose I got engaged with a Gun or Hausa in 
a conflict (depending on which side of the boundary), who would you support, the 
other ethnic or me, a fellow Yoruba?‟  Or „were there to be a conflict between the 
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Yoruba across the boundary with any other group, who would you support‟? Such 
questions appealing to the collective Yoruba identity and solidarity more often 
than not compelled respondents to reluctantly answer this question. The general 
answer was „we are one people, even though war is not good, yet we must support 
each other‟. This in fact is a re-enactment of pre-colonial inter-Yoruba relations 
where the Alaketu would seek Oyo or Egba support against the Dahomey, and so 
on. 
 On the nature of the boundary, responses were also subject to political 
correctness. All manners of answers were provided some acknowledging the 
boundary claiming that for as long as states are delimited by boundaries, 
boundaries are inevitable. However, beneath the politically correct answers are 
underlying nuances about the boundary. For those who by virtue of their location 
at this margin, benefit economically through the exploitation of the boundary 
characteristics, boundary is good and must be sustained, even though, in the same 
breath, they alluded to the arbitrariness of the same boundary. On the other hand, 
many other respondents regard the boundary as merely administrative and treat it 
as such. The oft-quoted statement of the Alaketu, interviewed by Prescott claiming 
that the boundary is a division between the French and the British, but not 
between the Yoruba is germane in this regard. 
Following from the nature of the boundary, the follow up question 
considering the arbitrariness of the boundary sought the view of respondents 
regarding the debate about the redrawing of boundary lines in Africa generally. 
The question posed the greatest challenge to the interview sessions. It obviously 
borders on the spirit of patriotism and loyalty to the „fatherland‟. Hence, the 
answers reflected this value of loyalty to the nation-state. Answers to the question 
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vary depending on the strength of the perception of the respondents about 
patriotism, tradition and economic advantages. For those who consider the 
boundary as a necessary part of the modern state system, it should be retained as it 
is. Even among those who claimed that the boundary is a disruption of tradition, it 
should be maintained as it is, though they advocated for closer cooperation and 
collaboration across the boundary. To some respondents still, the boundary is 
merely administrative, so it does not represent a problem and should be left as it 
is. For those engaged in smuggling, the boundary must not change for obvious 
reasons. However, to an insignificant number of respondents, the boundary should 
be redrawn to include all the Yoruba in one country. When these answers were 
presented to a leading Yoruba scholar of international boundaries, he argued that 
the answers reflected the role of the economy in the perception of the people. 
Apparently owing to the economic prosperity of Nigeria, many Yoruba in Benin 
wish they were included in Nigeria. Even though many Yoruba in Benin may not 
have considered a re-adjustment of the boundary, economic adversity may indeed, 
compel such sentiments among the people. Indeed, this would only be making 
formal the colonial practice of migration from Benin to Nigeria during periods of 
famine and economic hardship. 
 In spite of the division of opinion about the future of the boundary, every 
respondent desired freer movement of goods and services across the boundary. 
They also wished for greater integration at the level of governments. They 
claimed this will attract development to this margin of the state. 
From the result of the field research presented above, it is apparent that 
there exists a great sense of affinity between the Yoruba fractions across the 
boundary. A wide variety of interactions subsists among the people who still 
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consider themselves as one people in spite of the several years of differential 
colonial experiences and subsequent contrasting civilisations in the post-
independent period. All the six traditional rulers that were consulted during the 
field work concurred in their view of the colonial partition as not dividing the 
Yoruba, but the colonialists. What is evident in the answers of these traditional 
custodians of culture and history is the acknowledgement of their Yorubaness. 
Indeed, they were all able to trace the tradition of origin of their respective 
domains to the Yoruba homeland of Ife. The significance of this for their strong 
affinity with the Yoruba across the boundary in Nigeria cannot be over-
emphasised. When asked of the relationship between them as traditional rulers 
and the Nigerian Yoruba traditional rulers, they all responded that they have 
familial relationship with the obas in Nigeria. The Alaketu especially recalled the 
exchange of royal visits between his predecessors and important Nigerian Yoruba 
obas. As he recently ascended the throne, he has not been able to arrange for a 
visit to these obas, but he assured the researcher that plans are afoot to make such 
a trip.
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In the process of the making of the Yoruba nation, printcapitalism was 
pivotal in the imagination of the Yoruba community. The Oyo dialect of the 
Yoruba language was codified and sanctioned by the colonial administration as 
the standardised version of the language. Newspapers, journals, book and 
religious instructions (catechisms) were published in the standardised form of the 
language and used all over the Yoruba country
145
. Of significant importance in 
this regard was the collection and publication of Yoruba myths of common origin, 
                                               
144 The Ooni of Ife visited Ketu as part of a national visit to Benin in 2009. 
145
 In the early years of European penetration of the African hinterland, Ketu was visited by the 
Anglican mission from the British colony of Lagos as part of Yorubaland. Indeed, the head of the 
mission was a liberated former Yoruba slave who later became the first African bishop of the 
Church Missionary Society of the Church of England 
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the several waves of migration from, and the centrality of Ife in the history of the 
people.  In tune with the British educational policy of including a substantial part 
of the history and culture of the colonised in educational curricula, the history of 
the Yoruba so recorded was taught to pupils at appropriate levels. Consequently, 
the individual Yoruba pupil from the earliest stage possible was exposed to the 
Yoruba history and conception, creating in his imagination the Yoruba worldview, 
which considers every part of Yorubaland as one having originated from 
Oduduwa and migrated from Ife. 
The first lesson in Yoruba history would include an exploration of the so-
called „four corners of Yorubaland‟: Ketu (in Benin), Ijebu, Oyo and Ife (Johnson, 
1921). Another crucial influence of the Yoruba history as recorded through the 
use of the standardised version are the fabled seven sons of Oduduwa who due to 
sibling rivalry migrated from Ife to found the primary towns from which 
Yorubaland evolved. These son-kings were the Alaketu of Ketu, the Onisabe of 
Sabe and the Onipopo of Popo (located in present-day Benin) as well as the 
Alaafin of Oyo, the Orangun of Ila, the Olowu of Owu and the Oba of Benin. 
Every other Yoruba town and settlement evolved from these earlier phase of 
migration from Ife. The implication of dynastic relationship and affinity for the 
Yoruba identity is significant. The inclusion of Yoruba history as part of school 
curriculum aided the imagination of the Yoruba nation and ingrained in the minds 
of the people a community of shared history, values and expectations. There 
therefore exists a strong historical linkage among all the Yoruba kingdoms and 
groups that even differential colonialism could not sever. This is contrary to the 
Hausa identity that has remained a subject of controversy: questions about 
whether Hausa is an ethnic or merely a language may not be unconnected with the 
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perception of the subjects of Miles‟ (1991 and 1994) examinations and analyses.  
On the research field, the Yoruba identity of the population of the 
borderland on both sides of the boundary is unambiguous. To begin with, every 
Yoruba respondent spoken to was well aware of his identity as Yoruba. They 
could all recall the oral tradition of their origin from the Yoruba heartland of 
Ife/Oyo in Nigeria. Furthermore, the obas recalled pre-colonial relationships with 
Oyo which included military alliances to deter Dahomean harassment as well as 
ritualistic relations. Ritual and religious relations outlast colonialism. Asiwaju 
(2001) records that the coronation rituals of a new Alaketu are not complete 
without the ritual procession to Imeko in Nigeria. During an interview with the 
current Alaketu in his palace in 2008, he claimed that he had to perform the ritual 
including a pilgrimage to Imeko without which he could not ascend the throne as 
oba. The significance of this for ethnic solidarity cannot be over-emphasised as 
the Alaketu is regarded as the chief traditional authority over all Ketu whether in 
Nigeria or Benin;
146
 it reinforces the assertion that ethnic loyalty (affinity) 
compels inter-ethnic relations in spite of forces to the contrary. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The partition of Yorubaland into two distinct colonial states following the 
European scramble for African territories towards the end of the 19
th
 century, 
expectedly led to the disruption of age-old patterns of interaction, social 
organisation and the simultaneous development of new patterns. This has had 
                                               
146 At the time of the field research for this study, a conflict over the authority to appoint junior 
chiefs for certain villages under the domain of the Oloola of Ilara between the Oloola and the 
Alaketu had just been resolved. The territories of the Oloola as noted above lie astride the 
Nigeria/Benin boundary, making for ambiguous identities. Again, the Alaketu is the king of a town 
in Benin, yet, his „sphere of influence‟ cuts across the boundary into Nigeria where all the Ketu 
people regard him as their paramount ruler. This is further given credence by the recognition 
accorded the Alaketu by the Ogun State Government in Nigeria which treats him as one of the 
„high‟ chiefs of the state. 
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significant consequences on the group partitioned, outlasting actual colonisation 
with crucial implications for the group and the successor states. Over six decades 
of colonial rule characterised by contrasting state building processes bestowed 
profound legacies on French and British Yorubaland. While official British policy 
tended to promote local culture and nationalism (unwittingly) through the 
institution of native authority based on customary law, the initial French policy of 
assimilation characterised by „crush and destroy‟ approach tended to undermine 
and replace local culture with French culture as the local culture was considered 
primitive and uncivilised. Even when French policy became more liberal, it really 
did not translate into much gain to the native population. In effect, the contrasting 
policies resulted in the making of two distinct national identities from a hitherto 
homogeneous African culture group. However, owing to the depth and strength of 
ethnic affinity among the Yoruba, as well as the inability of colonial practices to 
promote the development of a truly national identity, pre-colonial ethnic linkages 
and affiliations survived the colonial epoch, almost unscathed.  
 Colonialism was an epoch whose legacies are as far-reaching as they are 
deep-rooted. The political map of the continent was redrawn, largely without 
consideration for the people whose territories were not only being partitioned, but 
whose lives would never remain the same throwing up crucial consequences that 
nationalities and states have continued to grapple with. The Yoruba is one of the 
several such partitioned groups whose culture areas were sliced through by 
arbitrary colonial mapping and re-mapping. The consequences of the partition of 
Yorubaland presented here are duplicated all over the continent contributing to the 
labelling of Africa as troubled and conflict-prone. 
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While the political map of the continent is a given and can hardly be 
redrawn to reflect ethnic identities, boundaries as rigid, inalienable character of 
the state can be re-construed as windows of opportunities, bridges and sites of 
collaboration. This would remove the tensions and barriers that have developed 
between neighbouring states owing to differing perception between the state and 
the partitioned people.  
In effect, this chapter addresses the substantive research question directly 
by addressing the question relating to the impacts of colonial rule on the 
partitioned group, which in the main, engendered the fostering of enduring, but 
contrasting perceptions by the states on the one hand, and by the people and 
groups on the other. It also addresses the question of how contrasting colonial 
administrative systems and socialisation processes, which fostered the 
development of different national identities, affected or not, the Yoruba identity of 
the partitioned sub-groups. The chapter also addresses the main research question 
indirectly through a series of sub-research questions relating to contrasting 
colonial administrative styles, which produced wholesale transformation of the 
colonised societies. It also analysed the reactions of the people to the imposition 
of boundaries and foreign rule.  
The next chapter, among other themes, investigates and analyses the 
perception and attitude of the post-colonial state in Africa to the vexed issue of 
colonial boundaries. In the build-up to independence, there were agitations by 
nationalists for a re-examination and re-drawing of the colonial boundaries as they 
were foreign, arbitrary and „dehumanising‟. The expectation therefore was that 
with the transfer of sovereignty to the African, the arbitrariness of colonial 
boundaries would be addressed and boundaries would either correspond to agreed 
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patterns or that in view of the growing strength of pan-Africanism, inherited 
colonial boundaries may indeed be eradicated completely. How did independent 
Africa handle its colonial heritage of boundaries? These are some of the research 
questions addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
INDEPENDENCE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE? 
6.1  Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to answering the research 
question by examining the sub-research questions on contrasting perceptions 
(State versus group); and the conflict potentials of the ex-colonial boundaries in 
Africa. The previous chapter deals extensively with the character of intra-ethnic 
interaction across the international boundary between Nigeria and Benin. This 
present chapter is focused on the official discourses and perception of the 
boundary by the state, which contrasts sharply with the perception of the people. 
It also analyses the tensions that this contrasting perspectives generate between 
the states and the people as well as between the two neighbouring states. The 
post-colonial official discourses of the boundary are couched within the context of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Solemn Declaration of 1964, which has 
remained crucial to territoriality in the continent. 
Beginning with the attainment of independence by the former Gold Coast 
(Ghana) in 1957, there commenced a wave of political independence all over 
Africa. Indeed, the decade of the 1960s was regarded as the decade of 
emancipation for the continent. The implication of independence for this study is 
obvious: as dependencies, colonial African territories were not subjects of 
international law, but were appendages of their imperial overlords. However, at 
independence, the status of these territories changed from dependencies to 
recognised states in the international system. Similarly, the status of their 
populations changed from that of subjects to citizens. Concomitant with this 
transformation was the problem of what becomes of the colonially-ordered 
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boundaries that had been the subject of much contestation and debate since the 
inception of colonial rule. Having gained sovereign control of affairs in the former 
colonial geo-polities, there were heightened expectations that these anomalous 
colonial contraptions would eventually be remedied and a new boundary regime, 
reflecting the interests and socio-political characteristics and realities of Africa 
would be overseen by the emergent African leaders.
147
 The remedy envisaged 
could either be a redrawing of individual boundary or in the spirit of the popular 
pan-Africanism, these boundaries would be eradicated as the post-colonial state 
system would be replaced by a United States of Africa. Whichever the choice, the 
remedy would radically alter the territorial status quo in the continent. Indeed, the 
weight of (elite) public opinion in the continent supported these expectations as an 
influential section of the political elite was at the forefront of this agitation.
148
 
 Another rationale for the expectations about the future of the colonially 
determined boundaries was the general belief that owing to the nature of their 
determination, these boundaries would provoke irredentist agitations and conflict 
would be rife in post independence Africa. This claim hinged on the fact that 
many of the boundaries were ambiguous, un-demarcated, porous and un-
patrollable and hence, they would be sources of conflicts among neighbours 
regarding territorial extent.
149
 Furthermore, as the boundary partitioned several 
groups into different spheres, ethnic loyalty would compel intra-ethnic relations 
                                               
147 This is inferred from the groundswell of debates against the manner of the determination of these 
boundaries as well as the popular pan-African movement which had been crucial in the agitation for 
self-rule and Union Government in the continent. 
148 The most vocal proponent of a United States of Africa was the Ghanaian charismatic nationalist 
leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. 
149 Starr and Most (1976) have argued that geographically contiguous states are more likely to 
engage in conflicts than geographically distant states. However, the propensity for conflict among 
neighbouring African states is further heightened by the nature of the boundary, especially its 
divisive character, ambiguity, porosity and un-patrollable character. 
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and for such people, the height of such intra-ethnic interactions may compel 
irredentist agitations (Phiri, 1984). However, contrary to received wisdom, the 
excited expectations of boundary revision and boundary generated conflict have 
been the exception rather than the rule in Africa.
150
  
This chapter analyses the characteristics of boundaries in post-
independence Africa in order to answer the research question by addressing the 
sub-research question relating to the conflict potentials of the ex-colonial 
boundaries, especially since their adoption as the basis for ordering postcolonial 
relations. Africa ought to be embroiled in territorially-derived conflict given that 
these ex-colonial boundaries, problematic as they were, were reified by 
postcolonial African leaders. Have there been widespread territorial conflicts? If 
not, why have the expectations of conflict, so radically and forcefully projected, 
failed? The chapter seeks to provide answers to these questions by examining and 
analysing post-colonial boundary discourse between Nigeria and Benin in order to 
further provide answer to the impact of the partition on the Yoruba astride the 
Nigeria – Benin boundary. It begins by examining the intervention of the OAU in 
boundary consolidation, that is, the OAU adoption of the principle of uti 
possidetis
151
 in its declaration of the sanctity of colonial boundaries as the basis 
                                               
150 Granted, there have been a number of boundary related disputes and conflicts among African 
states since independence, these however have been the exception rather than the rule. One can 
count on the finger tips the number of such conflicts: Ghana/Togo (Ewe irredentism); 
Morocco/Spanish Sahara (historically based territorial claims and counter claims); 
Nigeria/Cameroun (borderland resource conflict); Nigeria/Chad (water resource based over control 
in the Lake Chad area); Ethiopia/Eritrea (historically based territorial claims); Somalia and her 
neighbours-Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti (Somali irredentism). This runs counter to the widespread 
upheaval predicted should the colonial boundaries remain unchanged. 
151
 Uti possidetis is the principle of international law which stipulates that the parties to a particular 
treaty are to retain possession of that which they forcibly seized during a war. A treaty ending a war 
may adopt the principle of uti possidetis, the principle of status quo ante bellum (the state of affairs 
before the war). 
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for ordering post-independence interstate relations in the continent. It then 
examines the pattern of contemporary interstate relations based on the preserved 
and reified ex-colonial boundaries, highlighting the collaboration and cooperation 
between neighbouring states as well as conflict (and conflict resolution strategies) 
occasioned by the difference in perception between the state and the people whose 
lives bear the brunt of the partition of their culture area. 
Given the theme, the chapter is structured into three broad sections 
namely: a general descriptive and historical section which highlights the intrigues 
and power politics antecedent to the OAU Solemn Declaration of 1964 in the 
period just before and after independence.
152
 The second section then undertakes a 
similar historical (chronological) description of the specific inter-state discourse 
between Nigeria and Benin highlighting the (ab)use of the boundary between 
them as a symbol of power as well as a point of collaboration. The final section 
presents an analytical discourse of the role of boundary in post-independence 
interstate relations between Nigeria and Benin. 
 6.2 Boundary Regime and National Consolidation: the OAU Recipe 
 The Organisation of African Unity was established in 1963 as the regional 
organisation for all the independent states in the continent. The objectives of its 
founders included the promotion of unity and solidarity among Member States; 
the eradication of all forms of imperialism and minority rule in Africa as well as 
the promotion of the quality of life of the average African (Preamble, OAU 
Charter, 1963). The OAU at its First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads 
of States and Governments in 1964 solemnly declared that „all Member States 
pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national 
                                               
152 The root of the debates leading to the Solemn Declaration is founded in the pan-African 
movement which gained momentum in the early years of the twentieth century. 
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independence‟ (OAU: Res. 16, 1). This declaration offers two explanations 
concerning post-colonial boundaries in Africa: first, it ended the debates regarding 
the status and future of these boundaries between two contending blocs, one 
rooting for a wholesale readjustment of boundaries or their virtual abolition in the 
formation of a Union Government, while the other bloc advocated for a gradual, 
but functional integration of the states in the continent, based on the inherited 
colonial boundaries. Secondly and more importantly, the declaration sanctioned 
inherited colonial boundaries as the basis for ordering post-colonial inter-state 
relations in the continent.
153
  
 The adoption of the principle of uti possidetis, reflects the changing meaning 
and emphasis of the principle as a legal concept. As Shaw (1997: 492) notes, uti 
possidetis as a legal principle began as a Roman law which sought to maintain the 
status quo of a situation irrespective of the origin of the conflict. This definition 
and emphasis were to change in the early colonisation period when it became the 
principle of endorsement of actual possession in disputes over ownership by 
imperial powers (Shaw, 1997). Finally, the principle became the basis of the 
transformation of colonial boundaries to the boundaries of sovereign states 
following decolonisation. The essence of uti possidetis, in this regard, was to 
prevent boundary conflicts between successor states. As the International Court of 
Justice has identified, the essence of uti possidetis:  
Lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial 
boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such 
territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitations between 
different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same 
sovereign. In that case, the application of uti possidetis resulted in 
administrative boundaries being transformed into frontiers in the full 
sense of the term (ICJ Reports, 1986: 554).  
                                               
153 For the Latin American experience, please see Schwarzenberger, G. 1957; St. John, R. 1977 and 
Dominiguez, J., et al, 2003 
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In the case of post-colonial Africa, adopting the principle of uti possidetis 
for the retention of inherited colonial boundaries was principally to prevent the 
much expected boundary-based conflicts. As the next section shows, preservation 
of the colonial boundaries was the best option available to the post-colonial 
African leadership as other options would create more problems that they would 
solve. 
6.21 The Making of the Solemn Declaration 
It is important to examine and analyse the antecedents (intrigues and power 
politics) to the OAU „Solemn Declaration‟ of 1964 granting sanctity to the 
colonial boundaries, in spite of the expectations and agitations to the contrary. 
Following the Manchester Conference
154
 of the pan-African movement in 1945, 
which was pivotal to the decolonization efforts in Africa, pan-Africanism as a 
movement became very popular, not only among African political elite, but across 
classes and divides in the continent (Langley, 1979). Simultaneous with the 
agitation for independence across the continent was also the movement for a 
Union Government for independent Africa which was the ultimate objective of 
pan-Africanism (Oliver and Atmore, 1972). To further the cause of pan-
Africanism, in 1958 the All African Peoples‟ Conference (AAPC) was convened 
in Ghana at the behest of Kwame Nkrumah, the socialist President of Ghana who 
was Gold Coast‟s leading nationalist and had been a major player at the 1945 
Manchester pan-African Conference (Oliver and Atmore, 1972).  
                                               
154 It was at this conference that Africans from the African continent for the first time attended the 
pan-African conference. Prior to this time, pan-Africanism was exclusive to Africans in the 
Diaspora. The seeds for a more aggressive nationalism towards decolonisation were planted at this 
conference such that when the African elite returned home, they initiated massive movements aimed 
at wresting powers from the colonialist. 
195 
 
It is instructive to note that the AAPC was the very first gathering of 
African leaders and that the resolution among other things called for the general 
readjustment of the colonial boundaries. The Conference resolution: 
 Denounces artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to divide the 
peoples of Africa, especially those which cut across ethnic groups and divide 
people of the same stock; 
 Calls for the abolition or readjustment of such frontiers at an early stage. 
(Source: AAPC Resolution, 1958). 
It is obvious that the least expectation in independent Africa would be a 
readjustment of the inherited colonial boundaries as evidenced by the resolution 
of this conference, which was attended by three hundred delegates from the few 
independent states at the time and sixty two African nationalist groups (Binaisa, 
1977). Indeed, the objective of the convenors of the conference was the initiation 
of the groundwork for the establishment of a United States of Africa.
155
 Given this 
background, it then becomes paradoxical that independent African leaders elected 
to preserve and reify these boundaries, contrary to pre-independence agitations 
and expectations. One of the major tasks before this chapter is to unravel this 
volte face and to justify the maintenance of the ex-colonial boundaries as the basis 
of territorial sovereignty in independent Africa. 
 The answers to this paradox are found in petty rivalry among emergent post-
independence African leaders; ideological differences and the neo-colonial 
aspirations of France which found expression in its influential control over its 
former colonies in the continent. These factors led to the emergence of three 
                                               
155
 Given the antecedents of Nkrumah in the pan African movement, and his utterances and actions 
since assuming office as President of Ghana (the first independent sub-Saharan African state), one 
can safely conclude that the ultimate objective of the conference was the formation of a union 
government for the continent. 
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contending blocs regarding the future of African integration as well as the status 
of the inherited boundaries: the Casablanca group, which championed the cause of 
the emergence of a Union Government as well as the redrawing of the colonial 
boundaries; the Brazzaville bloc - was made up of former French colonies 
(apparently influenced by France) which sought the protection and maintenance of 
the inherited boundaries; and the Monrovia group which sought a piecemeal, 
functional integration of the continent on the basis of the inherited boundaries – 
meaning political integration would have to wait until it became practicable. The 
Monrovia and the Brazzaville blocs later merged to form a united front against the 
Casablanca group at the Addis Ababa conference of 1963.
156
  
At the Addis Ababa conference of 1963 where the Charter of the OAU 
was signed, the two contending blocs strongly presented their positions as the 
preferred choice for post independence African regionalism. As expected, the 
Casablanca bloc, under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah argued that „African 
unity is, above all, a political kingdom which can only be gained by political 
means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the 
political Kingdom, not the other way round‟ (Nkrumah, in Binaisa, 1977: 57). On 
the other hand, Binaisa (1977: 57) reports the address by the moderate bloc, 
targeted as a pot-shot at the Casablanca bloc, in an address read by Tafawa 
Balewa, Nigeria‟s Prime Minister at the time:  
Some of us have suggested that African unity should be achieved by 
political fusion of the different states in Africa; some of us feel that 
African unity could be achieved by taking practical steps in 
economic, educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation and by 
trying first to get the Africans to understand themselves before 
embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement 
                                               
156 The union explains the defeat of the Casablanca bloc in spite of its political influence in the 
continent at the time. 
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of political union. My country stands for the practical approach to the 
unity of the continent.  
  
The subsequent OAU Charter, in reflecting the position of the dominant 
bloc (the merger of the Brazzaville and the Monrovia groups), stipulated that 
Member States should pledge themselves to respect their inherited borders. In the 
spirit of the Charter, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments at Cairo 
in 1964 made a „Solemn Declaration‟ which in effect reified these boundaries. 
The Declaration sought to commit African states to „respect the borders existing 
on their achievement of national independence‟ (AHG: Res. 16, 1). This 
effectively put paid to suggestions for the readjustment of these boundaries.  
Over the course of the decades since 1963, the OAU became regarded by 
many commentators as a waste of time as it failed in its principal objectives.
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Indeed, African political leaders themselves acknowledged the inability of the 
organisation to meet its lofty objectives and began the process of its 
transformation which culminated in the founding of the African Union (AU) in 
2002 with re-oriented and „achievable‟ objectives. In keeping with the spirit of its 
predecessor, the AU chose to adopt the „Solemn Declaration‟ of 1964 as its 
mantra on boundaries (AU, Constitutive Act, 2002). Indeed, the AU went a step 
further than its predecessor by establishing a standing programme on borders 
known as the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) under the direct 
supervision of the African Union Commission.  This approach of the AU 
underscores the crucial importance of boundaries to the issues of „peace, security, 
progress and integration‟ in the continent. Indeed, in the Constitutive Act 
establishing the AU, high up in the Union‟s objective is the defence of „the 
                                               
157 With the exception of the struggle for emancipation where it recorded 100% success, the OAU 
failed to achieve any significant success on almost every other score.  
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sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States‟ 
(emphasis added) (AU, Constitutive Act, 2002). Furthermore, the Act prescribes 
that the Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: 
(a) Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union; 
(b) Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence (emphasis 
added). (Source: AU, Constitutive Act, 2002). 
 Where the OAU failed in transforming the inherited boundaries to points of 
collaboration and cooperation between states, the AU seeks boundaries that 
connect between neighbours and regards these as the basic building blocks of 
effective Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that are considered as crucial 
to the integration project of the Union (AU, 2007). The Programme hinges on the 
principle of the respect of the borders existing on the attainment of national 
independence (in other words, the inherited colonial boundaries) as enshrined in 
the OAU Charter, the „Solemn Declaration‟ of 1964 and the Constitutive Act of 
the AU. The principles of negotiated settlement of border disputes as well as the 
shared commitment to delimit and demarcate inter-state boundaries as the basis 
for peace and security are also crucial foundations of the AU Border Programme.  
One of the major objectives of the AUBP is the task of demarcating every 
un-demarcated boundary in Africa by the year 2012 (AU, 2007). The argument 
being that realizing this objective will reduce boundary-related conflicts in the 
continent as un-demarcation breeds ambiguity which could then engender conflict 
between neighbours over territorial extent. The details of the Union‟s stance on 
boundary demarcation are presented below with added emphasis: 
(i) The delimitation and demarcation of boundaries depend primarily 
on the sovereign decision of the States. They (the states) must take 
the necessary steps to facilitate the process of delimitation and 
demarcation of African borders, including maritime boundaries, 
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where such an exercise has not yet taken place, by respecting, as 
much as possible, the time-limit set in the Solemn Declaration on 
the Conference on Security Stabilisation Development and 
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). We encourage the States to 
undertake and pursue bilateral negotiations on all problems relating 
to the delimitation and demarcation of their borders, including those 
pertaining to the rights of the affected populations, with a view to 
finding appropriate solutions to these problems (emphasis added); 
(ii) The Regional Economic Communities and the African Union 
should assist the States in mobilising the necessary resources and 
expertise, including by facilitating exchange of experiences and 
promoting inexpensive border delimitation and demarcation practices; 
(iii) The Commission of the African Union should conduct a 
comprehensive inventory of the state of African boundaries and 
coordinate the efforts of the Regional Economic Communities, and 
launch a large-scale initiative aimed at sensitising the international 
community on the need to mobilise the required resources and any 
other necessary support. On their part, the former colonial powers 
should submit all information in their possession regarding the 
delimitation and demarcation of African borders. (Source: AU, 2007). 
 The Border Programme was considered expedient (by the Union) in the 
continent by the need to address the following: 
1. The persistence of border delimitation and demarcation issues as it is 
estimated that only about a quarter of boundary lines in Africa have been 
demarcated creating „undefined zones‟ and ambiguous borders with critical 
implications for sovereignty and peace and security; 
2. Growing cross-border criminal activities; 
3. Deepen the gains of the RECs and other numerous large scale cooperative 
initiatives; and 
4. Facilitate the development of cross-border integration dynamics sustained by 
local stakeholders. (Source: AU, 2007). 
Interstate relations in post-independence Africa have been conditioned by the 
OAU Resolution of 1964 and the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the AU 
(2002) which offered the Westphalian model of territorial sovereignty based on 
the inherited colonial boundaries as the basis of international recognition and thus, 
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the essence of interstate relations in the continent. There are obvious (ab) use and 
tensions with this stance, which have implications for regional integration 
initiatives as well as interstate cooperation and collaboration. The next section 
locates the official discourse between Nigeria and Benin with respect to their 
shared boundary (border-partitioned Yoruba area) within the context of the OAU 
resolution. It presents the interactions between these two states in a chronological 
order stressing points of cooperation as well as those of tension in their 
interrelationship. 
6.3 The Nigeria – Benin Boundary: Official Discourse 
Having established the rationale for the maintenance and subsequent 
reification of the ex-colonial boundaries in Africa, this section considers the 
specific discourse of the Nigeria-Benin relations highlighting the problems with 
their shared boundary in the context of tensions arising from the dissonance 
between the formal (statist) perspective and the (ab)use of this boundary by the 
cultural group it partitioned.
158
 On the other hand, the section draws attention to 
the issues of cooperation and integration between these states in spite of the 
tensions arising from the dissonance in perspectives. As highlighted in chapter 2, 
there are two distinct perceptions relating to the boundary between these two 
states, reflecting the conflict between official policy and the realities of the 
borderland people. The implication of this is largely that official policies, mainly 
insensitive to the situation of the borderland people are always undermined by the 
people, whose daily lives are constrained and hampered by these policies. 
This section therefore begins by tracing the pattern of interaction between 
the two independent states as territorial sovereigns within the context of the OAU 
                                               
158The partition and its implications have been analysed in considerable details in the previous 
chapter. 
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declaration of 1964; highlighting points of interests such as instances of border 
clashes, issues of border demarcation and border closures. It also draws attention 
to the manner in which the states handle cross-border ethnic (cultural) interactions 
(and related cross-border activities) as well as formal interstate relations, 
including economic cooperation as well as the expulsions of „illegal‟ immigrants 
from Nigeria in the 1980s. 
Nwokedi (1991) has identified three distinct phases in the formal inter-
state discourse between these two states indicating the direction and character of 
the relationship. These phases are identified as: the challenge of independence 
characterised by the tension between France‟s neo-colonial interest and Nigeria‟s 
anti-imperialist stance in the continent. The second phase was the normalisation 
and consolidation era largely between the 1970s and the 1980s. This phase was 
characterised by the growth of bilateralism and multilateralism underpinned by 
the growing realisation of cooperative and interdependent relationship. The final 
phase began from the 1990s to the present; it is characterised by what has been 
described as „co-prosperity‟ and „co-security‟ relations, signifying the 
acknowledgement of the ever growing need for collaboration and cooperation 
between the two neighbouring states (Nwokedi, 1991).  
6.31 Formal Interstate Relations: the First Phase 
Nigeria - Benin relations began shortly after the attainment of 
independence by the two states in 1960. It began and was nurtured within the 
milieu of France‟s neo-colonial enterprise in Africa as well as the simultaneous, 
but contending Nigeria foreign policy which sought (seeks) to make Africa its 
centrepiece. Given the strength of France‟s neo-colonial aspirations and influence 
over its former colonies, Nigeria‟s relationship with Francophone (West) Africa 
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was bound to be problematic. By 1962, barely two years after independence, a 
Community of former French colonies had developed to include thirteen of the 
twenty four independent states at the time. Benin was a prominent member of this 
Community, having provided the core of the French West African civil service 
(Staniland, 1987).
159
 Furthermore, given that the two countries initially belonged 
to different blocs, as well as contrasting colonial heritages (languages, monetary 
systems, official cultures and judicial systems), one can safely conclude that the 
relationship between these two states began on a tentative note. Indeed this view 
has been supported by some commentators on interstate relations in the continent 
(Ojo, 1980; Nwokedi, 1991; Omede, 2006). 
It is necessary at this point to examine the „French connection‟ in post-
colonial Africa as it has remained a crucial and recurrent factor in contemporary 
interstate relations in the continent. In the late 1950s, the French President, 
Charles de Gaulle initiated and actively promoted the French „policy of grandeur‟, 
which sought the resurgence of the prestige of the French state and of French 
capitalism (Luckham, 1982). France withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) integrated military command structure in 1967 following 
what de Gaulle perceived as its subordination by both the United States and Great 
Britain (Kaplan, 2004; Michel, 2007). Having lost national esteem by its treatment 
in NATO, as well as the need to resurrect the greatness of the French state, France 
turned to the only place on earth where its hegemony would be unchallengeable, 
and where it felt it had strategic interest for the restoration of its national esteem. 
                                               
159
 Dahomey, as Benin was known in colonial times (and early independence years) was regarded as 
the „Latin Quarter‟ of the French West African Federation owing to the large number of Dahomeans 
engaged in the services of the French colonial administration throughout the length and breadth of 
the Federation.  
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Thus, Africa came under the effective sphere of influence of France even on the 
threshold of national independence.  
The policy of grandeur was summarised by de Gaulle in these words: 
„France, because she can, because everyone wants her to do so, because she is 
France, must carry out in the eyes of the World a truly global policy‟ (Le Monde, 
1964 in Luckham, 1982: 75). This truly global policy was not more than a neo-
colonial project, which sought to continue the subordination of its former 
colonies, in the main, and the rest of Africa generally to French control and 
exploitation. The French African connection is not limited to the economy, but it 
also encompasses the military and regime maintenance and change. Indeed, 
„French militarism‟, for a long time, was the most visible part of the French neo-
colonial project in the continent.  France has been actively engaged in military 
intervention in Africa (more than any other foreign power). Between 1962 and 
1995, France intervened militarily nineteen times
160
 in the domestic affairs of 
members of the Communaute
161
 (the Francophone Community of states in Africa) 
(Gregory, 2000: 437).  A critical component of Francophonic-French military 
alliance remains war games or military manoeuvres. The most practical objective 
of the military manoeuvres has been to act as a deterrent force to potentially 
belligerent non-alliance countries by demonstrating French military capabilities, 
                                               
160 French military policy has since changed in Africa, following the Rwandan crisis and the 
implication of the French military in the genocide. Furthermore, the exclusivity of France in 
Francophone Africa had been ended with the encroachment of the United States, Britain and 
Anglophone African states (especially Nigeria and South Africa) which necessitated a re-
examination and refocusing of French military policy in the continent (See Gregory, 2000). 
161 A critical component of Francophonic-French military alliance remains war games or military 
manoeuvres. The most practical objective of the military manoeuvres has been to act as a deterrent 
force to potentially belligerent non-alliance countries by demonstrating French military capabilities, 
which are highly mobilisable given the ubiquitous presence of French military bases and installation 
all over Africa. 
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which are highly mobilisable given the ubiquitous presence of French military 
bases and installation all over Africa. 
In the pursuit of its policy of grandeur, France has had to contend with the 
OAU and especially Nigeria. Nigeria was considered by de Gaulle as the most 
important opposition to the actualisation of the French policy in Africa (Bach, 
1980). Thus, when the Nigerian Civil War provided an opportunity to destabilise 
the country, France actively supported the break-away Republic of Biafra and 
influenced its Francophone satellites to support the secessionist republic. Benin, 
Cote d‟Ivoire and Gabon were some of the Francophone countries which 
supported Biafra‟s secession from Nigeria.  
The Nigerian threat to the French project in Africa stemmed from its size 
and resources as well as its perception of itself as the light-bearer for African 
emancipation from all forms of foreign domination. Furthermore, and perhaps 
more importantly, is Nigeria‟s aspiration to become the industrial heartbeat of 
Africa. This aspiration, Ojo (1980: 573) claimed was „plausibly realisable only 
within a West African sub-regional integration scheme that would be 
implemented at a pace which would not outstrip Nigeria's ability to develop the 
productive capacity needed to make it the centre of growth‟.  
  Right from the beginning of independent statehood, Nigeria sought actively 
to carve a niche for itself in Africa, but more especially in the West African sub-
region. The threat of Nigeria‟s economic hegemony in the sub-region, it has been 
claimed, was one of Nkrumah‟s major driving forces for a pan-African 
government (Ojo, 1980: 573). To the Francophone bloc, Nigeria‟s economic 
ambition which sought to exploit the West African sub-regional integration was 
considered with trepidation. To France and its ambitions in Africa, Nigeria was 
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(is) the major stumbling block and France guided its African satellites to oppose 
and undermine Nigeria‟s ambition at every turn. For instance, the earlier 
initiatives, sponsored by Nigeria, towards the creation of a common market in 
West Africa were frustrated at every turn by the Francophone elements of the sub-
region, especially with the French sponsorship of the Communaute Economique 
de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO). 
 It was within such inauspicious milieu that Nigeria-Benin relations began. 
The highlights of this period are presented below: 
The decade of independence posed the challenge of domestic stabilisation for both 
countries. For Benin, Nwokedi (1991) argued that it would have been practically 
impossible for this country to embark on any meaningful foreign policy given the 
spate of instability it witnessed during this decade. He pointed out that Benin 
„witnessed the adoption of twelve constitutions, the emergence of ten successive 
presidents and an equal number of successful and unsuccessful military coups‟ 
(Nwokedi, 1991: 36). Such levels of political instability will undoubtedly hamper 
any meaningful foreign policy. Nigeria, to a certain degree, also experienced its 
fair share of the „African malaise‟ of political instability and military coups. The 
culmination of these was the civil war between 1967 and 1970, which has 
significant implications for the relationship between these countries. 
 A few months after independence, Nigeria concluded treaty agreements with 
Benin within the context of its foreign policy of „emphasising and building upon 
cultural links which already exist‟ (Nigerian House of Representative Debates, 
1960 in Oyebode, 1994: 246).  These treaties included the Convention on 
Common Frontier Posts with Dahomey as well as the Visa Abolition Agreement. 
A short while later in 1961, relations with Benin were put in jeopardy following 
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the diplomatic face-off between Nigeria and France occasioned by France‟s 
atomic weapon test in the Sahara, in spite of opposition led by the independent 
African states. Nigeria severed diplomatic relations with France and further 
banned French aircrafts and ships from its territories (Phillips, 1964: 125). Given 
the overwhelming influence of France in its former colonies, which depended on 
French technical and other forms of support, the potential impact of the ban on 
Benin was significant. As it was in the process of constructing the Cotonou 
harbour at this time and depended on the Lagos port for the offloading of the 
equipment needed (mainly French originated), Benin was to suffer untold 
hardship. However, following appeals from Niger, Chad and Benin, Nigeria lifted 
the ban on French vessels a few weeks later (Nwokedi, 1991: 36).
162
  
 In 1962, Nigeria and Benin signed a joint agreement establishing a common 
custom tariff along their shared boundaries. The agreement was aimed at creating 
a common market for the two countries in order to speed up the integration of the 
sub-region. In the same year, the attempt to form the Benin Union (at the 
prompting of Nigeria and Benin in order to expand the gains of their earlier 
bilateral agreement) comprising of Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana failed (West 
Africa, in Nwokedi, 1991). The failure may not be unconnected with the tension 
between Ghana and Togo over Ewe irredentism. In the course of the same year, 
the Yoruba party - Action Group – while appealing to Yoruba solidarity and 
irredentism proposed to the Nigerian Parliament that the western boundary of the 
country be redrawn to include the Yoruba in Benin Republic (Bach, 1978: 81-92). 
However, the proposal did not enjoy the support of the majority of the Parliament 
                                               
162 Chad and Niger are landlocked states and have always depended on Benin for the transportation 
of their import and export commodities, hence their concern with the Nigerian ban on French 
vessels. 
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as readjusting the boundary as proposed would shift the ethnic balance 
(population) in favour of the Yoruba in the ethnic dominated Nigerian party 
politics of the time.  
 In the midst of the instability leading to the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, 
Benin closed its diplomatic post in Lagos along with those in Kinshasa and Accra 
in what its authorities termed a diplomatic reorganisation (Nwokedi, 1991: 37). 
However, commentators of African affairs found this move extremely 
inexplicable given the significance of Nigeria to Benin, as it should be a keen 
watcher of unfolding events in the former which will undoubtedly impact on the 
economy of the latter (Nwokedi, 1991: 37).  
As the instability in Nigeria led ominously towards a total outbreak of war, Benin 
in the spirit of African brotherhood, sought to mediate through its foreign affairs 
minister in the conflict, but to no avail.  
The conduct of the civil war will later strain the relationship between the 
two countries as Nigeria accused Benin of complicity with France
163
 over the 
latter‟s support for the breakaway Biafra Republic. The allegation stemmed from 
the permission Benin granted to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to use its territory as a transit point for the airlifting of relief materials to 
Biafra.
164
 Besides the weakening of Nigeria‟s economic embargo on Biafra, 
Nigeria accused the ICRC of clandestinely shipping weapons and other logistic 
                                               
163 The press suggested that France, together with Switzerland, applied pressure on Benin to allow 
the use of its territory. Indeed, it was further suggested that the Swiss Government granted aid worth 
£2.1m to Benin on the same day that the transit agreement was signed between Benin and the ICRC 
(Nwokedi, 1991: 39). 
164Nigeria‟s most potent weapon of war against Biafra was a food blockade which ultimately forced 
the secessionist republic to surrender after thirty months of confrontation. 
208 
 
supports to Biafra under the cover of humanitarianism (Kirk-Greene, 1971: 78). 
165
 
This phase of the interstate relations between Nigeria and Benin initiated 
formal relations as sovereign entities following independence. The challenge of 
French neo-colonial aspirations aided the creation of the „official‟ boundary 
discourse as Benin was a key actor in the emerging French Communaute in post-
colonial West Africa. The tension generated by the clash of ambitions between 
Nigeria and France affected relations between Nigeria and Benin, which 
culminated in the Nigeria‟s allegation that France used Benin as a launching pad 
to airlift weapons to the breakaway Biafra Republic under the guise of 
humanitarian intervention. However, this situation was to change during the 
second phase of their inter-relationship following the end of the Nigerian Civil 
War and the growing dependence of the Benin economy on Nigeria. 
6.32 The Second Phase of Interstate Relations 
The second phase of the interstate relationship between Nigeria and Benin 
began following the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, when driven by the 
task of revamping its war-ravaged economy, Nigeria initiated rapprochement with 
Benin. This was made possible following the overthrow of the Beninese president 
who had permitted the ICRC the use of Cotonou port as a transit point during the 
civil war as well as Nigeria‟s acknowledgement of the critical importance of 
Benin to its security and stability.
166
 Subsequently, in June 1970, Benin‟s three-
                                               
165 The airlift of humanitarian materials to Biafra was later halted by Nigeria over disagreement with 
the ICRC on the issues of cargo verification and night flights. 
 
166 Following the civil war, Nigeria realised the critical importance of friendly neighbours; had any 
of Nigeria‟s neighbours actively subverted its war efforts, the war may have dragged on for much 
longer or the outcome may indeed be different. Furthermore, the Nigerian authorities acknowledged 
the strategic importance of Benin to Nigeria‟s economic progress being the „gateway‟ between it 
and the rest of the West African sub-region. 
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man Presidential Council made an official visit to Nigeria during which 
commitment to the re-opening of the Beninese embassy closed in 1967 was made. 
In August of the same year, Nigeria‟s head of state reciprocated the visit and a 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed; heralding 
the beginning of particularly mutually beneficial and buoyant interstate relations. 
The renewed relationship thrived on the threat of the CEAO; Nigeria courted 
Benin and concluded bilateral economic and military agreements, which removed 
Benin from the CEAO orbit and effectively laid the foundation (together with 
Togo) for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Aluko, 
1976).
167
 This marked a landmark achievement in intra-African relations in spite 
of the foreboding presence of an imperial hegemon.
168
 
In 1971, further agreements were reached in the areas of economic 
harmonisation leading to the trade treaty concluded the same year. This treaty 
spurred the growth of trade relations between the countries. However, the volume 
of trade is difficult to quantify as the bulk of exchanges across their international 
boundary is mostly unrecorded (through smuggling).  
 The rapprochement was nurtured in the midst of growing French influence, 
which made the success recorded all the more significant. Early in the 1970s, the 
French President, Pompidou, visited Francophone West Africa and charged the 
Francophone countries to harmonize efforts to counterbalance Nigeria‟s weight, 
which led to the formation of the CEAO (Nwokedi, 1991). As highlighted above, 
                                               
167 Benin has always been of strategic importance to Nigeria. In its bid to weaken the emerging 
CEAO, Nigeria needed to separate Benin from the Union and included it in its sphere of influence 
which will eventually force the landlocked Francophone states of Niger, and Chad (dependent on 
the port of Benin) to transfer allegiance from the CEAO to the Nigeria-led ECOWAS in formation. 
168
 In spite of this feat, relations across this boundary have been disappointingly limited. Had these 
states built on the gains of the 1970s, that sector of West Africa would have blazed the trail in 
regional integration, more so with a shared culture group which would have further bridged the gap 
created by colonial rule. 
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Nigeria was able to deal with the CEAO threat through what has been described 
as „spraying diplomacy‟.169  
 Following the Nigeria‟s cement armada of 1975, when its main ports were 
clogged with countless ships with hardened cement owing to congestion 
emanating from excessive government order of cement for the bourgeoning 
construction industry, Nigeria sought the assistance of Benin to divert Nigeria 
bound ships to the Cotonou port. Subsequently, Benin sought unsuccessfully to 
make this transit arrangement permanent by seeking for a permanent percentage 
of Nigeria‟s import trade routed through its port170 (Nwokedi, 1991: 41).  
 In July 1976, Nigeria and Benin signed a technical cooperation agreement 
under which joint venture projects were established. The main joint projects under 
this agreement are the Save Sugar Company and the Onigbolo Cement Company 
both sited in Benin Republic (Oyebode, 1994: 243). Nigeria also granted an 
interest-free loan of over One Million Pounds (£1m) to Benin for the 
reconstruction of the Porto-Novo – Idi-Iroko road (Aluko, 1981: 119). 
 In 1978, Nigeria introduced its first in a series of import prohibition lists, 
leading to significant reduction in the volume of recorded trade between the two 
countries. Beginning from the mid-1970s, motivated by its National Development 
Plan (hinged on import-substitution and industrialisation), Nigeria‟s main trade 
policy instrument shifted from tariffs to import restriction and prohibition 
(Oyejide, et al, 2005). From 1978 when the first import prohibition list was 
published till date, Nigeria has relied on import control as a policy instrument. 
The impact of this on the economy of Benin has been significant prompting that 
                                               
169 Spraying diplomacy is how Aluko (1976) described Nigeria‟s liberal gifts of money and other 
assistances to Benin, which he claimed bought over the Beninese authorities to the side of Nigeria. 
170 Nigeria‟s Third National Development Plan included the revamping and expansion of six ports 
which have been able to handle all of Nigeria‟s import export transaction leading to the end of the 
transit arrangement with Benin. 
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country‟s ambassador to Nigeria to raise issues regarding the prohibition. The 
ambassador issued a statement complaining about the ban on importation, 
especially of textiles claiming „it has dealt a blow on the economy of the Republic 
of Benin‟ and „constitute a violation of the memorandum of understanding 
between the two countries regarding trade liberalisation‟ (Guardian, 20.11.2003: 
3). 
The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Person, the Right of 
Residence and Establishment was ratified in 1979 by Member States. This 
Protocol has significant implications for the role of boundaries in interstate 
relations and cooperation. However, as we have seen above and we shall further 
elaborate shortly, Nigeria flouts the provisions of this protocol almost at will 
following alleged Benin complacency in controlling cross-border crimes 
(especially smuggling) from its side of the border. Similarly, Benin does not rate 
highly on the enforcement of the Protocol as its officials especially at the border 
crossings constitute a hindrance to free movement of people and goods.
171
 
 The joint border commission established in the 1960s was reactivated in 1981 
to cater for the growing rate of cross-border crimes as well as prevent and mediate 
in territorial disputes. 
 Consequent upon the ever growing spate of smuggling and related cross-
border crimes, the Nigerian authorities closed its border with Benin twice between 
1984 and 1986. As the Nigerian import prohibition lists of 1978 continued to 
increase in the number of items included, making these items much sought after in 
Nigeria as supply dwindled, it led to a simultaneous increase in smuggling as the 
                                               
171
 Observation at the border crossings and field work interview; over 75% of respondents claim that 
(even with the presentation of valid travel documents), they are still subjected to extortion and 
harassment by officials of border agencies. This researcher had a first hand experience of the 
harrowing experience of cross-border travels in the region. 
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payoffs became very significant. On the other hand, certain agricultural as well as 
petroleum products are being smuggled out of Nigeria to Benin across their 
porous interstate boundary. Indeed, during the early 1980s, Benin was exporting 
smuggled Nigerian cocoa as its own product prompting its classification 
(statistically) as a cocoa exporting country, even though it produced a very small 
quantity of the product (Meagher, 1997).  
Between 1983 and 1984, Nigeria expelled millions of illegal immigrants, 
the bulk of whom were from the West African sub-regional countries of Ghana, 
Togo, Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroun. Of these people, it is only Ghanaians 
who do not have close ethnic affinity with ethnic groups in Nigeria and hence the 
bulk of the repatriated aliens were from Ghana. A small fraction of Beninese 
nationals were expelled, however, the bulk of these belong to the non-Yoruba and 
non-Ajah groups as it was impossible to distinguish between Nigerian and 
Beninese Yoruba.
172
 Again, owing to the multiple networks of interactions, which 
predated and outlasted colonial rule, differentiation between these groups is 
simply impossible. During the enforcement of the expulsion order in Nigeria, the 
Beninese Yoruba simply got integrated into the households of their Nigerian 
Yoruba kith as has always been the practice.
173
 Indeed for those Beninese 
nationals who were expelled, they simply trekked back into Nigeria and resumed 
their livelihood as though there was never an interruption.
174
  
                                               
172Thoug, some immigration officials interviewed claimed that there is a slight dialectical difference 
between the Yoruba dialects of these groups evidence from the field suggests no such difference, 
especially for the borderland Yoruba. 
173 Interview with the Balogun of Ketu, Lagos (15.11.2008). This view was corroborated in 
interviews at various locations on both sides of the boundary.  
174 Field research interview at Ijofin, a Nigerian border town (17.10.2008). The present Onisakete of 
Sakete  (a major  Beninese Yoruba town) was invited to become King while living in Nigeria during 
and beyond the expulsion order (Interview with the Onisakete at the Palace in Sakete - 29.10.2008) 
213 
 
In spite of the border closures and the forceful expulsion of illegal aliens 
in the early 1980s, Nigeria was able to conclude the quadripartite extradition 
treaty with Benin, Togo and Ghana in 1984 (West Africa in Nwokedi, 1991: 45). 
This treaty was aimed at securing Nigeria‟s border against fleeing fugitives as 
well as to ensure their repatriation should they succeed in escaping border 
surveillance and cross the border to any of these countries. 
 As every effort to contain the spate of border crimes continued to fail and 
Nigeria continued to suffer the consequences of these activities, the Nigerian 
government established about one hundred additional border posts in 1986 to deal 
with this hydra-headed problem.  
 In 1988, a major international conference was jointly organised by the two 
countries to brainstorm on issues of cross-border cooperation and security. The 
conference was motivated by the acknowledgement that the border between these 
two countries remained both a potential source of conflict as well as of 
cooperation. A major fallout of the conference is seen in the agreement to relax 
border regulations by both countries later in that year to allow local cross-border 
cooperation on issues of immigration and security. 
 At the close of the decade in 1989, spurred by the need to eliminate 
ambiguity at its border, the Nigerian government began the re-survey of its 
boundary with Benin, which would then be followed by (re) demarcation. In that 
same year, Nigeria granted Benin emergency financial relief to assist in that 
country‟s economic crisis (Nwokedi, 1991). 
 The relationship between these countries for the latter part of the 1980s and 
early 1990s was conducted within the context of West African integration 
(ECOWAS) as well as the growing economic downturn in Nigeria. Perhaps the 
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more significant of the two factors was the economy, which led to the breakdown 
of existing technical agreements owing to the inabilities of each party to meet the 
aspirations of the other. Benin had pinned its hope of economic revival on these 
agreements and in the face of the failure of Nigeria to meet these expectations, 
Benin began to gravitate towards the CEAO, which it had spurned in the 1970s 
(Oyebode, 1994).  
 Relationship between the two states began to blossom following the civil war 
in Nigeria in spite of the influence of France on Benin, along with the other 
Francophone West African states. The rapprochement came from the 
acknowledgement of mutual importance by the two states. Following its 
experience during the war, Nigeria realised the significance of friendly neighbours 
in the maintenance of its territorial integrity and sought vigorously to encourage 
cooperation with all its neighbours
175
. Similarly, the economy of Benin had grown 
to depend on the Nigerian market, hence cooperation and collaboration, especially 
in the area of trade and industrialisation were desirable to Benin.  
However, these initiatives were to suffer owing to the contrasting 
perception of the boundary line by the border partitioned groups (the Yoruba for 
the purpose of this study), which manifested in the form of smuggling across the 
boundary. This development contributed to the official border discourses as it led 
to the adoption of different policies which reified the structuralist perception and 
treatment of the border by the state. As a reaction to the growing spate of 
smuggling and other illegal cross-border activities, the Nigerian government 
adopted import prohibition as a trade policy instrument which uses the border as a 
point of enforcement. Border closures and expulsion of „illegal‟ immigrants were 
                                               
175 The ICRC case was an eye opener to Nigeria‟s leaders. 
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other policies adopted by the Nigerian state, which use the border as sites of state 
power and control. 
In summary, the border discourse during this phase of the interstate 
relations vacillated between the cooperative and the unfriendly, owing to various 
compelling factors. However, it is clear that the underlying desire of the two states 
during this period tended to be cooperative but mitigated by other factors. Hence, 
the final phase in this periodisation represents a period characterised by the 
deepening of interstate cooperation and collaboration given the growing 
interdependence between the two states. 
6.33 The Third Phase of Interstate Relations 
The third phase of the relationship between Nigeria and Benin, according to 
Nwokedi (1991) began from the 1990s to the present. It is a period characterised 
by the acknowledgement of growing interdependence both in terms of security 
and prosperity, the so called „co-security‟ and „co-prosperity‟ relations.  
Inexplicably, data for the early part of this period are rare; however, the 
bulk of the commercial transactions between the two countries remained largely 
unrecorded as clandestine exchange continued across the border, even during 
periods of hostile state policies. Re-export activities remained the most important 
link in Benin-Nigeria trade relations, accounting for about 25% of customs 
revenue and 13% of Benin‟s total revenue (LARES-INRAM, 2004). These re-
exportations to Nigeria are largely in officially prohibited products which are 
subject to high taxation when imported into Nigeria. A significant percentage of 
imported products to Benin are re-exported either officially or clandestinely. In 
the estimate of Benin‟s non-recorded trade, INSAE indicates that the overall 
values of re-export amounted to CFAF 93.3 billion on average over the 1995-
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2003 period. It has been established that close to 51% of Benin‟s foreign trade is 
destined for clandestine re-export with other countries. Nigeria is the major 
destination for the bulk of Benin‟s clandestine re-exportation (World Bank: 
African Working Paper Series, 2007). 
Benin hosted La Francophonie Summit in Cotonou in 1995. The major 
decision of the summit was a commitment by the Heads of State and Government 
to concentrate the operating agencies' activities on the five major cooperation 
programs of La Francophonie: freedom, democracy and development; culture and 
communications; knowledge and progress; economics and development; and La 
Francophonie in the world (Canada: Foreign Affairs and International Trade). 
The major implication of this was the reduction in official re-exportation to 
Nigeria following the commitment of Benin to the ideals of La Francophonie. 
Though, the exchange picked up between 1996 and 1999, however owing to the 
implementation of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) Common 
External Tariff
176
, re-export to Nigeria declined further by close to 30% of the 
total volume of re-exportation in 2000 (World Bank: African Working Paper 
Series, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
176
 The West African Monetary Union is based on the recognition of one monetary unit - the Franc 
of the African Financial Community (CFA F), which is issued by the Central Bank of West African 
States (BCEAO). WAMU is composed of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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Table 2: Benin‟s direction of recorded imports (in millions of US Dollars) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
World 559.1 602.8 639.5 843.2 1,449.4 1,561.6 1,542.4 1,794.2 
Africa 
Of which 
97.4 99.6 98.5 213.5 191.0 152.6 210.2 263.9 
Burkina 
Faso 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Cameroun 2.5 13.9 4.4 8.8 13.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 
Cote 
d‟Ivoire 
24.6 26.8 29.4 88.3 47.3 33.8 36.7 44.5 
Morocco 3.7 3.2 3.8 5.8 6.6 3.3 3.6 4.3 
Niger 3.7 3.2 3.8 5.8 6.6 3.3 3.6 4.3 
Nigeria 7.3 8.9 1.6 8.5 10.5 11.3 12.0 15.2 
South 
Africa 
1.7 3.8 16.5 4.4 0.0 18.9 20.5 24.9 
Togo 0.9 4.1 5.7 47.2 54.3 40.9 44.4 53.8 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics for 1996 to 2003 
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Table 3: Benin‟s direction of recorded exports (in millions of US Dollars) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
World 261.9 184.8 232.4 207.1 210.4 187.8 198.0 270.9 
Africa 
Of which 
183.7 137.9 179.4 163.0 134.6 133.1 142.7 231.1 
Burkina 
Faso 
0.4 0.3 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
Cote 
d‟Ivoire 
0.6 2.0 2.1 2.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Morocco 22.0 15.6 13.0 4.24.8 4.8 6.2 6.7 8.5 
Niger 3.0 3.5 3.7 5.4 5.1 5.7 8.7 11.1 
Nigeria 5.1 1.4 21.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 
South 
Africa 
8.2 1.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Togo 3.4 1.5 2.4 0.6 0.7 3.0 3.2 4.1 
   Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics for 1996 to 2003 
 Tables 2 and 3 present official record of recorded trades between Benin and 
its major trading partners. Relying of this data could be misleading as trades with 
Nigeria represent an insignificant position in the direction of trade to and from 
Benin. The real situation (including clandestine trade) is presented in Table 4 
from studies conducted by the Cotonou-based independent non-governmental 
organisation Laboratoire d’Analyse Regionale et d’Expertise Sociale (LARES).  
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Table 4: Benin: Influence of Main Trade Partners, 1996-1999 (annual average over 
the period) 
                                   Exports                              Imports                          Exports+Imports 
                        Market       Standardised     Market       Standardised   Market       Standardised 
                          share            weight            share               weight         share              weight 
Developed countries 
France 3.15 1.77% 86.08 29.97% 89.22 19.21% 
Italy 5.15 2.90% 10.20 3.55% 15.35 3.30% 
Spain 4.23 2.38% 12.53 4.36% 16.75 3.61% 
USA 0.58 0.33% 20.73 7.22% 21.31 4.59% 
Developing countries 
China 2.51 1.41% 17.79 6.19% 20.29 4.37% 
India  3.95 2.23% 7.37 2.56% 11.32 2.44% 
Indonesia  9.49 5.35% 1.74 0.61% 11.24 2.42% 
Thailand  9.25 5.21% 12.33 4.29% 21.57 4.64% 
Morocco  31.45 17.73% 2.00 0.70% 33.45 7.20% 
Nigeria  107.60 60.67% 116.44 40.54 224.04 48.23% 
Total 177.35 100.00% 287.20 100.00% 464.55 100.00% 
Source: Linjoum, 2007 (calculated from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and 
LARES).
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On the non-trade stage, interstate relations between Nigeria and Benin 
received wider coverage in the period beginning from the turn of the new century. 
By 2003, Nigeria was forced to close its borders with Benin owing to increasing 
levels of cross-border crimes, especially smuggling, cross-border banditry and 
human trafficking. This followed the lack of consensus and progress following the 
                                               
177 The data on table 4 are combination of both recorded trade (from the IMF Direction of Trade) and 
un-recorded trade from Laboratoire d’Analyse Regionale et d’Expertise Sociale (LARES) and Institut 
pour la Recherche d’Application des Methode de Developpement (IRAM)  
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security summit between officials of the two countries earlier (BBC News, 
09.08.2003). The immediate impact of the closure, that is trade restriction, was the 
spiralling costs of petroleum (smuggled from Nigeria), and the related spill over 
effects as well as port congestion at the Cotonou port in Benin (of products 
destined for the Nigerian market). The Beninese economy began to reel prompting 
a meeting between the leaders of the two states, which led to the signing of a 
memorandum committing them to cooperation on cross-border smuggling and 
insecurity (AfDB/OECD, 2008: 142). The border was re-opened a week after the 
closure, apparently following the commitment of Benin to tackling cross-border 
crimes emanating from within its territory.  
In the same year (2003), Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana signed a treaty 
on a five hundred million dollar gas project (Bank Information Centre, 
01.02.2003). 
In 2005, Nigeria and Benin launched the Joint Border Security Patrol to 
jointly police their shared boundary and prevent cross-border criminal activities 
and promote legitimate trade exchanges. In the same year, they amicably resolved 
territorial disputes along the Okpara River when Nigeria agreed to cede thirteen 
villages to Benin, which also agreed to return three villages to Nigeria (CIA, 
2005). During the course of that year, the two countries signed an agreement 
against human trafficking (Thisday Newspapers, 23.09.2005). 
In a bid to strengthen cross-border cooperation in combating international 
crimes, Nigeria and Benin held a joint security meeting in 2006 where the 
challenges and benefits of an effective joint border patrol were highlighted. At 
this meeting, Nigeria, through its chief of police, committed to the provision of 
men and materials for the joint venture. 
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It is important to note that only the first thirty five kilometres of the land 
boundary between Nigeria and Benin from the sea was demarcated by 2007, 
which had been a source of ambiguity and tension between them. In 2007, 
Nigeria‟s boundary commissioner, Sadiq Diggi claimed that re-demarcation 
exercise had started and already cost Nigeria over four hundred and forty 
thousand United States Dollars (US$440,000) in compensation payment to 
Nigerian owners of properties on the borderline that were set for demolition (Live 
Journal, 11.02.2007). In the same year, Nigeria provided a seventy five megawatt 
power station to Benin.
178
 Furthermore, Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana, guided 
by the need to fast track the integration of their economies, formed the Co-
Prosperity Alliance Zone (COPAZ) at a summit in Abuja, Nigeria in 2007 
(COPAZ, 2007) 
6.4 Analysis of Findings 
 The trend of the border discourse between Nigeria and Benin from 
independence to date has constantly changed from cooperation and collaboration 
to friction and tension. In this pattern, the border has always been used as a point 
of state control and regulation, through border closures, strict customs control and 
boundary re-demarcation. These discourses reify state territoriality and 
simultaneously highlight the differentiating character of boundaries. However, 
these uses of the boundary fly in the face of the perception, and the uses to which 
the borderland people associate with the borderline.  
The purpose of this section is to analyse the competing and contrasting 
discourses of the boundary in the post-colonial state, based on the preceding 
periodisation of the relationship between Nigeria and Benin. Furthermore, the 
                                               
178 Field work interview: Sakete, 28.10.2008 
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section also makes explicit reference to the sub-research question on the 
contrasting perception, and the use, of boundaries by both the state and the 
borderland groups. 
Interstate relations began on a cooperative note with the two states 
concluding mutually beneficial treaties including the establishment of a customs 
union, a common frontier post, and the abolition of visa requirement for their 
nationals. This move hinged on a foreign policy which emphasised and built 
„upon cultural links which already exist‟ (Nigerian House of Representatives 
Debates, 1960, in Oyebode, 1994: 246). Furthermore, the exigency of geographic 
proximity promoted mutually beneficial relations. However, French neo-colonial 
ambitions in the continent, which clashed with Nigeria‟s foreign policy objectives, 
were to intermittently affect the good-neighbourly relations, by promoting tension 
or causing disaffection between Nigeria and Benin. France nearly caused a 
diplomatic row between Nigeria and Benin (and the other Nigeria‟s Francophone 
neighbours) over the atomic test in the Sahara in 1961. Relations reached a frosty 
climax following the allegation by Nigeria that Benin was being used by France 
as a transit point for the airlifting of arms to Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War.  
Following the end of the civil war in Nigeria, rapprochements were 
reached, initiated by Nigeria‟s appreciation of good and friendly neighbours 
owing to the experience of the war. Cameroun was pivotal in the food blockade 
adopted against Biafra; had Cameroun not supported Nigeria, the war would have 
dragged on and the outcome may be different (Konings, 2005: 286). Hence, 
Nigeria began to cultivate cooperative relationship with its neighbours. This 
period marked an especially cordial relationship between Nigeria and Benin as 
Benin also needed Nigeria‟s economic and financial aid.  
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If the early period of cooperation between Nigeria and Benin was 
influenced by the „French connection‟, relations from the 1970s have been largely 
conditioned by the competing and contrasting perception of the borderland people 
who consider the boundary as points of economic opportunity. Furthermore, 
owing to the strength of ethnic affinity in this region, the border-partitioned 
groups continue to treat the boundary as merely administrative in the conduct of 
their social and cultural activities, which necessarily transcend the borderline. As 
recorded by Flynn (1997), the Yoruba astride this boundary have become 
embedded with the border, exploiting the arbitrage opportunities of living at the 
edge of the nation-state. The implication of this for the official border discourse is 
significant; as the state was forced to adopt import prohibition strategies, 
borderland people continue to circumvent the state by engaging in clandestine 
exchange of prohibited commodities, with the connivance of officials of the state. 
Contrasting perceptions also account for border closures and expulsion of „illegal‟ 
immigrants. Indeed, as noted above, these policies of the state (import prohibition, 
strict border control, and expulsion of immigrants) have largely failed owing to 
the dissonance between official and unofficial discourses.  
Official discourse between these states has been guided, in the main by the 
considerations of territorial integrity characterised by strong borders and border 
controls.
179
 Owing to considerations of national interest, Nigeria‟s foreign policy 
towards Benin, though theoretically guided by the principle of „good 
neighbourliness‟ has often vacillated between the cordial and the frosty as 
                                               
179 There are countless border posts with equally countless border checks and controls along the 
Nigeria-Benin boundary indicative of strong state presence at these crossings. For instance, the 
sheer number of control points (with numerous armed security personnel of state agencies) at the 
Lagos (Nigeria) and Seme (Benin) border crossing may indeed mislead the observer to conclude 
that the two states are at some form of war. The air around the border crossing is tense and hostile as 
these personnel are seen harassing travellers. 
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evidenced by the findings presented above. Though, the interactions between 
them have incorporated issues of low politik, strong borders have always been 
required and preferred by Nigeria in order to control immigration, trade and 
services across its most important boundary. Subsequently, it has employed the 
concept of the hard border characterised by very visible border policing strategies 
(customs, border police, immigrations, quarantine, and so on) quite often in its 
relations with Benin. In an interview with a Director at the Nigeria Boundaries 
Commission, this researcher‟s hypothesis about the structurally-induced attitude 
of state was confirmed. Official view of the borderland people is captured in the 
following words: „people do not comply with rules…nomadic people disregard 
for boundaries…the people cross boundaries indiscriminately‟.180 The official 
perspective is couched in rules and legalism, not minding the implications of such 
on the people on whom these rules are exercised. 
The border has been closed at intervals; several border posts have been 
established and multiplied over the years, manned by well trained and well armed 
agents of the states. All of these strategies point to the significance placed on the 
control of this border by the Nigerian state; the border with Benin represents 
Nigeria‟s gateway to the rest of the West African sub-region and therefore 
regarded as very important to the economy of the country being the major access 
to and from the market of the sub-region.  
The significance of the border is further raised with the character of the 
Benin economy, which is essentially re-export in orientation, the bulk of which is 
destined for the Nigerian market (AfDB/OECD, 2008). And as Benin‟s tariff and 
tax regime is much lower than Nigeria‟s, much of the cross-border exchanges are 
                                               
180 Telephone Interview with a Director at the Nigerian Boundaries Commission, Abuja, Nigeria 
(16.11.08) 
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conducted through the clandestine channel to avoid paying the rather heavy 
Nigerian taxes by importers of goods meant for the Nigerian market, but routed 
through Benin.
181
 It can be argued that smuggling developed in this area owing to 
the imposition of the colonial boundary, which created opportunity for arbitrage. 
As colonial boundaries were inherited wholesale by African states at 
independence, reactions to the boundary remain unchanged. Indeed, post-colonial 
boundaries in Africa became further reinforced as states struggled to consolidate 
and keep disparate groups intact as well as to protect fledging economies. 
However, the harder boundaries became as walls, the more the people adjusted 
their strategies to circumvent the state. For instance, even when borders were 
closed by the Nigerian government at different times, significant illegitimate 
cross-border trades subsisted.
182
  
Smuggling is by far the most serious cross-border activity and it has had 
severe repercussions for interstate relations between Nigeria and Benin. Indeed, it 
has been claimed that smuggling is deliberately encouraged by the government of 
Benin in order to benefit from the larger and more prosperous Nigerian market 
(FCO, 2009). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office claims that „the other 
mainstay of the economy is reexport trade with neighbouring countries, 
particularly Nigeria. Much of this is unrecorded and some estimate that this trade 
represents over 30% of GDP. It is estimated that 75% of imports into Cotonou 
                                               
181 The researcher gathered from anonymous Nigerian customs officers that Nigeria‟s import policy 
directly and indirectly encourages smuggling (telephone interviews, 3-18.06.09). The Nigerian 
Customs tariff for fully-built imported (used) motor vehicle ranges between 20 and 35% of the 
value of the vehicle including an extra 5% VAT. As the tax regime in Benin is considerably lower, 
vehicles meant for the Nigerian market are shipped to Benin and smuggled across the border into 
Nigeria. 
182 Border closures can hardly affect a borderland people whose culture area is partitioned by the 
same boundary. This is true for the Yoruba astride the Nigeria-Benin boundary as they circumvent 
the state and its agents at every turn. During border closures, they simply divert their routes from 
officially sanctioned border crossings and reverted to the pre-colonial networks of communication 
which have been preserved. 
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port are destined for Nigeria‟. Indeed, the economy of Benin has suffered at such 
times when Nigeria has tightened its import rules partly to stop the thriving 
smuggling of goods from Benin. The government of Benin depends on customs 
receipts for about half of its income. Nigerian trade policy is critical to the health 
of the economy (FCO, 2009). The bulk of the motor-vehicles (and second hand 
clothing) on Nigerian roads are smuggled through Seme in Benin Republic, while 
a large proportion of the petroleum products consumed in Benin is likewise 
smuggled from Nigeria. These activities only benefit Benin at the expense of 
Nigeria and have led to disagreements between the countries at different times. 
As the next sub-section shows, smuggling, though engendered by arbitrage 
opportunities, created by two distinct economic zones, could only be sustained by 
the connivance of state officials in charge of border control and regulation. These 
officials exploit their role as enforcers of body regulations for personal gains at 
the expense of the state.  
6.5 ‘Unofficial Official’ Discourse of the Border 
 As pointed out above, the Beninese economy is heavily dependent on trade 
relations with Nigeria, the bulk of which is conducted through unofficial 
networks. According to an estimate by the Cotonou-based Laboratoire d’Analyse 
Regionale et d’Expertise Sociale (Centre for Regional Analysis and Social 
Studies), at least 75% of the consumer goods unloaded at the port of Cotonou are 
bound for the Nigerian market (AfDB/OECD, 2008). However, owing to 
Nigeria‟s use of its shared border with Benin as an instrument of power and 
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control, Nigeria has had to close this border at different points as it deemed 
necessary.
183
  
Though, the two states have demonstrated resolves to contain the menace 
of cross-border crimes at the bilateral level, these efforts have failed to yield any 
significant success owing to a combination of factors:  systemic (official) 
corruption; Benin‟s dependence on the Nigerian market; contrasting perception of 
the borderland people as distinct from official perception; differential tax regimes, 
among others. Smuggling
184
 and cross-border criminal activities have also been 
serious points of divergence between the two countries, prompting the 
establishment of the joint Nigeria - Benin border security patrol (mentioned 
above) to contain these problems, with Nigeria providing the bulk of the resources 
(men and material)
185
. However, according to a Beninese gendarmerie at the 
Benin end of the Ilara border post, the overbearing attitude (abuse of power and 
arrogance) of Nigerian officials of the joint security border patrol has rendered the 
venture ineffective and potentially counterproductive. The Nigerians are accused 
of „invading‟ Beninese territories without authorisation or courtesy, to arrest and 
harass Beninese nationals.
186
 According to this official, this attitude has alienated 
the Beninese part of the joint patrol making them disillusioned about any joint 
venture with Nigerian officials. This researcher was informed that just the week 
before his visit, the Nigeria Police segment of the joint border patrol „invaded‟ a 
Beninese border village, without authorisation, right in the presence of Beninese 
security officials, shooting sporadically and arresting Beninese nationals at 
                                               
183 Apart from the importance of the need to control what crosses its borders, Nigeria also uses the 
strategy of border closures to protect and nurture its domestic industrial capacity, which bears the 
brunt of massive re-exportation and smuggling from Benin 
184 The question of smuggling has been examined in detail in the previous chapter. 
185 Field work interview, 30.10.2008 
186 Field work interview, 31.10.2008 
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random. This could be considered as an act of war, but because of Nigeria‟s 
stature, it got away with such unprovoked invasion.
187
 
Smuggling has become endemic and difficult (if not impossible) to control 
largely due to the culpability of officials of state agencies, whose responsibility it 
is to enforce border related regulations and prevent smuggling and other cross-
border crimes. Granted, the border is porous, however, clandestine cross-border 
activities are sustained by official corruption, indicated by the manipulation of 
border regulations as well as the exploitation of their official position for personal 
economic gains. Customs, immigrations and police officers on either side of the 
boundary collude with smugglers and other cross-border criminals to evade the 
payment of official rates by collecting a fraction of the due rate into personal 
pockets.
188
 The Nigerian President in 2004 expressed his exasperation with the 
culpability of government agents (customs services, especially) in the smuggling 
business in these words: „we just have to beg them. I think other than begging, I 
don‟t know what else to do. If it is possible to run a nation without customs, I will 
do it‟ (Guardian, 15.01.2004: 7). The collection of unofficial toll has been 
extended to cover every traveller; traders and non-traders alike. Travelling 
between the two countries, especially at the Seme border crossing, has become an 
ordeal to tourists and other non-smuggling travellers. Ethnographic evidence 
collected during the field work supports this claim as the researcher witnessed 
                                               
187 Field work interview, 31.10.2008 
188
 This is one manifestation of growing state failure and the resultant „self-help‟ strategies of the 
citizens (both private citizens and officials of the state) in Africa. Hence, this development is 
difficult to contain as the state continues to fail in its responsibilities to its citizens; the more the 
state fails, the more the dependence on „self-help‟ strategies by the citizens. 
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extortion of travellers and those unwilling to „cooperate‟ were subjected to undue 
delay and harassment.
189
  
The efforts of the states to challenge this growing menace has largely 
failed as those who are charged with the responsibilities of maintaining the border 
and enforcing the rule are themselves actively engage in violating and (ab)using 
the border and the law.
190
 Indeed, uniformed personnel of the state agencies at the 
border are regularly recruited by amateur smugglers to personally transport 
contraband from Benin to given addresses in Nigeria. The aim of this „joint-
venture‟ is to ensure the safe delivery of the contraband as security personnel are 
hardly stopped or questioned by fellow security officers on duty, in a warped 
sense of espirit de corp.
191
 
Smuggling and related cross-border crimes would not have been a major 
issue had there existed no differential tax and tariff regimes across the boundary. 
As noted in chapter four, the authorities in Benin, right from early colonial times, 
have actively sought a lower tariff regime on imports, initially to attract more 
ships to its port at Cotonou. However, following the dependence of the Beninese 
economy on re-exportation into Nigeria, contemporary Benin policies not only 
encourage, by imposing significantly lower import duties and tariffs on consumer 
goods (meant for the Nigerian market), but actively support the practice. The 
maintenance of differential tax regimes, continues to support the re-export policy 
                                               
189 As this researcher was unwilling to pay the unofficial tolls (at several points) either side of the 
boundary, he was detained and harassed at every point. At the immigration control on the Benin 
side, his international passport was confiscated owing to his uncompromising stance, which led to 
undue delay. His passport was eventually released after about three hours of delay. 
190 Field work interviews: 15-16.11.08. 
191 The researcher was informed by an anonymous respondent that he regularly uses such 
mercenaries to „cross‟ used vehicles from Benin to Nigeria. 
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of Benin, as the imported products from Europe are then re-exported (smuggled in 
the main) to Nigeria. Finally, the existence of a continuous geo-cultural space 
making for a maximum (cultural) border region between these two countries has 
aided the inability of the states to effectively police the boundary and deal with 
the tensions emanating therefrom. As noted in the analysis of Flynn (1997) 
presented above, the borderland people have so internalised and domesticated the 
boundary that they have become intricately attached to it. They continue to exploit 
their location at the border and their knowledge of the many informal channels of 
communication to aid their clandestine cross-border activities. Apart from being 
active participants in the clandestine trade, they also mediate between non-local 
traders (smugglers) and customs officials by negotiating bribes between them for 
a fee (Flynn, 1997: 321). Furthermore, they also act as informants to smugglers by 
leading them to foot-tracks in order to beat customs patrol. On the other hand, 
they provide information on smuggling to customs officials, especially when the 
smugglers are uncooperative.  
Granted, smuggling would still have been carried on had the Yoruba not 
been located across the boundary as the economic forces (of differential prices) 
would still stimulate smuggling, yet, it has been proved that their existence at this 
location has been critical for these activities, especially owing to their knowledge 
of centuries-old informal networks of communication, which are used to beat 
official traps, as well as the provision of safe-haven for cross-border criminals, 
who are usually borderlanders (Flynn, 1997). 
In spite of all the efforts of the two states (mainly Nigeria-led), smuggling 
and other related cross-border activities will continue to be a serious source of 
friction between the two states as there are fundamental sources which mitigate 
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against these efforts.  In the face of ineffectiveness of joint efforts, Nigeria has 
always resorted to the only effective tool it knows: border closures.
192
 It is evident 
that this may still be resorted to in the near future in view of the apparent failure 
of policy to control the border. 
Border closures as a state policy has crucial impacts on the Beninese 
economy which depends significantly on both official re-exportation as well as 
clandestine exchanges with Nigeria. Beginning from the civil war period, Nigeria 
has closed its border with Benin fairly regularly, especially during military rule 
(to prevent the escape of coup plotters) and during border clashes with Benin. 
Border closures have also been used as an instrument of state regulation and 
control, especially as a state policy either to protect the Nigerian economy or to 
compel the Beninese regime to tighten its end of the border. However, over the 
past couple of decades, beginning from the 1988 bilateral workshop on trans-
border cooperation held in Nigeria, there has been a growing acknowledgement of 
the merits of cooperation rather than conflict between the two states.
193
 They have 
both organised joint border patrols, to stem the scourge of trans-border criminal 
activities and to promote peaceful interchanges across the boundary. They are 
both cooperating in the areas of industrial development, power and other 
infrastructural developments. In 2006, the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo 
commissioned an electricity power distribution plant (installed by Nigeria) 
donated to the Beninese government in the Yoruba town of Sakete. This act, to the 
                                               
192 Border closures would also remain ineffective as far as smuggling goes; major smugglers are not 
usually the „crossers‟ of these contrabands, but politicians and big businessmen, who are always 
able to pressure the government to relax border controls. A popular Nigerian online newspaper 
recently reported that the wife of the Nigerian president and one of the most influential aides of the 
president are Nigeria‟s biggest smugglers. The friend became close to the president when he almost 
single-handedly bankrolled the president‟s campaign to become the governor of Katsina state earlier 
in his career (Saharareporters.com, 18.07.2009). 
193 The proceedings of the workshop have since been published; see Asiwaju and Igue (eds.), 1988 
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Sakete Yoruba population, is a reflection of the need for greater cooperation with 
the Nigerian government across the boundary.
194
 As one elderly Yorubaman 
stated „this whole separation into different spheres is hampering development; in 
truth, we now belong to different countries, but we are still the same people. We 
should reach across the boundary in cooperative relationship for progress‟.195 
It is important to note that efforts are being intensified at the official 
(interstate) level to build bridges across the colonial divides.
196
 Beginning from 
independence, Nigeria‟s attitude has been conditioned by the need for regional 
integration which it considers as the basic vehicle for African development and 
emancipation from neo-colonial aspirations from outside the continent (Ojo, 1980: 
573). In spite of external forces directed at counterbalancing Nigeria's political 
and economic weight, strategic considerations compelled bilateral and multilateral 
relations, even between historical (colonial) rivals. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, the integrative effects of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), though, blighted for a long period, has taken a positive turn 
with the commitment of member states to the spirit of the Community and 
intensified cross-border cooperation. The significant part of the cross-border 
cooperative efforts of the ECOWAS is the incorporation of the borderland people, 
a category which was previously neglected in the early years of the Community. 
As the next section shows, informal interactions, if not as important as those 
between the state in building bridges and enhancing cooperation across 
boundaries, surely enhance the role of the state in trans-border cooperation. 
                                               
194
 Interview with a group of commercial  motorbike riders at a park in Sakete (04.11.08) 
195 Interview with Mr. Leon Ogoutolu (over 70 years old), Isale Eko, Sakete, 18.10.08) 
196 The most significant of these efforts is the ECOWAS initiative, which will be discussed in great 
detail in the next chapter.  
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As noted above, both Nigeria and Benin established the ministries of 
Integration and Cooperation in Africa (apart from the traditional Foreign Affairs 
Ministry). As the title denotes, the Ministry is committed to integration and 
cooperation at the governmental level between them and other neighbouring states 
as well as other African states; its objectives are hinged on the promotion of inter-
African trade, assistance and cooperation. However, in a classical example of the 
lack of will and direction by the political leadership in Africa, this all important 
ministry has been scrapped following regime change in Nigeria. Dedicated 
agencies and institutions are needed to cultivate and promote interests in 
cooperation across international boundaries in Africa, reminiscent of the creation 
of dedicated agencies on colonial rule by the colonialists. Interstates relations 
between Nigeria and Benin are abysmally low; the level of (formal) trade relations 
is so low that it contributes to the domination of these economies by the West. 
Economic complimentality between these two states would have reduced the 
dependence on foreign consumer goods which aggravates their balance of trade 
deficit. Cultural and other linkages are not being encouraged by the present 
predominant statist disposition of these states, which inevitably treats international 
boundaries as delimiters of sovereign authorities and associated claims of 
exclusive authority and control. Their failure to enact policies which engender 
cooperation across boundaries have left the borderland people with no option but 
to resort to „self-help‟ which largely exploits their location for economic 
advantage (Igue, 1992 and Flynn, 1997). This has led to frictions and tensions 
generated by the dissonance between the formal perspective and the informal 
perspective to the boundary line. The gap is also being exploited by corrupt state 
officials to enrich themselves at the expense of the state. In other words, the 
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inability of these states to adopt effective border policies has left them worse off 
in every ramification.  
The reactions of the borderland people to state policies and the „unofficial-
official‟ discourses hinge on these borders as irritants and state officials as rogues, 
who must be beaten at their own game. They divert their routes to those age-old 
foot tracks, way off the official crossing points where they would not be bothered 
by rogue state officials and where they would not have to pay customs duties. 
Those who have taken to smuggling have had to become armed and violent to 
contend with the increasing sophistication of the customs agency and other border 
control agencies.
197
 For those travellers who would not be bothered by the 
extortionist officials of state agencies, they simply prepare to bribe their way 
through the border as they are left with very little, inconvenient choices.
198
 
 The contrasting perception on the boundary between the state and the people 
has led to conflicts, first between agents of the state and the people, and secondly, 
between the two states. Ordinary travellers are harassed and exploited regularly at 
these border points;
199
 goods are routinely seized (even legitimately acquired 
commodities); while those smugglers who are prepared to pay the „price‟ enjoy a 
field day. There are frequent deadly confrontations between state officials and 
dare-devil smugglers who are prepared to die in order to ferry their contraband 
across the border.
200
  
                                               
197 It was one such confrontation that led to the killing of a customs officer, which hindered the 
conduct of the field work at the Seme border crossing reported above. 
198 Long delays at border crossing, confiscation of possessions or worse still, being branded as 
smugglers or drug dealers. 
199 Crossing the border is not a task one would want to undertake regularly; it could be very 
dangerous and unpleasant. However, for the borderland people, owing to familiarity with several 
clandestine road networks, official hostilities could not seriously hamper movement. Even when the 
border was officially closed, people still transacted their daily business almost unhindered 
(interview report) 
200 The Lagos- Cotonou road is a smugglers‟ track; at each customs post are visible makeshift sheds 
where seized goods are stored. However, along this stretch are gun duels between customs officials 
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 There are contending views across the Nigeria-Benin boundary. These 
competing perspectives have regularly created tensions and conflicts along the 
border. Official border policies cannot remain largely oblivious to the contending 
perspectives of the borderland people who regularly undermined the perceived 
hostile policies of the state. Though boundary is an essential part of state 
territoriality, it would remain exploited and abused as long as states perceive it 
essentially as a point of state control and regulation. As it shall be analysed in the 
next chapter, the failure of the state in Africa to benefit from regional integration 
led by the processes of contemporary globalisation is partly traceable to the 
fixation of the state with the structuralist orientation. This perspective is also 
responsible for the „unofficial-official‟ discourse of the boundary, which exploits 
the dissonance between the formal state perspective and the informal (functional) 
perspective. For effective interstate relations, there is the need to harmonise these 
contending perspectives; cooperation and collaboration should be promoted and 
supported by visible state commitments. Inhibitions to cooperative interstate 
relations, especially those in the „unofficial-official‟ realms should be eliminated 
with the active adoption the AU and ECOWAS integrative mechanisms. 
6.6  Conclusion 
 In an attempt to answer the research question through the sub-research 
questions on the conflict potentials of the inherited colonial boundaries as well as 
contrasting perceptions of the boundary by the state and the borderland people, 
this chapter examines and analyses the use and abuse of the international 
boundary between Nigeria and Benin in the post-colonial era. The fate of these 
boundaries was left to the newly formed Organisation of African Unity in 1963, 
                                                                                                                                      
and smugglers. Due to the increasing dangers involved in customs duties, the Nigerian Customs 
Service has become an armed service. 
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whose decision to maintain them as the basis of ordering post-independence 
interstate relations, paradoxically has been lauded as the right choice. The 
contention here is that the other choices, namely revision or abolition of these 
boundaries would create more problems than they would solve. The successor 
African Union, while preserving the „Solemn Resolution‟ of the OAU, has gone a 
step further by instituting a standing Programme on Borders and regular 
Ministerial conferences on the same subject under the direct auspices of its 
Commission. The AU Border Programme seeks to reduce the potential for 
territorially based conflicts by ensuring that all un-demarcated boundaries in the 
continent are demarcated by 2012. It also seeks to incorporate border communities 
into its initiatives on interstate cooperation and regional integration. The 
cumulative effect of the intervention of the OAU (AU) is the reduction of conflict 
through its sanctification of the inherited boundaries as the basis for ordering post-
independence relations as well as its other various mechanisms of promoting 
trans-border cooperation between states.  
 The second section of this chapter examines the dynamics of formal interstate 
relations within the context of territorial sovereignty as well as the contending 
perspective of national citizens (the Yoruba) at the border who belong to the same 
cultural persuasion as the group across the boundary in the neighbouring country.  
Cross-border interaction between the states and the peoples as well as the 
contrasting official and informal perceptions about the boundary create tensions 
and potentiality for conflict. In spite of efforts aimed at reducing these tensions 
and conflicts, the chapter posits that various factors, especially the structurally-
induced posturing of the states (as against the reality of a multiplicity of channels 
of interactions) create and promote these tensions.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WEAK STATE AND RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGN 
CONTROL OVER THE (YORUBA) BORDER 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the primary research question by providing 
answers to the sub-research question on the enduring quality of the Yoruba identity 
and solidarity in spite of forces to the contrary. This it does by analysing the 
preoccupation of Nigeria and Benin with securing their territorial integrity (at all 
cost), in spite of contemporary globalising influences. The chapter advances the 
position that this preoccupation is an indication of the weakness of the two states to 
effectively broadcast their power and enforce their rules, especially relating to the 
border as well as the several ways through which the Yoruba people have continued 
to negotiate the boundary. 
State weakness is very significant in understanding not only the effectiveness 
of the broadcast of state authority across the length and breadth of the territory of the 
state, it is also important in understanding the actions of population at the fringe of 
the state to the exercice of state power. Indeed, there is an ongoing struggle over 
control of the periphery of the state in Africa. Bratton (1994: 231) argues that there is 
„an unresolved political struggle‟ in Sub-Saharan Africa: „on the one hand, political 
elites wish to extend the authority of the state over scattered population, most of 
whom live in rural areas; on the other hand, peasants remain determined to preserve a 
realm of authority within which to make decisions about their own lives‟. This 
assertion captures succinctly, the conflicting and competing perceptions of the 
Nigeria – Benin boundary between the state the Yoruba astride the boundary, which 
underlies the „struggle‟ over control of this boundary between the people and the 
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state.  
This chapter advances the argument that state weakness is fundamentally 
responsible for the inability of Nigeria and Benin to effectively control their border 
with the implication that the border remains an object of power to the states, but to 
the people, it is both a point of opportunity as well as an irritant. Consequently, these 
states (especially Nigeria) adopt a strong border policy, thereby maintaining a facade 
of authority over territory. This border approach is contrary to the West African 
regional integration initiative which was ironically championed by the two countries 
in the 1970s.  
Nigeria and Benin are fundamentally weak states. Therefore they are 
particularly protective of their sovereignty and consequently tend to resist forces 
which impinge on their territoriality (as defined by boundary), including regional 
integration. Simultaneously, state weakness also influences the way in which the 
borderland population, especially one which straddles the border negotiates it. 
Indeed, many of the practices of negotiation, such as smuggling and cross-border 
banditry, are consequences of state weakness or failure. State practices regarding the 
border and the borderland people as well as the reactions of the people to these 
practices are products of the weakness of the state. This chapter therefore begins by 
summarising state weakness in Africa with emphasis on Nigeria and Benin in 
explaining their resistance to globalising forces as well as the resilience of Yoruba 
group affinity. 
7.2  State Weakness in Africa 
 Weak states are defined by Rice and Patrick (2008) as countries that lack the 
fundamental capacity and or the will to fulfil four sets of critical government 
responsibilities: „fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable 
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economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent and 
accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and 
controlling territories; and meeting the basic needs of their population‟ (Rice and 
Patrick, 2008: 3). In other words, weak states are those that are unable to meet the 
basic requirements of statehood, thereby creating a structural gap, which is 
exploitable (exploited) by the powerful who feeds off the weakness of the state 
(Englebert and Tull, 2008). On its part, the World Bank‟s (n/d) description of weak 
states as extremely impoverished countries experiencing difficulties arising either 
from conflict or weak institutions and capacity‟ (Susan and Patrick, 2008: 5) . On the 
other hand Herbst (2000: 3) argues that states are only viable if they are able to 
control the territory defined by their borders. In the same vein, Rotberg (1991: 28) 
describes functional states as those „constituted as repositories of power and 
authority within borders‟ and as „performers and suppliers of the political goods‟. In 
essence, a viable state is one which possesses the capability and the willingness to 
effectively fulfil the four set of critical governmental responsibilities as identified by 
Rice and Patrick. 
 State weakness is directly related to the inability of the state to project state 
power and authority over and across its territory. Herbst (2000: 11) argues that the 
fundamental problem facing state builders in Africa (across history) has been the 
difficulties associated with projecting state authority over inhospitable terrains 
characterised by low population density. Similarly, Illife (1995) contends about state 
formation in Africa that under-population was the chief obstacle as it is more 
expensive to extend central control over sparsely populated distant (fringe) locations. 
Low population densities engender a disconnection between capitals and the 
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hinterland.
201
 Consequently, sub-Saharan Africa hosts the World`s largest 
concentration of weak and failed states (Rice and Patrick, 2008).  Likewise, 
Weinstein and Vaishnav (2006) argue that African states constituted seventy five per 
cent of the World`s worst performing states, and that ninety percent of states 
struggling on many fronts were African. Englebert and Tull (2008: 108) also argue 
that nineteen of the twenty five countries ranked by the Centre for International 
Development and Conflict Management as being at the highest risk of instability in 
2007 were African. They conclude that given these indices, the future of the state in 
Africa remains shrouded in conflict, despondency and instability.  
 State weakness, characterised by reduced capacity and weak institutions, 
creates the dysfunctional state. In many instances, the functions of a weak state are 
taken over by other organisations, for instance, civil society organisations, given the 
inability of the state to perform these functions. In the face of reducing state capacity, 
despondency and self help strategies simultaneously develop in the society (Adesina, 
2007). The consequence is a state where government is far removed from the citizens 
and subsequently `might is right` and corruption becomes the order of the day. 
Mkandawire (2001) argues that the state has not only become dysfunctional in terms 
of engaging larger societal issues, it is also a real nuisance in the daily life of its 
citizens, evidenced by the withdrawal from state dominated economic and social 
spaces. 
 Englebert and Tull (2008: 108) contend that the consequences of state 
weakness are not limited to the national scope of the weak state, rather, in many 
cases, state weakness has triggered regional crises. For instance, the Liberian crisis 
spilled over to Sierra Leone and Cote d`Ivoire bearing wider consequences for the 
                                               
201 A summary of why the African state is fundamentally weak is provided in the next sub-section. 
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other countries in the sub-region. For the purpose of this study, state weakness is 
examined within the context of the national state in relation to the capacity of the 
state to exert authority over its territories, as well as the institutions and agencies of 
the state deployed to this end. 
Given the number and degree of weak and failed states in Africa, 
Mkandawire (2001) submits that the state, which was once the cornerstone of 
development, has become critical in the underdevelopment of the continent. Hence, 
the African state is variously described as „the rentier state‟, „the over-extended 
state‟, „the parasitic state‟, „the predatory state‟, „the lame Leviathan‟, „the 
patrimonial state‟, „the prebendal state‟, „the crony state‟, „the kleptocratic state‟, „the 
inverted state‟, etc (Mkandawire, 2001: 293).  
7.21 Rationalising State Weakness in Africa 
 As noted above, Africa hosts the highest number of weak states in the world. 
The prognosis for many of these states remains bleak (Englebert and Tull, 2008). The 
purpose of this sub-section is to provide an analysis of the rationale behind the 
fundamental weakness of the state in the continent. 
The first and perhaps the most significant explanation for state weakness in Africa is 
the patron-client basis of politics in the continent. Though clientelism has become so 
central to the state in contemporary Africa, its roots are located in pre-colonial 
African history where the organisation of society reified the „big-man/small-boy‟, 
male/female linkages in society. For instance, the Yoruba traditional authority 
system of the obaship, though checked by the institution of Oyomesi (in the Old Oyo 
Empire), was essentially elitist and authoritarian. The oba dispensed with state 
patronage as he deemed fit, favouring the elite class and supporters over the rest of 
the society. Hence, there existed a pattern of client-patron relationship in pre-colonial 
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Yorubaland, sustained by the traditional authority system.  
Colonial rule, with its dependence on existing traditional authority structure, 
not only maintained the patron-client linkages, it reified it. As noted in section 5.22 
of chapter 5, colonialism enhanced the power and prestige of the Yoruba obas, and 
by extension, it sustained the already existing patron-client linkages. Furthermore, 
colonial rule was essentially exploitative and extractive; hence, it was less interested 
in the social welfare of the colonised territories. This led to the creation of what Ekeh 
(1975) refers to as the „two publics‟ in Africa instead of one public. The two, made 
up of the „primordial public‟ and the „civic public‟ reflected the reactions of 
disempowered Africans to the extractive political economy of colonial rule. As 
argued by Ekeh, the primordial public developed as distinct from the civic public in 
order to extract from the civic public to meet the social and economic needs of the 
primordial groups being neglected by the authority. In his words, „the primordial 
public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm‟ 
(Ekeh, 1975: 92). Primordial groups, ties and sentiments influence and determine the 
individual‟s public actions. The civic public, Ekeh describes as the public realm 
traditionally associated with the colonial administrative structures and has no moral 
linkage with the private realm. One of the most significant characteristics of African 
politics, both colonial and post-colonial is that individuals operate simultaneously in 
the primordial and the public realms, which leads to the obfuscation of these distinct 
realms. Individuals who worked or were actors in the civic public realm extracted 
from the state to feed the patron-client network. This remains true in post-
independence Africa where the loyalty of the public officer is first and foremost to 
his primordial linkages rather than the state. It is also at the roots of the ethnic basis 
of political contestation in Africa as the control of the apparatuses of state guarantees 
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for the controlling group, continuous flow of patronage from the state. The 
relationship between ethnicity and politics is therefore mutually-reinforcing. 
Patron-client linkages weaken state institution as the rule of law is 
subordinated to the dictate of sentiments and interests. Institutional frameworks of 
order and control lose out to clientelism and „man-knows-man‟ becomes the 
underlying principle of societal organisation. Subsequently, the state becomes weak 
without the capacity and willingness to enforce rules, which leads to the fundamental 
failure of the state to broadcast its authority over its territory.  
Herbst (2000: 126-130) identifies the disconnection between the nation and 
the state as another significant factor in understanding state weakness in Africa. The 
African state is an artificial collection of a various array of ethnic nationalities which 
were never bound together by the unifying chord of nationalism. Rather, colonial 
rule, which favoured „divide and rule‟ based on customary law, differentiated ethnic 
groups and placed them in competition for state patronage with one another. As 
Smith (1986: 258) submits, „the central difficulty of “nation building” in much of 
Africa and Asia is the lack of any shared historical mythology and memory on which 
state elite can set about “building” the nation‟. The only shared history was the „un-
unifying‟ experience of colonial rule which reinforced ethnic identity, affiliation and 
differentiation. National identity therefore remains problematic and indeed has lower 
salience than ethnic identities as seen in the case of the Yoruba.    
Another factor, related to colonialism, which has promoted the weakness of 
the state in contemporary Africa, is the disconnection between capitals and their 
hinterlands. The state was forged in Africa via colonial rule; the administration of the 
colonial state (many were so large and incongruous) deepened the pre-colonial 
disconnection between capitals and their hinterlands owing to inhospitable terrains 
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and political and economic upheavals as highlighted in section 5.41 of chapter 5. The 
colonial infrastructure pattern which tended to link points of resource extraction with 
the capitals (usually located close to the seaports) further led to the neglect of the 
hinterlands, especially the periphery of their spheres of influence. Colonial authority 
therefore was never able to extend state power into these places, save for the feeble 
demands for taxation which were conveniently ignored (Herbst, 2000: 84). The 
problem of extension of power over territories continued into the postcolonial period. 
As Herbst argues, the newly independent states of Africa did not have to earn 
sovereignty, but had sovereignty ascribed following independence as pronounced by 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 2621. Subsequently, there exists no imperative 
to broadcast state power in order to secure territory; territory was a given, as is at the 
time of independence. The periphery of the state is therefore largely left to their own 
devises, which as we have seen, has been antithetical to state territoriality. 
At independence, African states inherited not only territories as determined 
by the colonisers, but also the colonial structure of administration and governance. 
However, these institutions were structurally weak as their purpose during colonial 
rule was different from what they were expected to fulfill in the postcolonial period. 
As colonial rule was exploitative, these structures were necessarily exploitative, 
arbitrary and repressive. At independence therefore, the majority of African states 
plainly „did not meet what had hitherto been the normally accepted criteria of 
statehood‟ (Clapham, 1996: 34). Consequently, client assuaging independent African 
leaders simply appropriated the defective structure of governance in the service of 
patron-client network, which as argued above, is the basis of much of the problem of 
the state in contemporary Africa.  
 Geography has been contributory to the weakness of the state in Africa. As 
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noted above, sparse population and inhospitable territory have made the broadcasting 
of state power problematic across the history of the continent. For the postcolonial 
era, Herbst (2000: 146) identifies three broad categories of the state in Africa based 
on population distribution: states challenged by geography; hinterland countries; and 
countries with favourable geography.
202
 According to Herbst, dispersed population 
densities create problems for the effective extension of state power over a large 
percentage of the population. Again, scattered pockets of high population densities 
heighten ethnic fragmentation and differentiation and create a more complex ethnic 
situation. Consequently, the state not only faces problem of extending central 
authority over outlying groups that are not only spatially distinct, but can also be 
mobilised around ethnic and cultural symbols that can and do compete with the state 
(Herbst: 146). Nigeria clearly satisfies the conditions of a country challenged by 
geography being quite large territorially and characterised by pockets of dispersed 
high population densities, with a variety of fragmented and competing ethnic groups. 
On the other hand, countries with favourable geography are those where the 
concentration of population is not far removed from the capital, making the extension 
of state power more easily achievable. Benin is one of such countries, being 
characterised by small territorial extent within relatively easy reach of the capital. It 
is further characterised by a concentric ring of population distribution, which 
corresponds to contemporary understanding of sovereignty (Herbst: 154). 
 While the classification of Nigeria as being challenged by geography is 
without debate, Benin‟s classification as characterised by favourable geography may 
lead to the conclusion that it can easily control its territory. However, the political 
                                               
202 For the purpose of this study, only two of the three categories, namely: countries challenged by 
geography and countries with favourable geography are the focus as the two states under consideration 
fall into either one of these categories. 
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history of that country shows that size may not matter and „small may not necessarily 
be beautiful‟. Benin has had its own share of authoritarian and corrupt regimes, 
especially under Marxist Kerekou when the country was almost run aground, unable 
to pay salaries of civil servants while the banking system collapsed (Allen, 1992).  
7.22 Nigeria and Benin as Weak States  
 Nigeria and Benin are classified as weak states, albeit in varying degrees. The 
Index of Weak States in the Developing World (2008) rated Nigeria in the most 
vulnerable category, as number twenty eight in the World. The Index described 
Nigeria as bordering on failure given the performance of the Nigerian state in the 
four set of critical government responsibilities used in the classification scheme (Rice 
and Patrick, 2008). Benin is ranked number seventy one in the category of states that 
are essentially not weak, but states to watch being characterised by fragile 
democracies or authoritarian regimes.  
 The colonial legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive patron-client 
relations, and a complex ethnic dialectic of assimilation, fragmentation and 
competition has persisted in these countries (Berman, 1998). Patron-client networks 
have extended to the very core of the state, which account for the personalistic, 
materialistic and opportunistic character of politics. Sit-tightism, the reluctance of 
incumbent regime to allow democratic ideals by manipulating the rule or by outright 
stealing of votes, has been a common feature in Nigeria and Benin.
203
 Again, 
political parties have remained ethnically based, accompanied by clientelism, 
violence and deepening corruption (Allen, 1992; Joseph, 1987; Osaghae, 1998). In 
elections, policies and manifestoes do not matter, but ethnicity. In the 1991 general 
                                               
203 While the national conference of 1991 led to a transformation of the state and governance in Benin, 
albeit transient, Nigeria has remained democratically insolvent with the electoral system characterised 
by violence and corruption. 
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election in Benin, Allen (1992: 54) shows that Kerekou won 80% of his votes from 
his Northern part of the country, while Soglo won nearly no vote in this region. 
However, Soglo won over 80% of his votes from the south-eastern part where he 
originated from. Politics in Nigeria has always been ethnically based. Political parties 
were formed along ethnic fault-lines. Ethnicity has been so woven into the fabric of 
the state that the constitution provides for ethnic balancing in the disbursement of 
state patronage. 
Owing to pervasive clientelism, or what Ekeh (1975) refers to as the 
competing primordial public, the civic public, characterised by the formal institutions 
and structures of the state has been rendered incapable and fundamentally weak in 
these states. Coupled with the inherent weakness of the colonially inherited 
structures and inhospitable geography, patron-client networks have remained 
antithetical to the state in Africa. In spite of the favourable geography of Benin as 
identified by Herbst (2000), the Beninese state continues to flounder economically 
and politically, it is unable to effectively broadcast central authority over the extent 
of its territory owing to its weak institutions and lack of will by its political elite. For 
Nigeria, it has been perennially classified as chronically weak and one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2009). Its ability to 
control its territory and border has always been challenged by ethnicity, corruption 
and weak institution.    
State weakness is responsible for the dissonance between official state 
perception and actual treatment of the border, on the one hand, and the perception of 
the Yoruba people on the other. As the state is almost absent and / or unable 
(unwilling) to exert its authority in these fringe locations, the Borderland Yoruba 
people are compelled to devise means to meet their needs, which oft times, are at 
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variance with the expectations of the state. This deepens the conflicting perceptions 
of the border between the state and the people. Furthermore, as weak state distances 
regimes from the people, it further removes the borderland (treated as the periphery 
of the nation-state) from the sphere of state control and influence, which also fosters 
reactions that are antithetical to the expectations of the state.  
The next section examines the impact of globalisation on territorial 
sovereignty, setting the background for the following section which analyses the 
response of Nigeria and Benin to the sovereignty eroding characteristics of 
globalisation. The objective is to provide answer to the sub-research question on the 
impact of globalisation on the state and the Yoruba. This is necessary as 
globalisation has enforced a reconceptualisation of territoriality, elsewhere in the 
world, especially in Europe. Given the the preoccupation of the two states with the 
maintenance of territorial integrity, how have they responded to the border-eroding 
impact of globalisation on the one hand, and on the other, how have the Yoruba 
adapted globalising forces for the furtherance of the Yoruba project? 
7.3  Globalisation and Territorial Boundaries 
The character of the state as a „territorially contained sovereign‟ has been 
greatly diminished and been reshaped since the 1980s and the 1990s like never 
before (Cohen, 2001; Schaeffer, 2003). The lowering of the Berlin Wall was 
instrumental in the changing roles of state territoriality. Before the Wall was 
dismantled, the world was divided into political blocs defined by the Cold War 
(Schaeffer, 2003: 9). Subsequently, the control of the state over the flow of persons, 
goods and services, ideas and capital over its borders has been significantly 
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diminished, essentially by the processes of globalisation.
204
 Indeed, Williams (2006) 
submits that the concept of sovereignty has been the subject of some kind of rebirth 
in recent years owing to its changing nature and diminishing importance.
205
 
Traditionally, sovereignty implies the juridical equality of states in the international 
system; freedom from external control; and the ability of the state to exercise control 
over its territory demarcated by international boundaries. Indeed, the control over 
boundaries, that is the ability of the state to protect its territorial integrity (sanctity of 
territorial space, control of flows of people, goods, services and capital across their 
boundaries as well as domestic control) is an inherent character of the Westphalian 
state.  
The contemporary changing nature of sovereignty is engendered by changes 
brought about by social, economic and political processes, which have reconfigured 
the map of the world since the 1990s (Cohen, 2001). Another dimension in 
understanding the changing nature and role of sovereignty relates to the role of 
international treaties/agreements contracted amongst states where national 
sovereignty (including control over borders) is subordinated to supranational treaty 
organisations. The combination of these forces has diminished the power of the 
sovereign state to control its domestic affairs as well as flows across its borders. State 
territoriality is being reconfigured by issues of globalised capital market operations; 
the integrated system of production and consumption; international labour mobility; 
                                               
204 Diminishing state control of flows across its boundaries presents a study in contradiction, 
especially in those regions of the world where regional integration has so developed as to lead to the 
formation of a supranational political organisation. While intra-regional boundaries have virtually 
disappeared, the external boundaries have simultaneously been fortified and even more difficult to 
cross than ever before. 
205 While what Krasner describes as domestic sovereignty remained a critical character of the 
Westphalian state, state territoriality was almost absolute; as sovereign, the state exercised absolute 
control over and across its territory free from external interference. However, following the 
intensification of the processes of globalisation, domestic sovereignty has experienced diminishing 
importance. 
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products of mass-media technology and revolutions in information and 
telecommunication technology; as well as international alliances, which have 
radically transformed the role and nature of the state (and state territoriality). „The 
roof has literally blown off the nation state‟ as its traditional control over its 
boundaries has been rendered almost obsolete by the forces of globalisation. 
Globalisation therefore has reduced the significance of international boundaries „in 
shaping the conditions of life of persons and society‟ (Cohen, 2001: 81). It suggests 
significant changes in the roles and nature of international boundaries as indicators of 
territorial limits between states on the one hand, and between states and the 
international environment on the other. These changes also include the regulation of 
the relationship between the state and the international environment (Cohen, 2001).  
The impacts of globalisation on the sovereign state with regards to 
territoriality could be summarised as following: 
 Globalisation has engendered a reappraisal of the traditional role of the nation 
state, especially with reference to territoriality and control over national 
boundaries; 
 The reappraisal has led to the reconceptualisation of the role of national 
boundaries as points of the exercise of state power and control. In some 
places, national boundaries have become obsolete in the process of regional 
integration, yet the external boundaries of these regions still exhibit the 
characteristics of boundaries as points of state control and regulation. 
 The processes of globalisation, though critical, have not been able to 
deterritorialise state territories marked out by boundaries; though trade 
liberalisation, transnational relations and globalised capital market operation 
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aided by information and telecommunication technologies have impinged on 
the traditional domain of state control and regulation, they have not been able 
to render the state obsolete. In other words, the state remains critical in the 
dynamics of the international system.   
The following subsections examines and analyses three relevant forces of 
globalisation in the context of Nigeria and Benin. The aim is to highlight the 
resistance of these weak states to forces which seek to diminish their own sovereign 
control over territory as defined by boundaries. This explains the resistance of these 
states to globalising forces as seen in the hardening of borders while inter-regional 
borders are being reconceived elsewhere. 
7.31 Nigeria and Benin in the Context of (West) African Integration 
The idea of a pan-African government has always been a critical consideration 
of the political elite in the continent. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
was established in 1958 by the ECOSOC Resolution 671 (25) which made provision 
for facilitating „concerted action for the economic development of Africa…with a 
view to raising the level of economic activities and standards of living in Africa and 
for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of countries and territories 
of Africa‟ (Adedeji, 2002: 299). Immediately after independence, pan-African 
integration was on the front burner of issues and discussions as well as 
considerations for the establishment of a Union government. Indeed, the African 
political elite were agreed on the ideals of a pan African government (with critical 
implications for the status and role of the inherited colonial boundaries), but differed 
on the modalities and timing of its becoming.
206
 Following the 1963 Addis Ababa 
                                               
206 Details of the power-politics involved in these negotiations are presented in Chapter 6 (section 
6.21). 
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conference which culminated in the founding of the OAU, it was agreed that 
continental integration be hinged on Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) as the 
precursor to continental integration.
207
 Hence, for West Africa, following the Franco-
Nigerian power struggle in the sub-region,
208
 which effectively stalled the 
establishment of a regional economic community, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975, made up of all the states in the sub-
region irrespective of colonial antecedents.  
The objectives of ECOWAS include: the establishment of a Community of 
states, where nationals of Member States are treated as Community citizens with 
the right of free and unhindered movement as well as the right of residence and 
establishment anywhere in the Community. It seeks the promotion of cooperation 
and integration leading to the establishment of an economic union for West Africa 
in order to raise the living standards of its peoples and to maintain and enhance 
economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the 
progress and development of the African continent (Article 3 of the ECOWAS 
Treaty). The Community seeks to achieve these objectives through: 
 the harmonisation and coordination of national policies and the promotion 
of integration programmes, projects and activities particularly in food; 
agriculture and natural resources; industry; transport and communications; energy; 
trade; money and finance; taxation; economic reform policies; human resources; 
education; information; culture… (ECOWAS Treaty, Article 3 (2a)) 
 the establishment of a common market through trade liberalization (abolition 
of customs duties) and the abolition of non-tariff barriers in Member States in 
                                               
207 Details of this conference and the diplomatic wrangling and intrigues are presented in Chapter 6 
(section 6.21) on the role of the OAU in anointing theses boundaries as the basis of ordering 
interstate relations. 
 
208 Details are also presented in Chapter 6 (section 6.31). 
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order to establish a free-trade area in the Community; the adoption of a 
common external tariff and common policy towards third countries; removal of 
obstacles to free movement of persons, goods, services, ideas, capital and the 
right of residence and establishment 
 the establishment of an economic union through the adoption of common 
economic and financial policies and the creation of a monetary union; 
 the promotion of joint venture initiatives, both between governments and private 
investors through the adoption of regional agreements on cross-border investment 
(emphasis added). 
The implications of the Community for sovereignty, territorial boundaries and 
related formal border structures in the sub-region are obvious, that is, if these 
provisions are implemented to the letter. The idea of Community citizenship, in spite 
of its weaknesses;
209
 the Protocol on Free Movement and Establishment; the 
establishment of a common market and a customs union, and so on are expected to 
erode the basis of traditional territorial sovereignty as it has done in the European 
Area. Border and immigration control of Community citizens, with the capacity to 
hinder free movement of persons, goods, services, ideas and capital ought to have 
become history in the region. Boundaries as delimiters of territorial extent; points of 
differential converters and immigration/customs control, therefore become obsolete as 
border posts recede. The roles of the boundaries change from inhibitors to free 
movement and filters to that critical point linking one region of the Community to 
another. 
                                               
209 Community citizenship as provided for by the ECOWAS Treaty allows for the deportation of the 
national of a Member State from another Member state; it does not allow full integration into the 
society of the Member State where the national of another Member State is domiciled. Indeed, the 
progression to the right to establishment, as part of the Protocol on Free Movement and 
Establishment has not been reached as the Community is still grappling with the right of free 
movement which is a precursor to the right of establishment. 
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However in actual practice, ECOWAS is far from its description in its Treaty and 
protocols. Bach (1997: 83) has been quite pungent in his criticism of ECOWAS; he 
claims quite correctly that there exists a „state of paralysis in almost every area of 
target‟. Official intra-regional trade represents an insignificant proportion of total 
export; the proposed establishment of a single monetary zone has failed to materialise 
in spite of three changes in the target date since 1994; the Protocol on free movement 
and establishment for Community citizens has also failed dismally. In essence, the 
ECOWAS has failed to create the right kind of impetus for interstate cooperation, 
regional integration, and, indeed, for the lowering of the divisive impacts of the ex-
colonial boundaries. In other words, the failure of ECOWAS could be partly held 
responsible for the maintenance of boundaries as barriers and the inability of 
globalisation to temper the traditional role of boundaries as it has done elsewhere. 
7.32 Explaining the Failure of ECOWAS 
As noted above and as evidence from field work across the Nigeria – Benin 
boundary shows, the goals of ECOWAS as a regional economic community have 
remained far from realisation. Particularly in its core target area of regional 
integration, trade liberalisation and free movement, the Community has been a 
colossal failure.  
The most significant factor responsible for the failure of ECOWAS is state 
weakness, which hinders member states from implementing its integrative objectives. 
Other factors, including the lack of political will, political instability, repressive 
regimes, historical factors of contrasting colonial heritages (including, contrasting 
official languages, legal systems, monetary and taxation systems, 
Anglophone/Francophone rivalries, etc) as well as neo-colonial aspirations of former 
imperial states; institutional factors which breed corruption; Nigeriaphobia (Adesina, 
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2007: 40); and so on are all founded on state weakness. 
As analysed above (section 7:2), state weakness, characterised by weak or 
dysfunctional state institutions as well as the inability to effectively broadcast state 
power, leads the state to resist forces which seek to reduce its territorial sovereignty. 
African states are extremely insecure about their sovereignty as many hardly exercise 
absolute authority across their territory. Therefore, these states are hard put to defend 
their territorial integrity and consequently they have consistently resisted regional 
integrative initiatives by refusing to implement integrative arrangements (Herbst, 
2000).  
The inability of the state to effectively broadcast state power and perform the 
traditional functions of the state is related to the nature of the structures of the state 
instituted during colonial rule. Deschamps (1994: 176) submits that „Africa inherited 
rudimentary or worthless sub-structures‟, which are unable to meet the postcolonial 
demands of statehood. In order words, the institutions of the state in Africa, as 
inherited at independence are unable to sustain the conducts of state affairs. Hence, 
Adesina (2007: 39) notes that the structures of state impede and work at cross-
purposes with the integration processes in West Africa.  
Regarding territoriality, the consequence of state weakness is two-fold: 
control over territory on the one hand, and the reaction of the state to contemporary 
globalising influences on the other. Owing to weak institutional framework, state 
weakness allows all sorts of exploitation and manipulation by both the Yoruba (and 
other cross-border traders) and officials of state border agencies at the borderland. 
The failure of state agencies to effectively implement border policies is behind the 
extreme policy of border closures. Indeed, Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria‟s president 
for the greater part of last decade voiced his exasperation with the Nigeria Customs 
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Service over the hydra-headed problem of smuggling across this particular section of 
the boundary between Nigeria and Benin. Obasanjo claimed that smuggling was 
being actively promoted by officials of the agency, paradoxically charged with 
controlling the movement of goods across the country‟s border (Guardian, 
15.01.2004: 7).  
Relating to integration, state weakness engenders the resistance of the state to 
forces which seek to reduce the sovereign control of the state over its territory as 
mapped out by boundaries. Clientelism, bad governance, corruption, economic 
despondency and conflict, which make for the weak state, force the state to adopt an 
anti-integration stance in a bid to keep control over its territory. As noted above, the 
border closure and the import prohibition strategies of Nigeria are symptomatic of 
the inability of the state, owing to weak state institutions to functions effectively. 
Hence the inability of these states to pursue and implement the integration agenda of 
ECOWAS in spite of multilateral and bilateral agreements, as well as  public opinion 
in support of regional integration.
210
 
Had the Treaty provisions and other agreements and protocols been implemented 
to the letter, the objectives of regional integration would have been attained in the 
sub-region. However, there exists a disjuncture between policy and practice 
(Adesina, 2007); it is a case of good intentions, without the necessary will to 
transform the intentions and policies into practice. A critical appraisal of the Treaty 
of ECOWAS indicates a significant influence of the EU in the integration process in 
this sub-region. However, it is easily observable that the depth of integration in 
Europe (led by the political will) is missing in the West African experience.  
The integration initiative in West Africa has largely failed to achieve its set 
                                               
210 Globalisation and integration are examined in details in the next section. 
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objectives owing to the failure of the political elite in the sub-region to transform 
policies into practice, which is contingent on the character of the state as essentially 
weak. There are abundant conventions and agreements promoting liberalisation, 
cooperation and collaboration among Member States, yet, the actual practice of states 
constitutes a hindrance to the actualisation of the integration objectives. The failure 
of these elites to promote regional integration is a reflection of weak state, bad 
governance and corruption as well as neo-colonial influences as seen in the 
sponsorship of a rival organisation by France in the sub-region.  
The inability of the state in West Africa to implement liberalisation policies and 
promote regional integration means that the region remains almost impermeable to 
the globalising influences of liberalisation and integration. In other words, relating to 
integration, the state in West Africa remains at the pre-liberalisation, pre-integration 
era where the control of the nation state over its territory remains almost absolute. 
Boundaries remain ever so strong as a point of state control and regulation in West 
Africa. In other words, the border eroding qualities of integration are scuttled by the 
resilience of the state and the actions of state elite which hinder the globalising 
impacts of integration. 
7.33 Yoruba Migration  
It has been established in the preceding sections that in spite of the efforts at 
regionalism and the ever current agitation for pan-Africanism, state territorialism in 
West Africa has remained largely impervious to the impacts of globalising forces, 
especially regionalism which has diminished the traditional role of the Westphalian 
state and eradicated national borders as exemplified in the case of the European 
Union. This subsection further examines the impact of globalisation on the border-
partitioned Yoruba group with the objective of answering the sub-research question 
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on globalisation and Yoruba ethnic relations across the Nigeria – Benin boundary. 
Are the Yoruba also impervious to the globalising forces, especially of 
transnationalism in the face of current forces which promote the deterritorialisation 
of identity and group relations? The section also seeks to assess the impact of 
transnationalism on the Yoruba project, its impacts on intra-ethnic relations across 
the boundary as well as the reaction of the state to the influences of transnationalism. 
There are two questions which will help in the analysis of the impact of 
transnationalism on the Yoruba: do the Yoruba also ignore this dynamic of 
globalisation just as the states have resisted regional integration initiatives? 
Consequently, globalisation has had little or no influence on the dynamics of trans-
border intra-group relations. On the other hand, could transnationalism as an agent of 
globalisation be nothing new to group relations among the Yoruba that the impact of 
contemporary globalisation becomes less noticeable? In other words, globalisation 
dynamics have been an integral part of the Yoruba group relations before the colonial 
partition that it is hardly possible to notice and calibrate any dramatic changes in the 
relationship among the fractions of the group astride the boundary. Field findings and 
extant literature reviewed in this study support the argument that globalisation is not 
a new phenomenon among the Yoruba as they had always exploited dynamics 
associated with globalisation in their relationship before the colonial intervention 
(Awe, 1973; Asiwaju, 1976a; Kopytoff, 1987; Adediran, 1994; Usman, 2009). 
Consequently, the impact of transnationalism as a factor of globalisation are not so 
identifiable being part of an age-long processes. However, as we shall discover 
shortly, some of these processes are being intensified while some are being revived 
in the context of contemporary globalisation.  
The analysis of the impact of transnationalism on the Yoruba will be pursued 
259 
 
on two distinct but interrelated themes, namely: the traditional Yoruba system of 
authority and the ordinary Yoruba who both conduct relations with related groups 
across the boundary. The traditional elite, for reasons highlighted earlier, are crucial 
to the Yoruba project, while the rest of the Yoruba community provides a broader 
perspective for analysing the impacts of globalisation on the group. 
The concept of transnational flow of people has a long history in Africa. In 
pre-slavery Africa, migration was an integral part of the way of life of the people. 
The state of territoriality ebbed and grew depending on fortunes at the war battle; or 
the occurrence of natural disasters which have been known to displace entire 
populations. In other words, transnationalism in Africa prior to contact with Europe 
was driven largely by reactions to social and natural developments. The dispersal of 
the Yoruba group and the emergence of „Yorubaland‟ are the consequences of the 
combination of these factors. Yorubaland witnessed a period of socio-political 
changes throughout the 15
th
 century; Economic and political pressures forced people 
to migrate from the central Yoruba area towards northern and eastern Yoruba 
(Usman, 2009). War and conquest impelled the migration of the people as seen in the 
case of the Ketu who were forced to seek „protective‟ locations following Dahomey 
belligerency.  
The transnationalisation of the Yoruba identity and culture became heightened 
following the onset of slavery. Indeed, slavery could be regarded as the genesis of 
the transnational (transcontinental) dispersal of the group which remains quite 
influential until the present times.
211
 Contemporary pan Africanism is rooted in the 
                                               
211 One of the most enduring legacies of slavery with regards to transnationalism is the social reality 
of traditional Yoruba religions: in Cuba, Brazil (Bahia), Haiti and Dominican Republic where 
variants of Yoruba religious practices exist, largely in slightly modified forms. Another very 
significant linkage between the West African Yoruba and the Diaspora is the establishment of 
Oyotunji Village in the United States, as part of the „New World Yoruba‟ initiative. The village was 
founded as a resurrection of the Old Oyo in present day Nigeria and run on the traditional culture 
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African Diaspora and was led by Blacks in the United States and the Caribbean until 
the middle of the last century.
212
 It is important to note that long before the terms 
globalisation and transnationalism became analytical descriptions, transnational and 
globalising forces were already at work.
213
 The translocation of the Yoruba people, 
who constituted the bulk of the slaves from the Bight of Benin to the New Worlds, 
could be regarded as the precursor to transnational (transcontinental) flows in the 
region, which only became deepened in recent times owing to the forces of 
intensified globalisation.  
Transnationalism became even more intensified with the advent and 
consolidation of colonial rule. The epochal character of colonialism left Africa 
fundamentally transformed and initiated the incorporation of the continent into the 
global community. The processes of modernisation and westernisation characteristic 
of colonial rule, destroyed indigenous processes in the society and simultaneously 
introduced lasting and crucial social structures and formations, transforming Africa 
from its traditional state into a „modern‟ and „civilised continent‟.214  
In the postcolonial era, transnationalism has been driven by contemporary 
globalisation processes of increased international labour mobility, human trafficking 
and refugee outflow. Consequently, the contemporary period has witnessed a 
migration from the African continent which is close in size to the forced emigration 
                                                                                                                                      
and practice of the Yoruba. Members of the commune make regular „pilgrimage‟ to the Yoruba 
„source‟ in Nigeria (Clarke, 2004). 
212 Pan Africanism was the precursor of nationalism in Africa; the leadership of pan-Africanism 
promoted local agitations for independence in Black Africa. 
213 This argument challenges the notion of the contemporaneous character of globalisation as 
claimed by the globalists. 
214 This period witnessed the migration of Africans to the metropolis in search of civilisation and 
modernisation. Many left the continent to study in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Portugal 
and the United States and returned to become the elite class. The West African Student Union 
(WASU) was established to meet the needs of African students in the United Kingdom as well as to 
provide emotional succour in a difficult environment. WASU became crucial in the independence 
movement as emergent African elite had the unifying experience of the WASU having been 
members in their student years. 
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of the slavery era.
215
 Indeed, some have argued that contemporary labour migration 
is a replication of the slavery period, albeit, unforced but voluntary. 
Adeyanju (2006) identifies five trends in the discourses of transnationalism 
and their impact on social groups and identity formation: transnationalism as social 
morphology; mode of cultural reproduction; arena of capital and material resources 
accumulation; site of political activism and engagement; (re) construction of place or 
locality.  
Transnationalism has transformed the African Diaspora into a credible force, 
both in their new homes and their „traditional‟ homes. Home town associations are 
formed in the Diaspora to provide social and emotional cushions to the impacts of 
location in strange (and often hostile) territories as well as to maintain cultural 
linkage with their original homes. In other words, the Diaspora population constitutes 
a link between their new homes and their original homes, which poses a challenge to 
the nation state as their „demands, expectations and loyalty are not restricted to their 
place of settlement but are extended to their community of origin and co-ethnic 
members in other countries‟ (Adeyanju, 2006).  
The impacts of transnationalism on the nation state include the emergence of 
new identities and related assertion or demand of rights (and new crimes
216
) in the 
host countries as well as political activism and engagement driven by remittances in 
the countries of origin. New identities based on the countries of origin of immigrants 
act as bonds which promote ethnocentrism (in host countries) as well as linkages to 
                                               
215 The hopes of African emancipation and development at independence were shattered a few years 
into independent rule by mis-governance and corruption almost everywhere in the continent. The 
subsequent crisis of the state and the failure of the neo-liberal therapies led to massive emigration 
(forced and voluntary) from the continent, especially beginning from the 1980s onward. 
216 The „torso in the Thames‟ case of a decapitated body labelled Adam by the Scotland Yard 
detectives investigating the case in 2003 was alleged to be voodoo or ritual murder related. The case 
was linked with the Yoruba religious rituals of sacrifice to the gods as it was alleged that the boy 
was a victim of ritual sacrifice. The Guardian raised the alarm „that African ritual killings have been 
imported to Europe‟ (Okome and Banoum, 2004). 
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the countries of origin.  Ethnic affinity and solidarity as well as the reality of social 
exclusion and inequality in their new homes play a major role in the formation of 
Diaspora identities.  Adeyanju (2006) argues that the transnational practices of 
Yoruba immigrants in Toronto emerged out of the combined influence of material 
experience in Canada and the already developed Yoruba ethnic identity prior to 
immigration.  
The impact of transnationalism as a globalising force on the Yoruba has been 
influential in many ways: remittances, investment and home town development, as 
well as political activism are the most crucial. The bulk of contemporary emigration 
from Yorubaland was propelled by economic considerations arising from the crisis of 
the state beginning from the 1980s; these émigrés retain very close linkages with 
their home communities contributing substantial financial support to their immediate 
families as well as being involved in community development initiatives. Indeed, 
remittances in the face of growing state failure and despondency have continued to 
play significant roles in the eradication of poverty and investment in developing 
countries. Remittances, according to de Montclos (2005: 1-2) have several 
advantages: 
 They can contribute to sustainable development since they are more 
endogenous than foreign aids; 
 They help reduce poverty and the other negative effects of globalisation 
dominated by market forces; 
 Assist African countries with debt servicing, increase foreign reserves, and 
partly compensate for capital flight. The World Bank puts the total value 
of remittances to Africa in 2002 at US$80 billion. If the value of 
remittances through the informal channel is added, the total value of 
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remittances may be more than tripled. Remittances have since become the 
second largest source of external funding for developing countries after 
foreign direct investment (FDI); 
 Remittances account for a significant fraction of the income of many 
developing states. Indeed, in many states, the Diaspora is actively 
encouraged to contribute to the investment in development. In Nigeria, the 
state has provided incentives, including an exclusive residential area for its 
Diaspora population in the Federal Capital Territory, to invest in the 
Nigerian economy. 
It is important to note the role of transnational linkages in remittances from 
the Yoruba and other African Diaspora to their original communities. As the rates of 
the conventional money transfer agencies (Western Union, Moneygram, etc) and 
bank transfers are quite high, the Diaspora simply rely on informal channels for the 
transfer of funds back home.
217
  
The Yoruba transnationalism aside from remittance for the socio-economic 
benefit of the Yoruba at home (Nigeria and Benin), constitutes a significant pool of 
political activism in these countries. In addition, the Yoruba astride the boundary of 
these two countries have been instrumental in influencing national politics in the 
other country. The failure of the Nigerian expulsion of illegal aliens, especially those 
from Benin, is related to the Yoruba transnationalism, which made the expulsion of 
Beninese Yoruba difficult.
218
 
                                               
217 Apart from the high charges on transfer, the Yoruba Diaspora communities prefer to deal with 
the informal transfer channels as the sum remitted  (in foreign currency) could be exchanged at the 
black market rates which are usually higher than the official rates used by the conventional money 
transfer agencies.  
218 Details of the expulsion and the role of the Yoruba are provided in Chapter 4. 
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During the Abacha Regime
219
 in Nigeria, the Yoruba ethnic group led the 
opposition, which challenged the regime following the annulment of the 1993 
presidential election. The crusade to reclaim the electoral mandate won by a Yoruba 
politician was expectedly led by the Yoruba ethnic group, which pitted the group 
against the regime. The reign of terror forced many Yoruba elite and activists into 
exile; their exit was largely facilitated by the Yoruba in Benin even as it (Benin) 
became noted as the escape route for the opposition group. The fleeing Yoruba elite 
and activists exploited their Yoruba linkages and affinity with the Yoruba across the 
boundary in Benin to escape from the onslaught of the repressive regime (de 
Montclos, 2005: 13). Apart from providing safe exit, Benin also provided safe haven 
for these refugees and became a launching pad for the opposition action against the 
Nigerian state. The opposition radio station (Radio Kudirat) was beamed into Nigeria 
from Benin as the Nigerian regulatory body would not register such an organisation 
(de Montclos, 2005: 11).  
The point being made here is that opposition to the Nigerian regime (and 
subsequent regime change) was possible due to the ethnic solidarity and affinity 
between the Yoruba groups in both countries. The oppression of the Nigerian Yoruba 
created an „ethnic community of suffering‟ which reinforced ethnic affinity and 
relations (de Montclos, 2005: 9). The Yoruba refugees simply appealed to the 
Yoruba identity which made room for them in Benin. Similarly, de Montclos (2005: 
24) reports that during the 1972 military coup led by Mathew Kerekou in Benin, 
prominent Yoruba elements of the deposed leadership fled to Nigeria and were 
                                               
219 The regime was especially repressive leading to the suspension of the country from the 
Commonwealth and the imposing of sanctions by the EU and the US. 
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provided safe haven by the Nigerian Yoruba.
220
  
Responding to the accommodation of the Yoruba activists in Benin, the 
Abacha regime actively supported the re-election of Mathew Kerekou who had lost 
an earlier election to the incumbent, Nicephore Soglo, whose administration had not 
only turned a blind eye, but granted refugee status to Yoruba activists in Benin. 
Abacha‟s support included the closure of the border between the two countries and 
the donation of one million dollars to Kerekou (de Montclos, 2005: 13). 
Religion is very central to the Yoruba, as a group and as individuals. Indeed, 
one of the most significant issues in transnational theory of revivalist movements 
today is the search for African roots (Clarke, 2004). And in this search, traditional 
Yoruba religion (orisha worship) and the Yoruba language are crucial. There has 
been a recent proliferation of the adherents of orisha worship among the Black 
Diaspora seeking a „connection‟ with their African roots. The quest for their African 
roots has led many revivalists to make regular pilgrimages to the West African 
countries of Nigeria and Benin (the traditional homesteads of the Yoruba). The most 
significant development in this regard was the establishment of the Oyotunji Village 
whose residents use Yoruba as a second language as well as a tool for cultural 
reclamation (Clarke, 2004). The significance of quest for cultural reclamation for the 
Yoruba transnationalism is that it creates a deterritorialisation of the Yoruba identity 
as the practice of the Yoruba culture creates transnational communities which 
transcend national boundaries.  
The deterritorialisation of the Yoruba identity is not limited to 
transcontinental aspect of its transnationalism. In the partitioned homeland of the 
Yoruba in West Africa, the practice of the Yoruba culture across the border aids the 
                                               
220 Rigobert Ladipo, the industry minister was welcomed in Nigeria by Wole Soyinka who 
facilitated his appointment as a professor at a Nigerian university (de Montclos, 2005: 24).  
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deterritorialisation of the Yoruba identity. Of the many ritualistic and cultural rites 
across the boundary is the Gelede religious cult. The Gelede is a religious cult that is 
prevalent everywhere in the border region and serves as a strong unifying marker of 
identity as it binds adherents together in a relationship that transcends the physical. 
The Gelede festival is an annual gathering of all the adherents of the cult from all 
over the region, across the boundary
221
. The Gelede masquerades from every place 
related to Ketu are gathered together in the town, once a year for a public 
presentation in dance and ritual performances. It serves to preserve the age-old 
affinity between the people which has subsisted over the years. Another important 
ritualistic cultural linkage between the people across the boundary is the Alaketu 
coronation ritual pilgrimage to Imeko and neighbouring villages.
222
  
Generally, orisha worship has the capability of creating a unified worldview 
among the Yoruba. Though, the number of adherents to the traditional Yoruba 
religion is dwindling, it still serves as a unifying force among the Yoruba across the 
boundary and between the Yoruba in the traditional homeland of Nigeria and Benin 
and the Yoruba in the Diaspora seeking a reclamation of their lost culture (Clarke, 
2004). 
The generality of the borderland people could be regarded as holding dual 
nationalities, as nearly every borderland Yoruba respondent during the field work 
interview claimed to have relatives and farmlands across the boundary. They cross 
the boundary as many times as they need, without immigration hassles, and where 
there are hassles, they simply avoid the official routes by turning to the preserved 
ancient routes; they do their businesses on their farmlands irrespective of the 
                                               
221 Interview with the Balogun of Ketu, Lagos Nigeria (24.10.08) 
222 In an interview with the present Alaketu installed in 2005, he confirmed to the researcher that he 
cannot be crowned king without this all important pilgrimage to Imeko and surrounding villages. 
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location. Typical with the traditional Yoruba setting is the location of farmsteads at 
considerable distance from the town, to which town dwellers relocate at planting 
seasons and return home to the city at a later stage or whenever the need arises. 
These farmsteads over time grow as population increases and become outposts of the 
main town. For the Yoruba of Ketu and Ifonyin
223
 especially, whose territories were 
divided by the boundary placing the head towns in Benin and the outposts in Nigeria, 
the degree of cross-border interaction is greater than those of Sakete, Porto Novo, 
Ipobe and Ita-Ijebu. The former Yoruba subgroups are compelled to cross the borders 
frequently to work in farms, visit family members, participate in cultural activities, 
and so on, much more than the latter group. 
The point being made is that Yoruba movements, both across the Nigeria – 
Benin boundary and transnational, imperil territorial sovereignty. In other words, 
while the state, owing to its peculiar characteristic as weak, deliberately and 
inadvertently hinder integrative force, the imperatives of cross-border movement and 
international labour migration have engendered the deterritorialisation of the Yoruba 
space which hold important consequences for the two states. As noted above, the 
unifying force of the Yoruba religion, as well as the pull of the Yoruba homeland (to 
Diaspora Yoruba) have contributed immensely to the deterritorialisation of the 
Yoruba. Furthermore, weak state institutions promote cross-border movements of the 
Yoruba as the state is unable to effectively control its territorial borders. 
 
 
                                               
223 Information gathered on the field research points to greater integration among these groups 
across the boundary. Crossing the border posts at Ilara (Ketu) and Idi Iroko (Ifonyin) are the least 
strenuous; the other border post at Seme is very difficult to cross, in spite of the ECOWAS Protocol 
on Free Movement of People. The officials at the border posts at Idi Iroko and Ilara are hard put to 
distinguish between Nigerian Yoruba and Beninese Yoruba. Indeed, these individuals cross the 
border several times in the course of the day, either to trade, farm or visit family.    
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7.34 Smuggling and Communications  
Over the years, smuggling and communications have posed a sustained 
challenge to the broadcast of state power, especially to geographically distant and 
economically marginal locations. As noted above, smuggling and many other 
practices of negotiation at the societal level are consequences of state weakness or 
failure. The Yoruba borderland between Nigeria and Benin is one of the most 
smuggling-intensive of Nigeria‟s borderlands as it constitutes Nigeria‟s most-
important link with the other countries on the West African coast. As Flynn (1997) 
notes, the Yoruba have internalised the border, controlling the smuggling network by 
intermediating between non-local smugglers and officials of government agencies, 
while also being major players in the business.  
The consequence of smuggling for state territoriality in this region is pretty 
obvious. Nigeria is unable to exercise absolute control over flows across their 
boundaries; even when borders are closed as an extreme control measure, evidence 
from the field work suggests that the Yoruba people still conducted cross-border 
businesses as the people resort to the multiple channels of communication outside the 
sphere of state control. For Benin, it would appear that the state deliberately weaken 
its control over cross-border flows as it encourages smuggling across its border with 
Nigeria. Border closures, which have become Nigeria‟s ultimate border control 
strategy, is against the letter of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement and 
settlement and the several bilateral agreements between the two states. Of significant 
note is the establishment of customs union between the two states in the 1960s. 
However, given the need to forcefully preserve its territorial integrity, Nigeria has 
not consciously promoted the union rather its actions (border closure and import 
prohibition) have been antithetical to the objectives of a customs union. For Benin, a 
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customs union with Nigeria will not be in its advantage as it exploits the differential 
tariff regime in Nigeria to further its re-export trade as well as smuggling to and from 
Nigeria.  
In spite of state regulation and control, smuggling continues to thrive and 
function as an indication of fundamental state weakness. While seeking to police its 
borders, the Nigerian state highlights the weakness of its structures and institutions to 
effectively function as required. As noted earlier, border closure to control movement 
of persons and goods, is an indication of state weakness to use its statutory border 
structures and institutions to control flows across its boundary. Subsequently, cross-
border activities essentially among the Yoruba subsist across the Nigeria – Benin 
boundary, promoting group affinity and identity. 
A recent factor which has further aided the group affinity of the Yoruba in 
this region is the introduction of the Global Systems Mobile Telecommunication 
(GSM) services in Nigeria and Benin in 2001 and 1997 respectively. 
Telecommunication has become easily affordable and accessible; people have been 
empowered to communicate and keep in close touch. Prior to this period, it was near 
impossible to connect with remote locations (which the borderland represents) on the 
old analogue telecommunication system. Indeed, for the Yoruba borderlander, 
international roaming services are unnecessary as the coverage areas of the GSM 
services providers extend some distance across the international boundary.
224
 
Previously isolated groups have been brought into closer contact and this has 
engendered greater trans-border (transnational) relations.  
                                               
224 During the field work, the researcher did not need to subscribe to roaming services on his 
Nigerian mobile phone, nor did he need to purchase a Beninese SIM card as the network of his 
service provider extends to cover his movement in Benin. 
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In addition to the GSM is the electronic media as a means of fostering closer 
group relations in the borderland astride the Nigeria-Benin boundary. In a similar 
manner as the GSM coverage area, the coverage areas of Nigerian television and 
radio services extend far into Benin. At the palace of the Alaketu during the field 
work interview, the Ogun State Television service was broadcasting a news bulletin, 
which, apparently was regularly tuned into by the Oba’s household.225 At the palace 
of the Onisakete’s during the field work interview, the transistor radio was tuned in 
to the Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation. These media undoubtedly promote kin 
affinity and inter-group relations as well as the Yoruba worldview.   
7.4 Conclusion 
While globalising forces, including regional integration, transnationalism and 
innovations in telecommunication have enforced the reconceptualisation of 
traditional territorial sovereignty almost all over the world, state practices in (West) 
Africa have remained at the pre-globalisation period. The major significance of the 
reconceptualisation of territoriality, prompted by contemporary globalisation, affects 
the traditional role of boundary as the juridical extent of state sovereignty, 
distinguishing between nationals and non-nationals, as well as point of state control 
and regulation over flows in and out of its territory. As integration withers state 
control over borders and communications and transnationalism engender 
deterritorialisation of space, state control over boundaries are consequently 
redefined.  
The thrust of this chapter is to contribute to the principal research question by 
providing answers to the sub-research question related to the resilience of the Yoruba 
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 As the interest of the researcher was roused by the news bulletin, he asked the Oba whether he 
also watches Beninese television station and does he prefer. The oba of course watches Beninese 
stations and he has no preference. He claimed that he watches Nigerian television because the 
service has some Yoruba programmes, which the Beninese televisions do not have. 
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identity and affinity. The chapter establishes that the Nigeria and Benin states 
actively promoted distinct national policies and used the border as a major 
instrument of state control. However, in spite of the strong border policy, these states 
have remained fundamentally unable to effectively police their territories. The 
chapter finds that state weakness, characterised by defective structures, bad 
governance, corruption and poor geography, is essentially responsible for the failure 
of these states to assert their authorities over territory. 
The failure of these states to effectively broadcast their power across the 
length and breadth of their territories allows the exploitation and manipulation of the 
border by the Yoruba people as well as officials of the states charged with policing 
the border. The consequence of this is the almost „unfettered‟ cross-border 
movements (goods and persons) among the Yoruba which function to promote intra-
Yoruba identity and solidarity.   
Relating to regionalisation and its impact on territorial sovereignty, Nigeria 
and Benin, as with other African countries, have consistently resisted sovereignty 
withering forces in order to preserve their control over territory, which 
regionalisation challenges. As established in this chapter, state weakness is the 
principal explanation for the resistance of the state to regional integrative initiatives. 
However, while the states are able to resist integration, they have been unable to 
control Yoruba movements across their shared boundary. Again, state weakness 
indicated by institutional inefficiency as well as clientelism (ethnicity) is responsible 
for this incapacitation of the state to control flows across its territory. Coupled with 
this is the revolutionary impact of telecommunication technology, which allows the 
bypassing of traditional state control measure in trans-border interactions amongst 
the borderland Yoruba. The cumulative impact of state failure, Yoruba 
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transnationalism and telecommunication is the preservation and reification of Yoruba 
identity, solidarity and affinity. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
8.1    Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a précis of the findings of this 
study as well as to highlight its major contributions to knowledge in the study of 
international boundaries in Africa. As pointed out in the General Introduction and the 
Literature Review, there are obvious gaps in the academic study of boundaries in the 
continent. These gaps inform the justification for this study. The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to examine this attempt to fill the gap by linking the empirical findings to 
the research questions. Finally, the chapter considers issues for further research 
arising from the limitations and the challenges faced by the study. The chapter is 
therefore divided into three sections, namely, summary, conclusion, and issues for 
further research.  
8.2   Summary 
The primary objective of this study was to critically assess the impacts of the 
international boundary between Nigeria and Benin, mainly on the Yoruba borderland 
subgroups, as well as the interstate relations between the two states. The principal 
assumption being that the manner of the colonial partition of African territories 
divided culturally homogeneous groups into different spheres of influence. For the 
Yoruba under consideration, their territories were partitioned into the colonial 
holdings of France and Britain, which respectively became Benin and Nigeria 
following independence. However, as there are contrasting views regarding the 
territorial extent of the Yoruba groups as well as the role of Africans in the boundary 
making process, the study, adopting the field research approach as well as archival 
research, begins by examining the manner of boundary making as well as the 
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prevailing conditions in Yorubaland at the time.   
Though, the Yoruba identity as it has come to be known today did not exist 
prior to colonial rule, yet, there existed some modicum of the Yoruba consciousness 
among the several Yoruba subgroups before the colonial intervention. Apart from the 
myth of common origin, strengthened by dynastic link with Ife (the acclaimed origin 
of all the Yoruba subgroups), Oyo was particularly instrumental in the Yoruba 
project as its empire extended the frontiers of the Yoruba identity and influence. 
Indeed, evidence from ethnographic field work in the study area supports the spatial 
spread of the Yoruba subgroups across the Nigeria-Benin boundary. It also shows 
that the boundary indeed cut through previously homogeneous culture areas of the 
subgroups around the border. Furthermore, field findings, supported by archival 
research reveal that the Nigeria – Benin boundary was essentially the making of 
French and British agreements, which were founded on treaties, concluded with 
naive or conquered African potentates. There was limited and insignificant African 
participation in the process, as the decisions were taken in metropolitan Europe, with 
several strategic interests being the determining factors.
226
 Again, as the European 
conception of territoriality differed considerably from the African conception, the 
emergent boundary did not reflect prevailing conditions. Hence the boundary, along 
with other African boundaries, has been described as superimposed, arbitrary and 
dehumanising (Reader, 1997: 127; Griffiths, 1986: 204).  
In the years leading to, and immediately after independence, the role of these 
boundaries in post-independence Africa became the source of major debates. Quite 
paradoxically, these boundaries were adopted, unmodified, by the OAU, as the basis 
                                               
226 Many of these determining factors were not related to Africa. For instance, as identified in 
chapter 4.31, the strategic consideration of safeguarding the route to the East propelled Britain to 
acquire the Cape as well as its involvement in Egypt and the Sudan. Fishing rights in Newfoundland 
were also critical to the scramble as France bartered these rights for territories in West Africa with 
Britain (Prescott, 1965). 
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of state territorial recognition and interstate relations. This position was informed by 
the need to prevent the turmoil which the redrawing or abolition of the boundaries 
would engender. The adoption of the ex-colonial boundaries was tantamount to 
sacrificing ethnic reunification
227
 on the altar of political expediency. The option 
would either have been a redrawing, which would create more problems than it 
would solve as the process would dismember already existing states, and 
simultaneously establish new ones, essentially on the basis of ethnicity. This would 
have created hundreds, or even thousands of new states, some of which would be 
unviable, owing to size and location, to effectively function as sovereign states.  
The second option, inspired by pan-Africanism, would have been the 
establishment of a „United States of Africa‟. This was by far the more popular 
expectation following independence. However, this option would have multiplied the 
problem of the nation-state in Africa. As the various states were colonies of different 
European states with distinct administrative styles, the emergent African states were 
as diverse as their colonial masters. Furthermore, colonial rule in each of these states 
failed to evolve a common identity, such that at independence, these states were a 
collection of disparate groups, forced together by colonialism. Hence, Englesberg, 
Tarango and Carter (2002) describe postcolonial inter-group relations in the African 
state as characterised by „suffocation‟, making for conflict, instability and 
underdevelopment. The consequence of this for a Unites States of Africa would be 
the multiplication of the problems of the individual states, which would create more 
problems than presently experienced in the continent. 
As territoriality, determined by boundaries, ascribes identity, the colonial 
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 The major argument for the adjustment of the boundaries hinged on the claim that they divided 
several cultural groups, which was perceived as a potential trigger of conflict in postcolonial Africa. 
The revision of the boundaries, along ethnic lines, or such other historic or cultural alignments, was 
thought to be the solution to the problem. 
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partition, and the postcolonial reification of these boundaries, ought to foster distinct 
identities for the partitioned groups. Colonisation with its epochal characteristics is 
expected to transform the identities of the colonised, just as Miles (1994: 42) notes, 
„to colonise is to alter identity‟. Furthermore, the formal postcolonial discourse of 
boundaries, which was meant to consolidate the ex-colonial territorial divisions, 
should also reinforce the colonially-ordered identities as distinct from the pre-
colonial identity of members of the partitioned group. For the partitioned Yoruba, 
this study discovers that the expectation of a transformation of identities did not 
occur. The so-called „border hysteria‟ is absent at this borderland. Field research in 
the borderland area astride the Nigeria – Benin boundary shows a strong group 
affinity and identity in spite of the several years of distinct, and sometimes, 
competing socialisation processes. In other words, the strength of the historical 
linkages, kin affinity, as well as commerce has kept alive the Yoruba group identity.  
One significant paradox of the French colonial administration, with reference 
to identity, relates to the traditional institution of authority. While French policy all 
but crushed this institution, it has remained an important factor in trans-border 
Yoruba relations. As shown in the study, in spite of the partition of the culture areas 
of the borderland Yoruba subgroups, as well as the diminution of the status of the 
oba in Benin, the Beninese Yoruba obas whose traditional sphere of influence 
extends across the boundary in Nigeria continue to exercise authority over such 
places. For instance, new obas are only appointed in the Ketu areas of Nigeria, by the 
Ogun State governor, on the approval of the Alaketu, who is a Benin national.  Given 
the role of the oba in the traditional Yoruba society, the trans-border influence of the 
Alaketu holds significant implications for the contemporary Yoruba project by 
promoting transnational linkages. 
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Considering the manner of the evolution of the boundary, as well as the 
imposition of colonial rule, with its foreign and transformed social structures (Ekeh, 
1983), two distinct perceptions evolved and has endured, as to the meaning and role 
of the boundary. While the partitioned groups sought to continue with pre-colonial 
intra-group relations in spite of the new colonial order, the imperial powers needed to 
differentiate territories. This has led to the development of different and competing 
perceptions about the boundary which, unsurprisingly, has endured into the post-
colonial period. The new order, propelled by Westphalian territoriality, involved the 
establishment of border structures, to control and regulate flows across the boundary. 
To the partitioned group, this was the height of imperialism as people who were 
members of the same groups, suddenly became alienated; people who previously 
moved about within their territories were suddenly corralled, and expected to acquire 
authorisation in order to visit family members and friends as well as farmlands and 
markets. The reactions of the people to this imposition took different forms. One the 
one hand, it was active protest, which involved protest migration and resistance to 
colonial rule. On the other hand, the borderland people simply adapted to the 
emergent territorial order by exploiting what Flynn (1997: 313) refers to as their 
„deep placement‟ in the borderland for arbitrage.  
The contrasting and competing perceptions have created opportunities for the 
borderland people to sustain the abuse the boundary, which has led to frictions 
between the states. Flynn (1997: 321) claims that the borderland Yoruba groups 
exploit the boundary for economic gains, either by participating in smuggling, or 
simply acting as brokerage agents between non-local smugglers and border guards. 
The ability of the Yoruba to exploit the boundary for pecuniary gains has been 
established in the course of this thesis to be a function of the weakness of the two 
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states to effectively broadcast their power over and across their respective territories.  
The cross-border exchange, largely clandestine, deprives the states of tax revenues 
accruable from customs regulations. This has led to the development of strong border 
policies, especially by Nigeria, to control cross-border commercial activities. 
However, owing largely to state weakness characterised by inefficient and 
dysfunctional institutions, the Nigeria – Benin boundary continues to leak, leading to 
intermittent interstate tensions between Nigeria and Benin as the Yoruba people 
continue to treat the boundary the way they deem fit, in the absence of effective state 
control. 
Apart from the tension emanating from contrasting perspectives, Nigeria – 
Benin interstate relations have suffered from the influence of external forces. France 
remains a critical force in the post-independence affairs of its former colonies in 
Africa. This influence was brought to bear in the relations of the former Francophone 
countries with Nigeria. France regards Nigeria as the major hindrance to its neo-
colonial project of grandeur in Africa and instigated its former colonies to checkmate 
Nigeria‟s influence (Nwokedi, 1991). However, in spite of the French pressure and 
the irritations of contrasting perceptions, Nigeria and Benin, propelled by 
geopolitical expediency, have been able to foster some degree of cooperative and 
collaborative relationship. In spite of the strong statist view of the boundary, this 
relationship, from the perspective of Nigeria, hinges on „emphasising and building 
upon cultural links which already exist‟ (Nigerian House of Representatives Debates, 
1960, in Oyebode, 1994: 246). Indeed, the Nigeria – Benin relationship, provided the 
basis for the establishment of the ECOWAS (Aluko, 1976). 
Related to the role of external forces in the relationship between Nigeria and 
its neighbours is what Adesina (2007) refers to as „Nigeriaphobia‟. The fear of 
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Nigeria‟s size, influence and ambition, promoted by France has fostered a lack of 
unity in the subregion which has contributed to the slow development of regionalism 
in West Africa. This phobia, also expressed by the other non-Francophone 
countries
228
 in the sub-region, is captured by Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal‟s President 
in 2000 when he „indicated that he would seek greater unity among the ECOWAS 
states that would exclude Nigeria‟ (Wade in Adesina, 2007: 45). These factors 
(negative external influence and Nigeriaphobia) have enduring consequences for 
regional integration in West Africa. 
In spite of this however, cross-border cooperation and collaboration has been 
given further fillip by the initiatives of ECOWAS on regional integration as well as 
the rejuvenated AU on African integration. The AU recommends the incorporation 
of the borderland peoples into the integration efforts of the various regional 
economic communities, which ECOWAS has adopted as one of the important bases 
of its integration project. Regional integration, especially following the lowering of 
the Berlin Wall, has become one of the arrowheads of contemporary globalisation. 
This has led to the reconceptualisation of the twin ideas of territoriality and 
sovereignty. In spite of the debates on the essence and roles of globalisation, 
territorial sovereignty has been significantly transformed owing to the forces of 
globalisation, chief of which is regionalism. Regional integration has led to the 
eradication of international boundaries, especially in Europe, with the development 
of the transnational European Union. However, the degree of integration being 
experience in Europe and propagated by the EU elsewhere has failed to be replicated 
in Africa, where international boundaries retain their traditional role of separation 
and filter.  
                                               
228 See Aluko‟s (1976) account of the relationship between Ghana and Nigeria and the role played by 
the fear of the latter‟s hegemonic domination of the sub-region.  
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The African boundary has remained impervious to the border-eroding forces 
of integration, largely due to the OAU/AU Resolution of 1964, as well as the 
weakness of the state characterised by weak and dysfunctional institutions and 
structures, which is exploited by the political elite to retain political power and 
influence. Allowing integration, with its sovereignty eroding characteristics, would 
further weaken the control of the state by the political class. Hence, the typical 
African political elite would resist integration by refusing to muster the required 
political will to transform integration policies into practice. As shown by evidence 
from the field work, the movement of goods and persons across the Nigeria – Benin 
interstate boundary is an arduous task due to the sheer size of the border control 
structures. It is however interesting to note that this anti-integration stance of the 
states are not only contrary to public opinion in the region, it is also contrary to 
bilateral and multilateral agreements which they have concluded. There is an 
acknowledgement of the inadequacies of this boundary by both policy makers and 
the borderland people, yet, the states continue to treat the border in a manner that 
reify it as a factor of division and differentiation rather than that of cooperation and 
collaboration. State territoriality has subsequently been unaffected by the globalising 
force of integration. However, this study shows that though, the control of the state 
over its international boundaries in Africa remains undiminished, transnationalism, 
promoted by the contrasting and competing discourse of the boundary has been 
critical in the region. In other words, while the state has been able to withstand the 
globalising impact of integration, it has failed to check the advances of 
transnationalism, which is an age-old phenomenon in the region. 
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8.3 Conclusion 
This section presents the major contributions of this study to the theme of 
international boundaries in West Africa. It seeks to achieve this by linking the 
empirical findings of the study to the primary and subsidiary research questions 
identified in chapter 1. It also links the findings to conceptual and theoretical work 
on boundaries. Furthermore, some of the findings of this study challenge some 
settled opinions in the literature, as well as chart new knowledge regarding some of 
the issues related to boundaries in the continent. 
This section begins by focusing on the linkage between the empirical findings 
of the study and theoretical and conceptual work on African borders. The imperial 
European idea of territoriality in Africa was flawed as it conceived Africa as 
unterritorial. This was a misreading of Africa, seen from the perspective of Europe, 
where distinct territorial sovereignties were mapped out by precise boundary lines. 
However, in Africa, the pre-colonial conception of boundary was not of precise lines, 
but zones of interaction. Again, the idea of territorial sovereignty in Africa was 
different from the European idea. In Africa, territorial sovereignty was dynamic as 
territories were lost and gained depending on wars and conquests. Furthermore, 
political influence petered out the farther one moved from the capital of the political 
organisation. In Europe, the union of territory and sovereignty had long been settled 
at the time of the colonial expansion into Africa. In other words, while state power 
finds ultimate expression at the European border (Anderson and O‟Dowd, 1999), in 
pre-colonial Africa, fringe locations would potentially be no-man‟s land, subject to 
appropriation by neighbouring powers. As Mbembe (2000: 263) notes, „pre-colonial 
territoriality was an itinerant territoriality‟, as the jurisdictions of political entities 
flowed and ebbed through wars, conquests, and the mobility of goods and persons. 
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This was the case with the fringe locations in the pre-colonial Yoruba society just 
before colonial rule when the kingdom of Dahomey pillaged locations along its 
frontier with both Oyo and Egba (Asiwaju, 1976a; Law, 1977).  
These contrasting ideas of the boundary and territoriality may be partly 
responsible for the haphazard partition of Africa. The Europeans saw terra nullis 
simply because the geopolitical organisation of the African society did not resemble 
what they were familiar with, hence, their characterisation of African boundaries as 
antecedental (Alexander, 1963). On the contrary, however, over the centuries, Africa 
had evolved some highly organised hierarchical societies, bounded by (shifting) 
frontier zones. This study shows, therefore that the evolution of boundaries could not 
have been antecedental, but subsequent, being superimposed on well developed 
preexisting social and political entities. 
Another major conceptual and theoretical contribution of this study on 
boundaries in Africa relates to the role of globalisation on the concept of sovereignty. 
Just as studies on African boundaries are few and far apart, studies on the impact of 
globalisation on African territoriality are also few. Indeed, as pointed out in this 
study, states (colonial or post-colonial) have provided the dominant contexts for 
research into the boundary and the persistence of traditional patterns of authority and 
identity. This present study has not only done this, but it has also asked questions 
about how and why it is that globalisation is affecting (or not) these patterns. This 
study shows that forces of globalisation (especially integration), which have ordered 
a reconceptualisation of the idea of territorial sovereignty, especially in Europe, is 
being actively resisted in Africa. State boundaries remain at the pre-globalisation 
stage due largely to the weakness of the state which makes it impossible for the state 
to effectively project its power and authority over its territorial space, as defined by 
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boundaries. The consequence of state weakness is that the influence of the state, 
especially at fringe locations, is weak and local elite constitute „parallel‟ locus of 
power, and these societies operate on a set of rules which is almost independent of 
central rules (Flynn, 1997; Boone, 2003). This situation therefore compels state elite 
to resist every form of rival territoriality, which regionalism represents. State elites in 
the continent, in the pursuit of personal ambitions and objectives, fail (refuse) to 
translate integration policies into reality. As evident in this study, through field work 
interviews and a review of relevant intergovernmental documents, both public and 
private opinions, through multilateral and bilateral agreements and transnational 
relationships, support the withering away of the borders as points of control and 
regulation, yet, owing to the failure of the state, these boundaries remain as barriers 
to movements and cross-border cooperation.  
Furthermore, the fixation of the African state with the OAU Resolution, which 
reified these boundaries as the basis of interstate relations also hardened them as 
points of division and separation. States have jealously guarded their territorial 
integrity by reinforcing border control even when it is more expedient to liberalise 
trans-border movement of goods and persons. The problem of smuggling, for 
instance, is sustained by state weaknes on the one hand, and on the other by the 
existence of different customs regimes on either side of the Nigeria – Benin 
boundary. This makes for price differentials across the boundary which encourages 
smuggling as the states are unable to effectively control movements across their 
shared border and the resultant loss of revenue to Nigeria.
229
  
However, while the forces of regional integration are being muzzled by state 
failure and complacency, other forces of globalisation especially transnational 
                                               
229 As shown in this study, Benin actually benefits from smuggling across this boundary with Nigeria 
and indeed, encourages it as its policy of re-exportation is targetted at the much larger Nigerian market. 
284 
 
relations and technology continue to undermine the resistance of the state to 
globalising forces. The study shows that, in spite of distinct colonial and postcolonial 
systems, the strength of the Yoruba project, supported by historic and kin affinities, 
has sustained trans-border relations between the border-partitioned Yoruba 
subgroups. Just as technology has been pivotal to the intensification of contemporary 
globalisation by promoting respatialisation and deterritorialisation, the GSM 
revolution in Nigeria and Benin, as well as the electronic media, have also been 
identified by this study as aiding the transnational relations amongst the borderland 
Yoruba. 
Before considering the empirical contributions of this study to knowledge, it is 
important to stress the significance of the field work. Interview sessions with the 
obas were critical elements of the field work. The obas, considered as repositories of 
the history and traditions of the Yoruba, were indispensable to the conduct of the 
study, as they provided the critical oral traditional sources of information. This kind 
of study, incorporating the obas‟ invaluable knowledge of history, has not been done 
in this region since Asiwaju‟s over twenty years ago. 
The empirical contributions of this study to knowledge are presented by 
examining the empirical analysis of the study vis-à-vis the relevant research 
questions. Each research question is highlighted, together with the corresponding 
answers provided by the study. 
Regarding the Yoruba ethnic group, as it has come to be today, this study 
finds that no ethnic identity as the Yoruba existed in the pre-colonial period. Rather, 
the Yoruba existed largely as (semi) autonomous groups, which shared a common 
history, a myth of common origin, common customs and practices, as well as 
mutually intelligible dialects of the same language. However, owing to the 
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overarching influence of imperial Oyo, as well as dynastic relationship with Ife, it is 
possible to ascribe a common identity to these groups of people. It was this modicum 
of homogeneity which informed the labeling of these groups as Yoruba by the 
missionaries at the onset of colonisation. However, through the colonial system of 
indirect rule, which governed the colonies through autochthonous authority system, 
the ethnic identity developed (Mamdani, 2002: 51).  
If the Yoruba identity did not exist at the advent of the colonial expansion, 
how then do we justify the partition of the Yoruba? Though strickly speaking, there 
was no „Yorubaland‟, the Yoruba subgroups had migrated from Ife, through various 
waves of migration, to cover a vast territorial expanse. These subgroups were 
organised into semi (autonomous) kingdoms, some of which had been conquered by 
Oyo, or in some military alliance with it, or any of its successor kingdoms (especially 
Egba). It was the territories of these groups that were affected by the location of the 
colonial boundary. In other words, the boundary partitioned the territories of several 
Yoruba subgroups, placing the fraction into the territories of different colonial 
authorities. Field work, supported by archival research of the original partition 
documents including inter-colonial agreements and correspondences, Colonial Office 
correspondences and treaties between local African rulers and colonial oficers, show 
that, indeed, the boundary cut through the territories of homogeneous culture groups. 
Hence, the field work included such locations as Ketu, Ilara and Imeko in the old 
Ketu kingdom, partitioned between Nigeria and Benin; Sakete, Ipobe, Isale Eko and 
Ifonyin in the old Ohori kingdom partitioned into Benin and Nigeria. 
The boundary was a product of British and French imperial agreements, with 
treaties concluded with several Yoruba and Dahomey rulers as the basis. The 
essential considerations were not the local communities, but wider strategic and 
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economic considerations. Hence, the emergent boundary sliced through the territories 
of several previously homogeneous groups, placing the fractions in different spheres 
of influence. The boundary is therefore regarded as superimposed and arbitrary. 
Africans were not consulted in the process. Indeed, at the Berlin West African 
conference, where the groundwork for partitioning Africa was laid, there were no 
African representatives (Pakenham, 1992). Griffiths (1986: 204) argues that „African 
boundaries were drawn by Europeans, for Europeans and, apart from localised 
details, paid scant regard to Africa, let alone Africans‟. Grifitths further submits that 
the boundaries are „dehumanising‟ as the process that determined them did not factor 
in prevailing social, economic and political realities at the time of the partition. 
Having established that the boundary partitioned certain subgroups of the 
Yoruba, what are the impacts of the division on these subgroups? A related 
subsidiary research question relates to the impact of contrasting colonial rule on 
these subgroups. The first obvious impact of the partition would be the severing and 
location of the parts into two distinct colonial spheres of influence, initially, and 
eventually into two distinct states at independence. This separation, coupled with 
contrasting socialisation processes, was expected to foster new values, new identities 
and new loyalties. The fractions initially became, either French or British subjects, 
and eventually became Beninese and Nigerians respectively. National identities are 
meant to spur patriotic fervour in the national, however, this study finds that, owing 
to the exploitative and oppressive nature of colonialism, and more especially, the 
strength of the Yoruba group affinity, the separation into two distinct states has not 
been able to foster distinct identities for the partitioned Yoruba groups. Indeed, the 
partition process and contrasting socialisation processes reinforced elements of 
Yoruba identity, especially the traditional authority structures. 
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In addition, the partition and the mposition of European state system and 
institutions created weak states in Africa with accompanying dysfunctions. 
Subsequently, the typical African state has been unable to enforce actual control over 
its borders in spite of the rather visible defence of their validity and the state‟s 
sovereign relationsship to them. Indeed, as it has been submitted in this study, the 
rather strong border policies of these states as exemplified by Nigeria, is an 
indication of the weakness of state institutions to project and enforce state authority 
at the borders.  
Furthermore, the Yoruba identity has proved to be resilient, not least since it 
was more firmly established prior to the partition than has previously been 
recognised, but also they continue to negotiate the border as if it was not there to 
divide them, but rather to serve as a new domain for them to relate to and exploit. 
They treat the boundary as merely administrative;
230
 they exhibit a certain degree of 
freedom of movement across and around it that they are able to maintain group 
affinity, and conduct intra-group relations as they had always done. Hence, the 
conflict of identity, witnessed at the US – Mexico border regions is absent here. In 
other words, the boundary, colonial rule and independence have not been able to alter 
the Yoruba identity of these subgroups. 
Expectedly, the dissonance between the perception of the groups and that of 
the state has led to tensions at the border. While the subgroups treat the border as 
merely administrative (an at times, as an irritant), the state regards it as the juridical 
extent of the state as well as the point of the expression of state power and control. 
Many of the cross-border activities of the subgroups are at variance with the 
                                               
230 The borderland Yoruba treatment of the boundary actually reflects a conflict of perception. 
Sometimes, they treat it as though it is not real, while at other times, they exploit its reality to their 
advantage. 
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expectation of the state. Along the border under consideration, smuggling, human 
trafficking, and cross-border banditry are the major abuses of the borderline. These 
have prompted Nigeria (the more aggrieved of the two states), to adopt some strong 
border policies, some of which breach bilateral and multilateral agreements, in order 
to check these activities. However, as this study reveals, these measures, rather than 
stop these activities, have led to the sophistication of their perpetrators. This, the 
study discovers, is due to the dissonance of perception, which promote the abuse of 
the border, as well as the failure of the state to meet its responsibilities. 
Another major reaction of the borderland Yoruba to the colonial imposition of 
the boundary (in colonial times) is protest migration. The Yoruba in the French 
territory at different times, in reaction to oppressive and exploitative, migrated across 
the boundary into the British sphere. The study shows that this migration was 
facilitated by the present of kin-groups across the boundary, which made the 
adaption of the migrants relatively easy.  
Going by the apocalyptic expectations that the ex-colonial boundaries, if 
unaltered, would generate continent-wide upheavals in postcolonial Africa, African 
ought to be one massive cauldron. Though, the rate of conflict in Africa is 
unmatched in the world, very few of these conflicts are related to territorial disputes. 
Indeed, this study shows that, were the ex-colonial boundaries not adopted as the 
basis of postcolonial territoriality, Africa would have been embroiled in the type of 
continental upheaval anticipated by the protagonists of boundary revision. The 
diminution of the conflict potential of the African boundaries is credited to the OAU 
Resolution adopting the inherited boundaries as the basis for ordering postcolonial 
interstate relations in the continent.  
Finally, the study contributes to knowledge on the place of the African 
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boundary in the context of intensified globalisation. Globalisation has prompted the 
respatialisation and deterritorialisation of the state, with implications for state 
territorial sovereignty. Boundaries are being reconceived and redefined, as regional 
integration has thrown up transnational political organisations, where flows across 
previously controlled borders, have become unhindered. This pattern is growing 
across the globe, but most developed in the European Union. However, Africa is yet 
to be influenced by the reconceptualisation of territorial sovereignty, propelled by 
regional integration. The rein of the African state over territorial matters are 
undiminished. Flows across international boundaries are tightly controlled and 
regulated. As higlighted above, state weakness and the OAU Resolution on borders 
of 1964 are largely responsible for this resistance of the African state to sovereignty 
eroding regional integration initiatives.  
In spite of the resilience of the state against the globalising forces of 
integration and respatialisation, it has not be able to resist the influence of 
transnationalism. This is essentially due to the fact that transnationalism has always 
been a part of the African society, long before colonisation. As noted above, owing 
to the depth of ethnic affinity among the Yoruba, ethnic loyalty has always 
compelled intra-ethnic relations, whether or not the group is located within the 
territories of one state. 
Given this conclusion, what then are the prospects for the long term, for the 
border and for the Yoruba? We will consider the long term prospect for the border 
first. As the border is a characteristic of the state, its fortune is directly related to the 
health of the state. In other words, the state gives form and character to its border. As 
long as the African state remains weak, characterised by dysfunctional institutions, 
its borders will be less effectively controlled. Furthermore, as long as these states 
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resist integration initiatives and continue to implement competing economic and 
fiscal policies, the border will remain a tool of economic exploitation and 
appropriation. Therefore, borders will remain points of loss of state revenues; points 
of corruption and criminal activities; potential points of interstate conflict, etc.  
For the Yoruba people, I do not forsee any fundamental change in their pattern 
of intra-group relations across the border. The most significant exaplanation for this 
remains Phiri‟s (1984) argument that whatever the condition, fractions of the same 
ethnic group will always interact propelled by the pull of ethnic affinity and 
solidarity. This is especially true for the Yoruba subgroups whose strength of group 
affinity and solidarity had been very firmly established prior to colonialism and has 
been sustained through rival colonialism and rival postindependence territoriality. 
Again, as the forces which allows the Yoruba to continue to negotiate the boundary 
as if it is not there to separate them remain, I foresee no tno change in the current 
pattern of interaction. Indeed, were there to be any transformation, I see a deeper 
transborder relations developing owing to the recent development of transborder 
community associations among the Yoruba along this borderline. 
In conclusion, the border as presently managed, will be unable to foster a 
differentiation between the Nigerian Yoruba and the Beninese Yoruba for the 
foreseeable future. Rather, state weakness and the strength of the Yoruba group 
identity will make for the reinforcement of the Yoruba identity, thereby sustaining 
the present resilience of the group identity. 
8.4 Agenda Further Research 
A number of issues and challenges thrown up in the course of this study 
warrant examinations which are beyond the scope of the study. This study, being 
principally a study of the boundary between Nigeria and Benin around the specific 
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geographical region occupied by the Yoruba ethnic group astride the boundary, is 
limited in scope to this region, boundary line, people as well as the nation-states. 
Issues of perception and treatment of the boundary by the states on the one hand and 
the people on the other; identity and nationality and immigration; smuggling and 
security concerns; trans-border relations; trade and regionalism, and so on have been 
approached and studied within the scope of the present study as defined in the 
background. Consequently, the analysis contained in the study derives primarily 
from the subject of examination, limited to the particular geographical space. 
The research technique adopted for this study reflects the scope and subject of 
investigation. In the attempt to address the research question relating to the territorial 
extent of the Yoruba, the research methodology is necessarily characterised by a 
fluid, accidental observation of a diverse range of actors across a specific geographic 
range. However, bearing in mind the functionalist inclination of this study, a bottom-
up approach, which focuses on two Yoruba borderland settlements, may be more 
compelling. As Miles (1994: 17) argues, micro-level analysis „permits a more 
intimate and hence more powerful representation of reality of the border split‟. 
Furthermore, a more scientific approach, owing to the scope, would be more 
compelling and attractive.  
Apart from methodological considerations, the other lessons learnt and 
challenges faced by this study would demand a further analysis, which its remit does 
not presently allow. Given the findings of this study relating to issues of integration 
and the roles presently being played by the states and the people astride the boundary 
under consideration, several challenges are posed for further study. Principal issues 
for consideration in the expanded study would include: 
 Do all the boundaries (those that partitioned groups) in Africa exhibit similar 
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characteristics? Or are there peculiarities that have developed owing to 
specific factors? For instance, are there differences between the boundaries 
between former Francophone colonies on the one hand, and between 
Francophone and Anglophone (or Lusophone) neighbours on the other hand? 
This will provide the platform for comparison beyond the scope of the present 
study; 
 The policies of the different states towards the boundary on the one hand, and 
the actual implementations of these policies on the other. Do all the 
boundaries exhibit the type of dissonance between policies and practice 
prevalent in the subject of the present study? 
 The examination of the different groups partitioned by the boundaries; their 
relationship with the part included in the other country; and their perception of 
the boundary which partitions and separates them. How do we define the 
identity (nationality) of groups which are partitioned by international 
boundaries?  
 Territorial conflicts between neighbours: what are the factors responsible for 
these? Why has the OAU/AU recipe failed in these (isolated) cases? Kacowitz 
(1997) describes West Africa as a region of „negative international peace‟; 
does this really represent the reality in the regions? And could this also be true 
for the other regions in the continent? 
 Regional economic communities: what are their challenges and prospects for 
success? For instance, regionalism has been an active objective of the OAU 
since the 1960s; this effort has also been actively supported by the European 
Union since the Treaty of Rome in 1958 as well as the United Nations, yet the 
continent has failed to achieve this set objective. What are the factors 
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responsible and how can they be ameliorated? 
This agenda for further study is necessary in order to transform the findings of 
the present study from the realm of theory to policy recommendations.  It would also 
address the challenges thrown up by this present study. Furthermore, further 
research, of the kind being proposed would help in the process of validating the 
findings of this present study by applying it to other boundaries which partitioned 
groups into different countries in the continent
231
. For instance, would the findings 
across the Ghana and Togo boundary along the Ewe region be similar to those of the 
Yoruba presented here? It would therefore aid the formulation of policies and 
theories regarding borders, borderlands and borderland peoples in Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
231 As the scope of regional integration extends beyond bilateral relations (the scope of the present 
study), it is necessary to push the horizon of the study to include all the boundaries in the region, 
which partitioned groups in order to identify integration retarding forces. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Summary of Interview Questions 
General 
1. Are you Yoruba? 
2. Do you speak the language? 
3. Are you aware of the presence of the Yoruba across the boundary (Nigeria or  
Benin? 
4. If yes, are you aware of the historical and cultural linkage between your  
Yoruba group and those across the boundary? 
5. Do you have relatives across the boundary? 
6. If yes, what manner of interaction exists between you and them? 
7. If no, do you feel any kind of affinity with the group across the boundary? 
8. Are you involved in transborder activities? 
9. Do you regard the Yoruba, (in Nigeria and Benin) as one? 
10. Does your knowledge of, and relationship with the Yoruba on the other side  
of the boundary have any impact on your cross-border activities? 
11. How often do you cross the boundary? 
12. Do you cross at official crossing points? 
13. If no, why do you not? 
14. Do you present your international passport at border crossing points? 
15. If no, why? 
16. Who would you prefer to relate with: the other ethnic groups in your country  
or the Yoruba across the boundary? 
17. How do you consider the boundary? Is it good or is it an irritant? 
18. Would you rather see the boundary redrawn to include the Yoruba in one  
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country? 
19. Would you want to see freer movement of people, goods and services across  
the boundary? 
20. Do you wish to see greater integration in this region? 
Specific for traditional rulers 
1. Is yours a Yoruba domain? 
2. Has your domain always been located here or did your ancestors migrate  
from some place? If yes, from where and can you trace the history of your 
sphere of influence? 
3. What relationship exists between your people and the other Yoruba in this    
country? 
4. Are you aware of the existence of the Yoruba across the boundary? 
5. What manner of relationship exists between your group and the groups across  
the boundary? 
Specific for government officials 
1. What is the nature of cross-border movement? 
2. Do the people comply with border regulations? 
3. Is the boundary porous? How do you ensure compliance with regulations? 
4. Does the existence of the Yoruba astride the boundary influence illegal cross- 
border movement? 
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Appendix 2: Interview Transcript 1 
Border Security Official (Nigeria) 
Q. Which of the Border Security Agencies do you belong to? 
A. Immigrations Service 
Q. What is your position in this organisation? 
A. Assistant Inspector of Immigration 
Q. What are your duties? 
A. To generally check the movement of illegal immigrants into the country 
(Nigeria) 
Q. What is the nature of cross-border movement of people? 
A. There are two kinds of cross-border movement of people. The first is legal, 
where travellers comply with border regulations. The second type is illegal 
(backyard movement), where travellers attempt to circumvent border regulations. 
Q. What are the regulations that a traveller needs to satisfy in order to cross the 
border legally? 
A. The possession of valid passport and visa, or ECOWAS travel certificate (for 
ECOWAS nationals), up-to-date vaccination records, and genuine purpose for 
travel. For those travellers who are driving their personal cars, they need, in 
addition to the above, valid vehicle insurance, ECOWAS laissez passé, 
international driver licence, and a certificate of road worthiness. 
Q. Do travellers comply with border regulations?  
A. Most travellers do not comply with border regulations. They prefer to „cut 
corners‟, as many of them do not have the basic travel documents. 
Q. Would you consider the border as porous? How do you ensure compliance 
with border regulations? 
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A. About 70% of the border is porous. Border policing is not effective owing to 
the sheer size of the border and its porosity. The common border policing strategy 
is „stop and search‟. However, this method is not effective as it is difficult to 
distinguish nationals from non-nationals because people of the same culture lie 
astride the boundary. However, in view of the difficulties in patrolling the border, 
the Nigerian government has established a joint immigrations and customs border 
patrol.  
Q. The Yoruba lie astride the boundary, as you have just identified. Does this 
influence cross-border criminal activities? 
A. To a certain degree, yes. Indeed, illegal cross-border movement is facilitated 
by the Yoruba people of the border area as they lead travellers, especially 
smugglers, to secret pathways, in order to avoid the border guards. 
Q. There have been issues raised in Nigeria, in recent years, regarding the 
infiltration of Beninese Yoruba into Nigeria during elections and census, to vote 
and be enumerated as Nigerians. How does the Service seek to prevent this in the 
future? 
A. I don‟t think it is possible for Beninese to vote or be counted as Nigerians 
during elections and census, as the Nigerian borders are usually closed during 
these periods. 
Q. You mentioned earlier that the border is porous and difficult to police. Again, 
the Nigerian Population Commission and the Nigerian Boundaries Commission, 
in 2005, organised a joint national workshop, to draw attention to the influence of, 
and the need to control, foreigners participating in these exercises. This shows that 
this is a real problem. Does this mean that the Immigrations Service cannot check 
this infiltration because of the porosity of the border and the difficulty in 
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distinguishing between Nationals and non-nationals? 
A. I would suppose so.  
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Appendix 3: Interview Transcript 2 
Border Security Official (Benin) 
Q. Which of the Border Security Agencies do you belong to? 
A. The Nigeria – Benin Joint Border Patrol Team 
Q. What is your position in this organisation? 
A. I am a Gendarmerie 
Q. What are your duties? 
A. To generally check illegal activities across and around the border 
Q. How would you describe this border, seeing that you are a Yoruba in Benin? 
Do you consider yourself as different from the Yoruba across the border ion 
Nigeria? 
A. There is no difference between us. It is colonisation which parted us. Our 
people cross the border several times in a day, and the Nigerian people also cross 
it as frequently as they need. As long as the activity is legal and conducted by the 
local population, the border guards do not stop such movements. 
Q. The Joint Border Patrol Team; who finances its operations? 
A. Nigeria provides the larger proportion of men and materials for the Team. 
Indeed, this vehicle (points to a sport utility vehicle parked in the premises of the 
Gendarmerie) was donated by the Nigerian government.  
Q. What kind of relationship exists between the Nigerian and the Beninese 
contingents of the Joint Team? How does this affect the efficiency of the Team? 
A. There used to be a good working relationship at the beginning. However, over 
the last few months, the Nigerian arm of the joint patrol has been unilaterally 
embarking on patrols. They have even been crossing the border into Benin 
territories to harass and arrest Beninese nationals without courtesy to the Beninese 
300 
 
authorities. The other week, they „invaded‟ our territories, shooting sporadically, 
harassing and arresting our nationals, without the knowledge of our authorities. 
This can be regarded as an act of war, but due to Nigeria‟s might, it got away with 
it. The display of arrogance and power by the Nigerians has led to distrust and 
disillusionment on the part of the Beninese contingent of the Team.  
Q. Can you please describe the nature of illegal activities that you usually 
encounter? 
 A. Most crimes usually emanate from Nigeria...  
The interview ended abruptly when a superior officer called the interviewee 
(speaking in the French Language).  
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Appendix 4: Interview Transcript 3 
Border Official (Nigeria) 
Q. Which of the Border Security Agencies do you belong to? 
A. The Nigerian Customs Service 
Q. What is your position in this organisation? 
A. I am a Deputy Superintendent of Customs 
Q. What are your duties? 
A. To prevent the illegal importation of goods, as well as the importation of 
prohibited goods into Nigeria 
Q. What is the nature of cross-border movement of people? 
A. Travellers could either make legal or illegal movement across the boundary. 
Legal movement would entail the possession of laissez passé and other travel 
documentations. For illegal crossings, this is usually facilitated by tribal linkages 
Q. Do travellers comply with border regulations?  
A. Travellers hardly comply with border regulations. They consider the territory 
across the boundary from their location as an extension of their land. This actually 
have historical basis, but since states now use boundaries to demarcate the extent 
of their authority, tribal conception should be changed accordingly. 
Q. Would you consider the border as porous? How do you ensure compliance 
with border regulations? 
A. The border is extremely porous and cannot be effectively patrolled at present. 
Due to the porosity of the border, the Customs Service is empowered by the 
Customs and Excise Code to „burst‟ warehouses inside Nigeria, which store 
contraband. This is in addition to the regular „stop and search‟ at the border, and 
along the route between the border and the major destinations of smuggles goods 
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in Nigeria.  
Q. Does the presence of the Yoruba stride this boundary influence cross-border 
criminal activities? 
A. Yes, it does. That is the way they survive. The youths in this area live on 
smuggling. It is difficult to apprehend criminals in the borderland, as the 
indigenous people often frustrate such an exercise. They provide smugglers with a 
safe-haven, direct them to other routes, which are unknown to the border guards. 
In addition, they speak the same language as the people across the boundary, they 
inter-marry, and have strong affinities with the Beninese Yoruba. This makes it 
difficult to get them to cooperate with law enforcement agencies, especially when 
the Yoruba across the border are the target. 
Q. Is it possible, as it is being claimed in some quarters, that the Beninese Yoruba 
vote in Nigerian elections, and are counted in Nigerian censuses? 
A. I really cannot tell. All I know is that the Nigerian borders are closed during 
these exercises and movements across them are temporarily stopped. 
Q. Smuggling has remained a major problem along the Nigeria – Benin boundary. 
Why is this so? 
A. Government policies, apart from the factors identified above, have also 
contributed to the problem.  For example, as a result of the fall in petroleum price 
in the international market, as well as the activities of militants in the Delta, the 
Nigerian government lost approximately $30m monthly. To generate revenue 
from other sources, the government, through the GRIMALDI Bonded Terminal 
recently increased the tariff on imported used cars (1.6 – 2.0 litre engine) from 
about $660 to $1,700. However, as the tariff in Benin is a fraction of what obtains 
in Nigeria, as well as the special rebate offered to Nigerian importers at the 
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Cotonou port, the bulk of Nigeria‟s imports are diverted, and rerouted from Benin 
(mostly smuggled) into Nigeria to avoid paying the exorbitant rates. This has led 
to an increase in smuggling in recent months.  
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Appendix 5: Interview Transcript 4 
People on the street (Ketu, Benin) 
Q. Are you Yoruba? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you speak the language? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. 35 years old 
Q. Are you aware of the Yoruba across the boundary in Nigeria? 
A. Yes.  
Q. Are you aware of the historical and cultural linkages between your group and 
the Yoruba across the boundary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have relatives among the Yoruba across the boundary? 
A. Yes 
Q. What manner of interaction exists between you and them? 
A. Exchange of visits in the service of lineage goals/interests and social welfare 
Q. Are you involved in cross-border activities? 
A. No, I am not. 
Q. Does this mean that you do not do business in Nigeria at all? 
A. Oh! Is that what you mean? Of course, I do business.  
Q. What sort of business do you do? 
A. Buying and selling. 
Q. Do you regard the Yoruba (in Nigeria and Benin) as one group? 
A. Yes. We are one and the same group. We speak the same language and have 
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the same culture. 
Q. Does your knowledge of, and relationship with the Yoruba across the boundary 
have any impact on your cross-border activities? 
A. Yes. It facilitates the conduct of my business as I travel among people of my 
culture and language 
Q. How often do you cross the border? 
A. As often as needed 
Q. Do you cross at official crossing points? 
A. Yes and no. 
Q. Why not? 
A. At times, the border guards may want to extort money from travellers, 
especially traders. So, I may choose not to cross where they can harass me. When 
Nigeria closes it s border, it becomes impossible to cross at official points, so, we 
turn to the secret routes. 
Q. Do you present your international passport at border crossing? 
A. I don‟t have one. 
Q. Who would you prefer to relate with: the other ethnic groups in your country or 
the Yoruba across the boundary? 
A. We are all one people. I have no preference. 
Q. Does that mean that should I, a fellow Yorubaman, though from Nigeria, be 
engaged in a quarrel with an Egun here in Ketu, you would leave me defenceless? 
A. Em...if that is the case, I would intervene to resolve the quarrel. 
Q. Alright, suppose it is your relative in Nigeria who is being molested by an 
Egun here in Ketu. What would you do? 
A. I will join in to defend my relative. 
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Q. How would you consider the boundary? Is it good or an irritant? 
A. It is good. 
Q. Would you rather see the boundary redrawn to include all the Yoruba in one 
country? 
A. No.  
Q. Why not? 
A. We are already used to the boundary as it is. Besides which way would the 
boundary be moved? As long as the states do not consider the boundary an issue, 
so be it.  
Q. Do you wish to see freer movement of people, goods and services across the 
boundary? 
A. Yes. It would encourage more business. 
Q. Do you wish to see greater integration in this region? 
A. Yes. Greater integration would be beneficial to everyone concerned. 
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Appendix 6: Interview Transcript 5 
People on the Street (Ijofin, Nigeria) 
Q. Are you Yoruba? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you speak the language? 
A. Yes 
Q. How old are you? 
A. 46 years old. 
Q. Are you aware of the Yoruba across the boundary? 
A. Yes 
Q. If yes, are you aware of the historical and cultural linkages between your 
Yoruba group and that across the boundary? 
Q. Do you have relatives across the boundary? 
A. Yes 
Q. If yes, what manner of interaction exists between you and them? 
A. Very close relationship. We jointly participate in festivals and other activities. 
Q. Are you involved in cross-border activities? 
A. No. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. I am a teacher 
Q. Do you regard the Yoruba (in Nigeria and Benin) as one? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does your knowledge of, and relationship with the Yoruba across the boundary 
have any impact on your cross-border activities? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. How often do you cross the boundary? 
A. Once in a while. 
Q. Do you cross at official border crossings? 
A. No. 
Q. If not, why do you not? 
A. Because I do not have a passport 
Q. Who would you prefer to relate with: the other ethnic groups in your country, 
or the Yoruba across the boundary? 
A. Other nationals, as this would foster greater national unity. 
Q. How do you consider the boundary? Is it good or an irritant? 
A. It is good. 
Q. Would you rather see the boundary redrawn to include all the Yoruba in one 
country? 
A. No. The boundary is good as it is. 
Q. Would you rather see freer movement of people, goods and services across the 
boundary? 
A. No, for security reasons. Freer movement could further deepen the present 
security problems at the borderland. 
Q. Do you wish to see greater integration in this region? 
A. Yes. 
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Appendix 7: Interview Transcript 6 
Traditional Ruler (Ketu) 
Q. Is your domain a Yoruba kingdom? 
A. Yes. It is not only a Yoruba kingdom, Ketu is one of the core Yoruba 
kingdoms having been founded by one of the sons of Oduduwa a very long time 
ago. 
Q. Has your domain always been located at this present site, or did your ancestors 
migrate from another location? If yes, from where and can you trace the history of 
that migration? 
A. Our forefathers migrated from Ile-Ife. Sibling rivalry led to migration from Ile-
Ife. Oduduwa, the founder of the Yoruba race, had seven sons; to forestall conflict 
after his death, he counselled his children to migrate, establish towns and become 
kings over these new settlements. It was one of the earliest waves of migration 
which led to the foundation of Ketu in its present location. About 120 families of 
sundry vocations banded together with the Alaketu when he led the migration 
from Ile-Ife in response to Oduduwa‟s advice about 1000 years ago. Alaketu‟s 
journey to the present location was guided by the Ifa divination. Ketu grew from a 
small settlement to the apogee of its influence in the early 19
th
 century before it 
was sacked by the warring Dahomey kingdom. However, as Ketu literally means 
destroyed, Ketu was reoccupied after every Dahomey attack. The first Dahomey 
attack occurred on August 1, 1846. The second attack was in 1848, while the final 
attack, which led to the transportation of the bulk of the population of Ketu to 
Dahomey as captives was in 1886. 
Q. What relationship exists between your people and the other Yoruba across the 
boundary? 
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A. We are one people. It was whitemen who divided the land, but the people 
cannot be divided. We are deeply integrated with our people in Nigeria. During 
the famine of 1949, we, as a family, had to relocate to the Nigerian side and lived 
with family for a period of time. During this time, our family planted farms and 
we attended school there.  
Q. Why did the whiteman‟s boundary divide your domain and what was the 
reaction to its location? 
A. At the time of the pacification of the territotories around Ketu, Ketu was just 
emerging from the last adventure of the Dahomeans. The Alaketu at this time, 
(Odemufekun) had gone blind, and according to Ketu customs, a blind Alaketu 
cannot rule. Hence, his wife (queen), who had a very strong personality, was the 
effective rule. At this time, British influence had been established at Imeko and 
the popular opinion favoured a British protectorate over the whole extent of Ketu 
kingdom. However, without regards to the traditional council, the queen ceded 
Ketu to the French, in appreciation for the deliverance from Dahomey. This 
decision was not popular in Ketu, especially because the Alaketu had called the 
council to make the decision regarding European protection, whose power had 
been usurped by the queen. 
Q. Did you make the coronation pilgrimage to villages and towns in Nigeria as 
demanded by tradition?  
A. Without that pilgrimage, I cannot sit on the throne of my forefathers. I indeed 
visited these places, which were locations that our forebearers settled in on their 
way to found Ketu. The pilgrimage began from Imeko to Idofa to Ilikimu (the 
Alaketu‟s out of town abode), to Irokoyin, to Idofin and finally to Ketu. The 
pilgrimage began on the 20
th
 of December 2002 and ended with the royal 
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proclamation at Ketu on the 27
th
 of December 2002. 
A. Thank you, Kabiyesi. Having established the linkage between the Ketu of 
Benin and the Yoruba across the boundary in Nigeria is there any such linkage 
amongst the Alaketu and the Nigerian Yoruba obas, on the one hand, and between 
the Alaketu and other Yoruba obas in Benin? 
A. Yes. My predecessor made several visits to prominent Yoruba obas (the 
Alaafin and the Ooni), who also returned the visits. I am making plans to visit the 
Ooni and the Alaafin soon. We are in close relationship. Here in Benin, the 
Yoruba obas have an association which brings us all together for our welfare and 
the promotion of the Yoruba culture. 
My relationship with the Yoruba in Nigeria is far more complex than would be 
expected. Ketu territory in Nigeria is very expansive. The appointment of every 
oba in Ketuland must be approved by the Alaketu. Again, I am highly revered by 
the Ogun State government in Nigeria, which invites me to state functions and 
accord me the same privilege as other Nigerian Yoruba obas. Ketu is a proper 
Yoruba town. We listen to the Ogun State Televison and radio stations from 
Nigeria. Indeed, we prefer these channels because the language of transmission is 
Yoruba, while the Beninese radio and television broadcast in French. 
Q. Finally, Kabiyesi, would you wish that the boundary be redrawn to include the 
Yoruba in the same country? 
A. No. That cannot be done because the people are used to the boundary as it is. It 
might also create problems with new national identity and new ideas. 
Thank you Kabiyesi, may your reign be long and prosperous. 
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Appendix 8: Interview Transcript 7 
Borderland Academic (Imeko) 
Q. What is your academic title and area of specialisation? 
A. I am a retired professor of History. My area of specialisation is border and 
borderland studies. Though formally retired, I am still actively engaged in 
academic research and consultancy. We recently founded the African Regional 
Institute here in Imeko. 
Q. Are you Yoruba? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Are you aware of the Yoruba astride the Nigeria – Benin boundary? 
A. I have researched this borderland since my doctoral programme in the 1960s. I 
am not only aware of the Yoruba astride the boundary, I have relatives on both 
sides. We exchange visits as demanded by the necessity of group and family 
relations. We remain in constant interactions. 
Relating to ethnic affinity and relations, there is a resurgence of some sort. In 
2001, the educated elite in the borderland area established a cross-border 
development association called Ketu International Region Development Union. It 
is a community development association which initially met regularly. Bank 
accounts were to be opened in Nigeria and Benin; only the Nigerian account had 
been opened as at 2008. This was a very rigorous initiative. Asiwaju was the 
foundation president, while Kolawole Idji was the vice. The Union pulled together 
the most educated elite on both sides. It embarked on development projects across 
the area. It represented the first time in Africa, the establishment of an association 
of borderland community; a private initiative aimed at community development. 
In Ogun State (Nigeria), there is also a Ketu development association, which is a 
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community development initiative of the Ketu groups in Nigeria. 
The coronation rites of the Alaketu include a pilgrimage to locations around and 
across the border. Indeed at the coronation ceremony of the present Alaketu in 
2005, the Ogun State governor was the guest of honour. Hios presence was 
unprecedented, and was to mark the beginning of a cordial relationship between 
the government of Ogun State and the Alaketu. The Alaketu reciprocated the 
governor‟s gesture by visiting Abeokuta in 2006 where he was accorded a state 
reception in the presence of some important Yoruba obas. The Alaketu is also 
regularly invited to the meetings of the obas in Oyo State, Nigeria 
In studying this border, the socialisation processes cannot be ignored as they are 
very critical to trans-border relations.  This boundary sits on the base of a 
common culture; it is expected to be influenced by this culture, and vice versa 
Q. Are you involved in trans-border activities? 
A. Yes, scholarly/family related 
Q. How often do you cross the border? 
A. As required. The most significant element of cross-border movement is 
commerce. The people have become so involved with arbitrage that they would 
do anything to sustain it. 
Q. Do you cross the border at official crossing points? 
A. Yes. It must be noted though, that border crossing is not big issue to the 
borderland people. They must cross the border in the service of lineage goals and 
interests. Even when the crossing the border was a hazard, for example in the 
1984-86 period when the border was militarised and closed, cross-border visits 
continued unabated. The border cannot be completely sealed owing to the vast 
informal network of communication around this region. 
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Q. Do you present your international passport at these points? If not, why? 
A. No. I do not need to as I am well known to the border guards due to my 
scholarly activities around this area 
Q. Who would you prefer to relate with: the other ethnic groups in your country or 
the Yoruba across the boundary? 
A. Inter ethnic relation is necessary for promoting national cohesion. For me, I 
owe Nigeria a lot and would want to see Nigeria as a more united and stable 
country. I am a holder of the Officer of the Niger, a retired University Professor 
and one time, National Boundary Commissioner. While being a Yoruba, I am also 
a Nigerian, who must work for its unity and stability. 
Q. How do you consider the boundary? Is it good or is it an irritant 
A. The boundary is simply the juridical extent of the state. 
Q. Would you rather see the boundary redrawn to include the Yoruba in one 
country? 
A. No. 
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